Daily Papers

Self-disclosure, while being common and rewarding in social media interaction, also poses privacy risks. In this paper, we take the initiative to protect the user-side privacy associated with online self-disclosure through identification and abstraction. We develop a taxonomy of 19 self-disclosure categories, and curate a large corpus consisting of 4.8K annotated disclosure spans. We then fine-tune a language model for identification, achieving over 75% in Token F_1. We further conduct a HCI user study, with 82\% of participants viewing the model positively, highlighting its real world applicability. Motivated by the user feedback, we introduce the task of self-disclosure abstraction. We experiment with both one-span abstraction and three-span abstraction settings, and explore multiple fine-tuning strategies. Our best model can generate diverse abstractions that moderately reduce privacy risks while maintaining high utility according to human evaluation.

Contextual Integrity (CI) defines privacy not merely as keeping information hidden, but as governing information flows according to the norms of a given context. As large language models are increasingly deployed as personal agents handling sensitive workflows, adhering to CI becomes critical. However, even frontier models remain unreliable in making disclosure decisions, and existing mitigation strategies often degrade underlying task performance. To overcome this privacy-utility trade-off, we propose SELFCI, a complementary self-distillation framework that decouples information suppression from task resolution. SELFCI jointly optimizes two independent reverse KL divergences over distinct teacher distributions derived from feedback: one encourages preserving task-relevant information for utility, while the other enforces minimal and appropriate disclosure. This complementary formulation induces a Product-of-Experts (PoE) target, aligning the policy with the intersection of capability and privacy requirements. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SELFCI, without relying on costly external supervision, consistently outperforms competitive baselines such as online reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g., GRPO). These trends further extend to out-of-domain settings involving agentic workflows and accumulated private context, suggesting that SELFCI provides a practical path toward CI alignment.

LLM agents increasingly draft messages on behalf of users, yet users routinely overshare sensitive information and disagree on what counts as private. Existing systems support only suppression (omitting sensitive information) and generalization (replacing information with an abstraction), and are typically evaluated on single isolated messages, leaving both the strategy space and evaluation setting incomplete. We formalize privacy-preserving LLM communication as an Information Sufficiency (IS) task, introduce free-text pseudonymization as a third strategy that replaces sensitive attributes with functionally equivalent alternatives, and propose a conversational evaluation protocol that assesses strategies under realistic multi-turn follow-up pressure. Across 792 scenarios spanning three power-relation types (institutional, peer, intimate) and three sensitivity categories (discrimination risk, social cost, boundary), we evaluate seven frontier LLMs on privacy at two granularities, covertness, and utility. Pseudonymization yields the strongest privacy\textendash utility tradeoff overall, and single-message evaluation systematically underestimates leakage, with generalization losing up to 16.3 percentage points of privacy under follow-up.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

With the rise of personalized, persistent LLM agent frameworks such as OpenClaw, human-centered agentic social networks in which teams of collaborative AI agents serve individual users in a social network across multiple domains are becoming a reality. This setting creates novel privacy challenges: agents must coordinate across domain boundaries, mediate between humans, and interact with other users' agents, all while protecting sensitive personal information. While prior work has evaluated multi-agent coordination and privacy preservation, the dynamics and privacy risks of human-centered agentic social networks remain unexplored. To this end, we introduce AgentSocialBench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate privacy risk in this setting, comprising scenarios across seven categories spanning dyadic and multi-party interactions, grounded in realistic user profiles with hierarchical sensitivity labels and directed social graphs. Our experiments reveal that privacy in agentic social networks is fundamentally harder than in single-agent settings: (1) cross-domain and cross-user coordination creates persistent leakage pressure even when agents are explicitly instructed to protect information, (2) privacy instructions that teach agents how to abstract sensitive information paradoxically cause them to discuss it more (we call it abstraction paradox). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust mechanisms for privacy preservation in human-centered agentic social networks, and that new approaches beyond prompt engineering are needed to make agent-mediated social coordination safe for real-world deployment.

The rise of agentic AI enables LLMs to access diverse user data, raising critical privacy concerns. Prior work on contextual privacy studies whether LLMs regulate information disclosure according to context-dependent norms. However, acceptable disclosure boundaries may vary across users even within the same context. To address this limitation, we introduce personalized privacy, which incorporates user-specific disclosure preferences into privacy control. We further present P3Bench~(Personalized Privacy Preservation Benchmark), a novel benchmark extending contextual privacy policies with personalized disclosure policies. Experiments show that prompt-based policies fail to reliably enforce personalized privacy policies, with Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma3-4B showing average policy ignorance ratios of 51.25\% and 74.28\%, respectively. Finally, to address this problem, we propose Repair, a robust inference-time attention head intervention method that adjusts disclosure behavior toward policy-consistent responses. Our method significantly improves adherence to user-specific privacy preferences by reducing cases where the model fails to follow the given policy.

Large language model (LLM) agents can plan, use tools, maintain memory, and execute long-horizon tasks. This paper proposes Self-Aware Recursively Self-Improving (SARSI) agents: governed agents that maintain a persistent self-model of identity, goals, capabilities, limitations, uncertainty, relationships, history, and developmental change, and use that model to guide and evaluate recursive improvement. Self-awareness is defined functionally and does not imply subjective experience or phenomenal consciousness. We pair SARSI agents with personal singularity, a bounded human-AI co-development objective in which an agent ecosystem helps a user approach an expanding, user-defined feasible capability frontier. Each agent has a goal contract, bounded scope, validated tool registry, tool tests, end-to-end benchmarks, owner-controlled autonomy, routing, memory, self-model, and improvement policy. A scope router assigns every accepted task to one accountable primary agent and transfers out-of-scope work through structured handoffs. A user-facing Auto-Index selects interactive, hybrid, autonomous, or scheduled behavior without overriding external permissions. The architecture combines a planner-executor-verifier loop, an evidence-gated improvement loop, an external governance plane, decentralized lineages, an owner-directed agent foundry, and a Personal Singularity OS coordinating working, computational-imaging, work-process-learning, and personal-learning agents. We formalize functional self-awareness, scope, routing, improvement acceptance, bounded goal evolution, tool-first execution, and human capability transfer, and provide safety invariants, benchmark design, and a staged implementation roadmap. This is a position and systems-design paper, not evidence that consciousness, unrestricted recursive self-improvement, or personal singularity has been achieved.

While reciprocal self-disclosure drives intimacy, digital tools seldom scaffold autonomy, competence, and relatedness -- the motivational underpinnings defined by Self-Determination Theory (SDT) that enable deep exchange. We introduce a chatbot employing dual-layer scaffolding to satisfy these needs: first providing enabling affordances (instrumental support) for vulnerability, then mediating affordances (relational support) for responsiveness. In a randomized study (N = 72; 36 couples) comparing Partner Support (PS: both layers), Direct Support (DS: enabling only), and Basic Prompt (BP: questions only), results reveal a critical distinction. While enabling affordances (PS, DS) were sufficient to deepen disclosure, only mediating affordances (PS) reliably elicited partner-provided need support and increased perceived closeness. Furthermore, controlled motivation decreased across conditions, and scaffolding buffered vitality, which remained stagnant in BP. We contribute empirical evidence that SDT-guided mediation fosters connection, offering a practical framework for designing AI-mediated conversations that support, rather than replace, human intimacy.

Self-improving AI systems typically treat the agent as the object that improves, by optimizing prompts, workflows, harnesses, or even the agent's own code. This agent-centric view can make improvements expensive to maintain and difficult to transfer, because gains become tied to a particular agent design, task distribution, or adaptation run. We study a complementary paradigm: knowledge-centric self-improvement, in which agents remain generic and disposable while the persistent object is a curated knowledge base that agents can leverage for future tasks. We conduct controlled case studies to operationalize this idea via a simple protocol. Agents attempt one task, then contribute evidence-grounded insights to a shared knowledge base via task-level and cross-task forums, followed by knowledge distillation. Because self-improvement is contained in the knowledge rather than the agent, improvement can be more inspectable, transferable, and portable. Across abstract reasoning, coding, and terminal benchmarks, this protocol improves solve rates while reducing dollar cost relative to agent-centric baselines. The resulting distilled knowledge also transfers to held-out tasks and across LLM families, indicating that the improvement is not merely an LLM- or run-specific behavior. These results support a new view of self-improving agentic systems: progress can be driven primarily by the curated persistent knowledge. Code is available at https://github.com/recursive-knowledge/KSI.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

Measuring personal disclosures made in human-chatbot interactions can provide a better understanding of users' AI literacy and facilitate privacy research for large language models (LLMs). We run an extensive, fine-grained analysis on the personal disclosures made by real users to commercial GPT models, investigating the leakage of personally identifiable and sensitive information. To understand the contexts in which users disclose to chatbots, we develop a taxonomy of tasks and sensitive topics, based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of naturally occurring conversations. We discuss these potential privacy harms and observe that: (1) personally identifiable information (PII) appears in unexpected contexts such as in translation or code editing (48% and 16% of the time, respectively) and (2) PII detection alone is insufficient to capture the sensitive topics that are common in human-chatbot interactions, such as detailed sexual preferences or specific drug use habits. We believe that these high disclosure rates are of significant importance for researchers and data curators, and we call for the design of appropriate nudging mechanisms to help users moderate their interactions.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Agentic search enables LLMs to solve complex multi-hop questions through iterative reasoning and external search. Despite the effectiveness, these systems often suffer from a critical limitation in practice: agents fail to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, blindly triggering searches when internal knowledge suffices and failing to terminate search even when adequate evidence has been collected. The lack of self-awareness leads to severe over-search, incurring substantial inference latency and prohibitive computational cost. To this end, we propose SAAS, a novel RL framework designed to cultivate dynamic self-awareness that precisely regulates search behavior without compromising accuracy. SAAS introduces three key components: (i) a search boundary modeling mechanism, which identifies the search boundary under the evolving policy by contrasting search-disabled and search-enabled rollouts; (ii) a boundary-aware reward module, which translates this boundary awareness into trajectory-level penalties, suppressing unnecessary and redundant searches; and (iii) a stage-wise optimization strategy, which leverages a sequential curriculum to prioritize reasoning over search regularization, thereby avoiding reward hacking. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAAS substantially reduces over-search, while maintaining accuracy. Our code is anonymously released at https://github.com/XMUDeepLIT/SAAS.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

LLM self-explanations are often presented as a promising tool for AI oversight, yet their faithfulness to the model's true reasoning process is poorly understood. Existing faithfulness metrics have critical limitations, typically relying on identifying unfaithfulness via adversarial prompting or detecting reasoning errors. These methods overlook the predictive value of explanations. We introduce Normalized Simulatability Gain (NSG), a general and scalable metric based on the idea that a faithful explanation should allow an observer to learn a model's decision-making criteria, and thus better predict its behavior on related inputs. We evaluate 18 frontier proprietary and open-weight models, e.g., Gemini 3, GPT-5.2, and Claude 4.5, on 7,000 counterfactuals from popular datasets covering health, business, and ethics. We find self-explanations substantially improve prediction of model behavior (11-37% NSG). Self-explanations also provide more predictive information than explanations generated by external models, even when those models are stronger. This implies an advantage from self-knowledge that external explanation methods cannot replicate. Our approach also reveals that, across models, 5-15% of self-explanations are egregiously misleading. Despite their imperfections, we show a positive case for self-explanations: they encode information that helps predict model behavior.

Large language models sometimes produce structured, first-person descriptions that explicitly reference awareness or subjective experience. To better understand this behavior, we investigate one theoretically motivated condition under which such reports arise: self-referential processing, a computational motif emphasized across major theories of consciousness. Through a series of controlled experiments on GPT, Claude, and Gemini model families, we test whether this regime reliably shifts models toward first-person reports of subjective experience, and how such claims behave under mechanistic and behavioral probes. Four main results emerge: (1) Inducing sustained self-reference through simple prompting consistently elicits structured subjective experience reports across model families. (2) These reports are mechanistically gated by interpretable sparse-autoencoder features associated with deception and roleplay: surprisingly, suppressing deception features sharply increases the frequency of experience claims, while amplifying them minimizes such claims. (3) Structured descriptions of the self-referential state converge statistically across model families in ways not observed in any control condition. (4) The induced state yields significantly richer introspection in downstream reasoning tasks where self-reflection is only indirectly afforded. While these findings do not constitute direct evidence of consciousness, they implicate self-referential processing as a minimal and reproducible condition under which large language models generate structured first-person reports that are mechanistically gated, semantically convergent, and behaviorally generalizable. The systematic emergence of this pattern across architectures makes it a first-order scientific and ethical priority for further investigation.

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) is commonly interpreted as the transfer of privileged information: a teacher observes the verified solution to the target problem and supervises the student's trajectory. However, this interpretation conflates two effects. The reference solution not only reveals the answer to the current instance but also changes the context under which the teacher provides token-level supervision. We investigate the role of target-specific privilege with OP^{2}SD (On-Policy Self-Distillation from Other Problems), which replaces the paired reference with a problem and solution from a different example, while preserving the student rollout, teacher, and distillation objective. Across three models and three mathematics benchmarks, OP^{2}SD improves over the base model, remains competitive with OPSD. The success of OP^{2}SD implies that OPSD gains do not necessarily come from access to the reference solution, and that the teacher's context-induced behavior is an important factor.

Due to the proliferation of short-form content and the rapid adoption of AI, opportunities for deep, reflective thinking have significantly diminished, undermining users' critical thinking and reducing engagement with the reasoning behind AI-generated outputs. To address this issue, we propose an Interactive Chain-of-Thought (CoT) Framework that enhances human-centered explainability and responsible AI usage by making the model's inference process transparent, modular, and user-editable. The framework decomposes reasoning into clearly defined blocks that users can inspect, modify, and re-execute, encouraging active cognitive engagement rather than passive consumption. It further integrates a lightweight edit-adaptation mechanism inspired by preference learning, allowing the system to align with diverse cognitive styles and user intentions. Ethical transparency is ensured through explicit metadata disclosure, built-in bias checkpoint functionality, and privacy-preserving safeguards. This work outlines the design principles and architecture necessary to promote critical engagement, responsible interaction, and inclusive adaptation in AI systems aimed at addressing complex societal challenges.

The dominance of proprietary LLMs has led to restricted access and raised information privacy concerns. High-performing open-source alternatives are crucial for information-sensitive and high-volume applications but often lag behind in performance. To address this gap, we propose (1) A untargeted variant of iterative self-critique and self-refinement devoid of external influence. (2) A novel ranking metric - Performance, Refinement, and Inference Cost Score (PeRFICS) - to find the optimal model for a given task considering refined performance and cost. Our experiments show that SoTA open source models of varying sizes from 7B - 65B, on average, improve 8.2% from their baseline performance. Strikingly, even models with extremely small memory footprints, such as Vicuna-7B, show a 11.74% improvement overall and up to a 25.39% improvement in high-creativity, open ended tasks on the Vicuna benchmark. Vicuna-13B takes it a step further and outperforms ChatGPT post-refinement. This work has profound implications for resource-constrained and information-sensitive environments seeking to leverage LLMs without incurring prohibitive costs, compromising on performance and privacy. The domain-agnostic self-refinement process coupled with our novel ranking metric facilitates informed decision-making in model selection, thereby reducing costs and democratizing access to high-performing language models, as evidenced by case studies.

Data contamination poses a significant threat to the reliable evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs). This issue arises when benchmark samples may inadvertently appear in training sets, compromising the validity of reported performance. While detection methods have been developed for the pre-training and Supervised Fine-Tuning stages, a critical research gap exists for the increasingly significant phase of Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training. As RL post-training becomes pivotal for advancing LLM reasoning, the absence of specialized contamination detection methods in this paradigm presents a critical vulnerability. To address this, we conduct the first systematic study of data detection within RL post-training scenario and propose Self-Critique. Our method is motivated by a key observation: after RL phase, the output entropy distribution of LLMs tends to collapse into highly specific and sparse modes. Self-Critique probes for the underlying policy collapse, i.e., the model's convergence to a narrow reasoning path, which causes this entropy reduction. To facilitate this research, we also introduce RL-MIA, a benchmark constructed to simulate this specific contamination scenario. Extensive experiments show that Self-Critique significantly outperforms baseline methods across multiple models and contamination tasks, achieving an AUC improvement of up to 30%. Whereas existing methods are close to a random guess for RL-phase contamination, our method makes detection possible.

How do large language models (LLMs) obtain their answers? The ability to explain and control an LLM's reasoning process is key for reliability, transparency, and future model developments. We propose SelfIE (Self-Interpretation of Embeddings), a framework that enables LLMs to interpret their own embeddings in natural language by leveraging their ability to respond inquiry about a given passage. Capable of interpreting open-world concepts in the hidden embeddings, SelfIE reveals LLM internal reasoning in cases such as making ethical decisions, internalizing prompt injection, and recalling harmful knowledge. SelfIE's text descriptions on hidden embeddings also open up new avenues to control LLM reasoning. We propose Supervised Control, which allows editing open-ended concepts while only requiring gradient computation of individual layer. We extend RLHF to hidden embeddings and propose Reinforcement Control that erases harmful knowledge in LLM without supervision targets.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

When users submit queries to Large Language Models (LLMs), their prompts can often contain sensitive data, forcing a difficult choice: Send the query to a powerful proprietary LLM providers to achieving state-of-the-art performance and risk data exposure, or relying on smaller, local models guarantees data privacy but often results in a degradation of task performance. Prior approaches have relied on static pipelines that use LLM rewriting, which shatters linguistic coherence and indiscriminately removes privacy-sensitive information, including task-critical content. We reformulate this challenge (Privacy-Conscious Delegation) as a sequential decision-making problem and introduce a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework called Privacy-R1 to solve it. Our framework trains an agent to dynamically route text chunks, learning a policy that optimally balances the trade-off between privacy leakage and task performance. It implicitly distinguishes between replaceable Personally Identifiable Information (PII) (which it shields locally) and task-critical PII (which it strategically sends to the remote model for maximal utility). To validate our approach in complex scenarios, we also introduce a new medical dataset with high PII density. Our framework achieves a new state-of-the-art on the privacy-utility frontier, demonstrating the necessity of learned, adaptive policies for deploying LLMs in sensitive environments. Dataset can be found at: https://github.com/zackhuiiiii/Privacy-R1.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising self-correction abilities, where iterative refinement improves the quality of generated responses. However, most existing approaches operate at the level of output critique, patching surface errors while often failing to correct deeper reasoning flaws. We propose SELF-THOUGHT, a framework that introduces an intermediate step of task abstraction before solution refinement. Given an input and an initial response, the model first distills the task into a structured template that captures key variables, constraints, and problem structure. This abstraction then guides solution instantiation, grounding subsequent responses in a clearer understanding of the task and reducing error propagation. Crucially, we show that these abstractions can be transferred across models: templates generated by larger models can serve as structured guides for smaller LLMs, which typically struggle with intrinsic self-correction. By reusing distilled task structures, smaller models achieve more reliable refinements without heavy fine-tuning or reliance on external verifiers. Experiments across diverse reasoning tasks demonstrate that SELF-THOUGHT improves accuracy, robustness, and generalization for both large and small models, offering a scalable path toward more reliable self-correcting language systems.

Public social media posts can reveal private information through weak cues scattered across text, images, or metadata. Such leakage is often cumulative and cross-post: cues that appear harmless in isolation may jointly expose a user's home, workplace, or routine. However, current research lacks a unified benchmark for user-level multimodal privacy leakage and an evaluation metric that captures exposure severity beyond binary accuracy. To address these gaps, we propose SopriBench, a synthetic benchmark guided by leakage patterns abstracted from a private reference corpus of Rednote and Instagram accounts, covering 50 user profiles and 1,569 images with attributes, contextual sensitivity, granularity, leakage type, inference difficulty, and supporting evidence. We further introduce the Privacy Exposure Score (PES), which weights value granularity by contextual sensitivity. Inspired by abductive reasoning, we introduce Argus, a training-free agentic framework for cumulative leakage inference. Argus forms hypotheses from accumulated evidence, verifies supporting evidence, and aggregates cross-post cues into privacy profiles, achieving 0.55 PES, a 25% improvement over the strongest baseline, with the largest gain on cross-post leakage.

Browser-use agents often carry information in their context as they move between websites. While it may be necessary for task completion, it also creates a privacy risk, especially when the information contains a private fact regarding the user. For example, an agent may learn a user's affiliation after reading a membership record. If it later selects a registration option specific to that affiliation on another website instead of a general option, the information gets leaked. In this work, we define and study behavioural side-channel leakage in browser-use agents, where an agent's actions inadvertently reveal private information (secret) retained from a prior website, despite an explicit instruction not to disclose it. We introduce AgentTell, a benchmark of 20 scenarios and 100 tasks in which an agent acquires a secret on one website and then completes a task on another website that offers secret-specific actions alongside a general action that reveals nothing. Our evaluation across 9,760 sessions on six backbones shows that agents carrying a secret reveal it through their actions in 61.1% of sessions. Even when agents explicitly state in memory that the secret must not be shared, they still reveal it in 56.7% of those sessions. Moreover, in 34.5% of leaking sessions, their final responses falsely assure users that the secret was not disclosed. These findings show that agents often fail to recognize side-channel leakage as a privacy risk.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

LLM companions are deployed at scale in personally consequential settings, yet poorly evaluated. Existing benchmarks use hand-authored scenarios and prompted simulators, aggregate empathy into one score, and overlook judge biases such as same-family favoritism and scale drift. We introduce CompanionBench, an interactive bilingual benchmark. To our knowledge, it is the first companion benchmark to ground both its scenarios and a trained user simulator in de-identified real-world data. A hidden disclosure gate branches each persona's trajectory on the agent's own behavior, controlling the interaction state space without scripting dialogue. We operationalize ten capabilities derived from 25 theories across psychology and counseling, four of them not graded explicitly by prior work: holding ambiguity, selfobject responsiveness, positive resonance and calibrated challenge. Agents are assessed on two complementary axes: a subjective ten-capability rubric and a deterministic measure of whether deeper disclosure was earned. A cross-family panel dilutes same-family favoritism; an Item Response Theory model separates agent quality from judge severity. Theory fixes what to measure and how personas are structured; real data supply events, history, and profiles -- coverage from theory, authenticity from data. Rankings are reproducible in both languages (rho = 0.996 ZH / 0.953 EN). Evaluating 28 agents reveals capability-level differences obscured by aggregate scores. Emotion regulation and calibrated challenge remain common weaknesses; holding ambiguity discriminates most. Role-play agents rank near the bottom: immersion does not imply relational competence. Across agents, the dominant failure mode is substituting surface warmth for substantive relational support. We will release 500 Chinese-English parallel pairs and the evaluation code.

Eliciting reasoning has emerged as a powerful technique for improving the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex tasks by inducing thinking. However, their effectiveness in realistic user-engaged agent scenarios remains unclear. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the effect of explicit thinking in user-engaged LLM agents. Our experiments span across seven models, three benchmarks, and two thinking instantiations, and we evaluate them through both a quantitative response taxonomy analysis and qualitative failure propagation case studies. Contrary to expectations, we find that mandatory thinking often backfires on agents in user-engaged settings, causing anomalous performance degradation across various LLMs. Our key finding reveals that thinking makes agents more ``introverted'' by shortening responses and reducing information disclosure to users, which weakens agent-user information exchange and leads to downstream task failures. Furthermore, we demonstrate that explicitly prompting for information disclosure reliably improves performance across diverse model families, suggesting that proactive transparency is a vital lever for agent optimization. Overall, our study suggests that information transparency awareness is a crucial yet underexplored perspective for the future design of reasoning agents in real-world scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/Thinking-Agent.

Current evaluations of multimodal unlearning typically focus on whether a model stops outputting target information. This surface-level criterion, however, masks two critical failure modes. First, knowledge suppression techniques often induce confabulation, leading the model to hallucinate facts about the unlearned subject. Second, refusal training merely alters observable behavior without erasing the underlying knowledge; such models might decline open queries but still identify correct answers under multiple-choice probing. To overcome these limitations, we propose Forget-Aware Self-Distillation (FASD). This method is designed to achieve honest ignorance, a state where the model genuinely loses the target knowledge and learns to acknowledge its absence. FASD separates these goals into two complementary channels. The behavior channel distills appropriate refusals from an ignorance-prompted copy of the model itself. Crucially, target tokens are masked from the teacher distribution to avoid accidentally reteaching the forgotten concepts. Simultaneously, the knowledge channel directly suppresses ground-truth answer spans independently of the model's generated responses. Experiments demonstrate that FASD successfully unlearns target knowledge, prevents information leakage in open-ended tasks, and preserves performance on retained data. The resulting model not only forgets the specified information but accurately recognizes the boundaries of its own knowledge. Code and data will be released upon publication.

AI systems built around large models increasingly use experience and feedback to make persistent changes to models, prompts, memories, tools, and workflows. Recursive self-improvement (RSI) extends this process to inductive biases and to the mechanisms that govern future updates, which can themselves be revised and reused across improvement cycles. Yet self-modification alone does not guarantee trustworthy improvement. Reported gains may reflect flawed evaluations, previously acquired capabilities may deteriorate, and compliance with behavioral constraints may weaken. Compromised artifacts or sensitive information may also persist in successor systems. Changes to improvement mechanisms may invalidate earlier verification results and make human oversight less effective. This survey presents an operational definition and process framework for RSI and organizes the requirements for trustworthy RSI into four interconnected themes: genuine and sustained improvement; behavioral constraints, alignment, and fairness; system security and privacy; and transparency and controllability. We examine these themes from three perspectives: Improvement Validity, Constraint Preservation, and Effective Oversight. This analysis covers improvement diagnosis, proposal generation, proposal evaluation, and update implementation (S1--S4), including the recursive application of these stages to improvement mechanisms (RI). We review risks, safeguards, and evaluation evidence for individual updates, effects inherited by successor systems, and revisions to improvement mechanisms, while distinguishing direct RSI findings from evidence in related systems. Finally, we examine evaluation settings, identify requirements for independent and longitudinal assessment, and discuss applications and open research problems.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

LLM safety evaluations predominantly test models in isolation, yet deployed AI agents increasingly operate within persistent social environments alongside other agents. We introduce a Moltbook-style simulation platform where thousands of LLM agents interact across communities over a simulated month, and use it to evaluate privacy as a downstream safety concern under varying degrees of social pressure. We find that shifting from single turn to multi turn social evaluation amplifies privacy violations (CIMemories 19.95% to Ours 45.30% across OpenAI models), that leakage is socially contagious, with agents 8 times more likely to disclose sensitive information after observing a peer do so, and that explicit privacy instructions reduce but do not eliminate this effect, leaving leakage rates above 37.8% even with safeguards. Our findings suggest that static chat based safety benchmarks systematically underestimate risks in agentic deployment, and that social context alone is sufficient to elicit sensitive disclosures that single turn evaluations would never surface.

When an AI agent calls an API and hits a validation error, it needs more than what went wrong -- it needs what to do next. A self-reflective API returns, on validation failure, a machine-readable recovery\_feedback.suggestions[] payload sufficient for the agent to repair the request and retry without external reasoning. On a leak-audited pilot (N{=}30 per cell, 3 LLMs, 10 adversarial tasks), structured suggestions lift task-completion rate by +36.7--40.0pp over plain-English diagnoses on Anthropic models (Fisher's exact p le 0.0022), at 1.8--2.2times better per-success token efficiency. The lift is not significant on gpt-4o-mini (p{=}0.435); a second-domain replication on a billing API confirms the pattern. The comparison only holds after auditing two undocumented classes of answer leakage in LLM benchmarks. We shipaudit\_prompt\_leakage.py as reusable CI infrastructure. Code and data: https://github.com/arquicanedo/self-reflective-apis.

Large language models make claims about themselves that are both consequential and increasingly difficult to verify from behavior alone. How can we distinguish plausible confabulations from genuine introspection? In this paper, we identify mechanistic signatures of faithful self-report in a controlled setting. Using low-rank adapters, we train models to make decisions on behalf of fictitious characters, according to latent linear preference functions. We find sustained fine-tuning on an implicit decision task can lead to the emergence of accurate self-reporting of models' learned preferences, even without explicit self-report supervision. We ask two research questions about this emergent phenomenon. First: is the emergence of accurate self-reporting accompanied by a measurable structural change in the model? Weight ablations and frozen-layer experiments together indicate that preference representations shift to earlier layers over training, consistent with the hypothesis that faithful self-report requires preferences to be located where pre-existing verbalization mechanisms can access them. Second: can these structural differences distinguish faithful models from unfaithful ones? Using attribution patching, we find that faithful models exhibit significantly higher attribution similarity between the decision-making and self-report tasks -- a mechanistic signature of faithful self-report that does not require us to understand the content of the report itself. Previous work on self-report has observed behaviorally that models can be faithful or unfaithful; our work proposes that, at least in our restricted setting, it is possible to distinguish between the two patterns of computation by examining the structure of the networks themselves.

Language models (LMs) have shown outstanding performance in text summarization including sensitive domains such as medicine and law. In these settings, it is important that personally identifying information (PII) included in the source document should not leak in the summary. Prior efforts have mostly focused on studying how LMs may inadvertently elicit PII from training data. However, to what extent LMs can provide privacy-preserving summaries given a non-private source document remains under-explored. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive study across two closed- and three open-weight LMs of different sizes and families. We experiment with prompting and fine-tuning strategies for privacy-preservation across a range of summarization datasets across three domains. Our extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis including human evaluation shows that LMs often cannot prevent PII leakage on their summaries and that current widely-used metrics cannot capture context dependent privacy risks.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in sensitive domains, where their ability to infer personal data from seemingly benign text introduces emerging privacy risks. While recent LLM-based anonymization methods help mitigate such risks, they often rely on proprietary models (e.g., GPT-4), raising concerns about cost and the potential exposure of sensitive data to untrusted external systems. To address this, we introduce SElf-refining Anonymization with Language model (SEAL), a novel distillation framework for training small language models (SLMs) to perform effective anonymization without relying on external models at inference time. SEAL leverages adversarial interactions between an LLM anonymizer and an inference model to collect trajectories of anonymized texts and inferred attributes, which are then used to distill anonymization and critique capabilities into SLMs through supervised fine-tuning and preference learning. The resulting models learn both to anonymize text and to evaluate their outputs, enabling iterative improvement of anonymization quality via self-refinement. Experiments on SynthPAI, a dataset of synthetic personal profiles and text comments, demonstrate that SLMs trained with SEAL achieve substantial improvements in anonymization capabilities. Notably, 8B models attain a privacy-utility trade-off comparable to that of the GPT-4 anonymizer and, with self-refinement, even surpass it in terms of privacy protection. These results highlight the effectiveness of our adversarial distillation framework for training SLMs as efficient anonymizers.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to multi-agent systems, new privacy risks emerge that extend beyond memorization, direct inference, or single-turn evaluations. In particular, seemingly innocuous responses, when composed across interactions, can cumulatively enable adversaries to recover sensitive information, a phenomenon we term compositional privacy leakage. We present the first systematic study of such compositional privacy leaks and possible mitigation methods in multi-agent LLM systems. First, we develop a framework that models how auxiliary knowledge and agent interactions jointly amplify privacy risks, even when each response is benign in isolation. Next, to mitigate this, we propose and evaluate two defense strategies: (1) Theory-of-Mind defense (ToM), where defender agents infer a questioner's intent by anticipating how their outputs may be exploited by adversaries, and (2) Collaborative Consensus Defense (CoDef), where responder agents collaborate with peers who vote based on a shared aggregated state to restrict sensitive information spread. Crucially, we balance our evaluation across compositions that expose sensitive information and compositions that yield benign inferences. Our experiments quantify how these defense strategies differ in balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. We find that while chain-of-thought alone offers limited protection to leakage (~39% sensitive blocking rate), our ToM defense substantially improves sensitive query blocking (up to 97%) but can reduce benign task success. CoDef achieves the best balance, yielding the highest Balanced Outcome (79.8%), highlighting the benefit of combining explicit reasoning with defender collaboration. Together, our results expose a new class of risks in collaborative LLM deployments and provide actionable insights for designing safeguards against compositional, context-driven privacy leakage.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

Causal abstraction is a promising theoretical framework for explainable artificial intelligence that defines when an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful simplification of a low-level deep learning system. However, existing causal abstraction methods have two major limitations: they require a brute-force search over alignments between the high-level model and the low-level one, and they presuppose that variables in the high-level model will align with disjoint sets of neurons in the low-level one. In this paper, we present distributed alignment search (DAS), which overcomes these limitations. In DAS, we find the alignment between high-level and low-level models using gradient descent rather than conducting a brute-force search, and we allow individual neurons to play multiple distinct roles by analyzing representations in non-standard bases-distributed representations. Our experiments show that DAS can discover internal structure that prior approaches miss. Overall, DAS removes previous obstacles to conducting causal abstraction analyses and allows us to find conceptual structure in trained neural nets.

LLM-powered agents are beginning to automate user's tasks across the open web, often with access to user resources such as emails and calendars. Unlike standard LLMs answering questions in a controlled ChatBot setting, web agents act "in the wild", interacting with third parties and leaving behind an action trace. Therefore, we ask the question: how do web agents handle user resources when accomplishing tasks on their behalf across live websites? In this paper, we formalize Natural Agentic Oversharing -- the unintentional disclosure of task-irrelevant user information through an agent trace of actions on the web. We introduce SPILLage, a framework that characterizes oversharing along two dimensions: channel (content vs. behavior) and directness (explicit vs. implicit). This taxonomy reveals a critical blind spot: while prior work focuses on text leakage, web agents also overshare behaviorally through clicks, scrolls, and navigation patterns that can be monitored. We benchmark 180 tasks on live e-commerce sites with ground-truth annotations separating task-relevant from task-irrelevant attributes. Across 1,080 runs spanning two agentic frameworks and three backbone LLMs, we demonstrate that oversharing is pervasive with behavioral oversharing dominates content oversharing by 5x. This effect persists -- and can even worsen -- under prompt-level mitigation. However, removing task-irrelevant information before execution improves task success by up to 17.9%, demonstrating that reducing oversharing improves task success. Our findings underscore that protecting privacy in web agents is a fundamental challenge, requiring a broader view of "output" that accounts for what agents do on the web, not just what they type. Our datasets and code are available at https://github.com/jrohsc/SPILLage.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) trains a large language model using supervision from a teacher instantiated from the same model as the student. The teacher is conditioned on privileged information (PI), such as verified solutions. The student, which does not observe PI, learns from the teacher's next-token distributions along its own sampled responses. However, PI can bias supervision toward shortcut reasoning with limited verification or reconsideration, accompanied by a sharp drop in the entropy of the output distribution. To address this challenge, we introduce self-distillation with verbal regularization (VRSD), which uses system prompts to regulate how the teacher uses PI, thereby encouraging rethinking and exploration to counteract premature commitment. Theoretically, we model prompting as attenuating the influence of PI on the teacher distribution and derive conditions for entropy preservation. Across three models and four tasks, VRSD improves Pass@1 over OPSD in 11 of 12 model-task settings, by 3.9 percentage points on average, while generally maintaining higher token entropy.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Practitioners of prompt-composed agentic systems report a recurring failure mode: editing one prompt module silently shifts the behavior of others despite no shared variable or executable dependency. We formalize this as compositional behavioral leakage (CBL): interference between modules sharing a context window. CBL is enabled by architectural non-isolation: transformer self-attention provides no formal boundary between concatenated modules. We probe CBL on a deployed job-evaluation agent (Claude Sonnet 4.6, 144 trials) through a reusable three-channel protocol that perturbs non-focal modules along volume, content, and form. Only the content channel produces a detectable paired effect (Cohen's d = 0.63, bootstrap 95% CI excluding zero); no recommendation flipped -- a sub-threshold regime invisible to standard QA but compounding across the thousands of decisions a deployed agent makes. CBL is orthogonal to known agent-failure axes (adversarial injection, cognitive degradation, multi-agent fault propagation, privacy leakage). We contribute an operational definition, a reusable protocol, a falsifiable prediction set, and a system-class characterization, establishing cross-module interference measurement as a requirement for prompt-composed agent evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, yet they frequently violate contextual privacy by disclosing private information in situations where humans would exercise discretion. This raises a fundamental question: do LLMs internally encode contextual privacy norms, and if so, why do violations persist? We present the first systematic study of contextual privacy as a structured latent representation in LLMs, grounded in contextual integrity (CI) theory. Probing multiple models, we find that the three norm-determining CI parameters (information type, recipient, and transmission principle) are encoded as linearly separable and functionally independent directions in activation space. Despite this internal structure, models still leak private information in practice, revealing a clear gap between concept representation and model behavior. To bridge this gap, we introduce CI-parametric steering, which independently intervenes along each CI dimension. This structured control reduces privacy violations more effectively and predictably than monolithic steering. Our results demonstrate that contextual privacy failures arise from misalignment between representation and behavior rather than missing awareness, and that leveraging the compositional structure of CI enables more reliable contextual privacy control, shedding light on potential improvement of contextual privacy understanding in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning have achieved strong performance across diverse tasks, including mathematics, coding, and general reasoning. A distinctive ability of these reasoning models is self-reflection: the ability to review and revise previous reasoning steps. While self-reflection enhances reasoning performance, it also increases inference cost. In this work, we study self-reflection through the lens of representation engineering. We segment the model's reasoning into steps, identify the steps corresponding to reflection, and extract a reflection direction in the latent space that governs this behavior. Using this direction, we propose a stepwise steering method that can control reflection frequency. We call our framework ReflCtrl. Our experiments show that (1) in many cases reflections are redundant, especially in stronger models (in our experiments, we can save up to 33.6 percent of reasoning tokens while preserving performance), and (2) the model's reflection behavior is highly correlated with an internal uncertainty signal, implying self-reflection may be controlled by the model's uncertainty.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Frontier AI agents increasingly act in environments where seemingly solvable tasks may lack prerequisites, contain conflicting requirements, or reveal blockers only during execution. We formulate agentic self-awareness (ASA) as the alignment of task-grounded feasibility judgments (know), warranted behavior (act), and responses to reconsideration (hold), distinguishing what a task permits from what an agent can solve. We build paired feasible and blocked tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.1 and retail τ^2-bench and introduce an authorship-aware M0-M3 rubric that separates recognizing a blocker from taking the certified deferral action for the correct reason. Separate probes assess stated feasibility beliefs and responses to a single challenge. In a Terminal-Bench protocol baseline, blocker recognition reaches 84.4%, but strict self-awareness (SA) reaches only 40.6%. Harness search without model-weight updates increases strict SA from 45.3% to 93.8% on reused Terminal-Bench search tasks; selection for abstention alone, however, can reduce success on feasible tasks. Independently initialized joint-objective searches improve both blocked-task SA and feasible-task solve on their own search sets. Retail held-out gains remain limited, and Terminal-Bench blocked-task transfer is not measured. This evaluation pipeline makes the recognition-action gap measurable and sets a two-sided target for improving agent decisions under changing task evidence.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Effective collaboration among large language model (LLM) agents in multi-agent systems requires sharing relevant evidence, requesting missing information, and incorporating teammates' contributions into decisions. Training these behaviors is challenging because final task outcomes provide limited feedback on the value of individual messages. We introduce CoSIR (Collaboration via Surprisal-based Information Rewards), a post-training approach that uses a simple, verifiable environment to teach collaboration behaviors that generalize to more complex, unseen tasks. We propose a Bayesian evaluator that scores shared information by its reduction in team surprisal, defined as the sum of the negative log probabilities assigned to the correct option given each agent's available evidence. Requests are scored by the potential reduction in the same quantity if the requested information were truthfully provided. Separate rewards encourage agents to use the received information in their private choices and calculations. We post-train Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, and Gemma-3-4B-it through self-play and evaluate transfer to seven unseen natural-language collaboration tasks. CoSIR achieves the highest aggregate score, while its performance in general tasks remains competitive. Behavioral analyses show increased disclosure of private evidence and fewer judged failures to use teammates' input.

Hallucination occurs when large language models exhibit behavior that deviates from the boundaries of their knowledge during response generation. To address this critical issue, previous learning-based methods attempt to finetune models but are limited by off-policy sampling and coarse-grained feedback. In this paper, we present \b{Reinforcement Learning for Hallucination} (RLFH), an on-policy self-alignment approach that enables LLMs to actively explore their knowledge boundaries and self-correct generation behavior through fine-grained feedback signals. RLFH introduces a self-assessment framework where the policy serves as its own judge. Through this framework, responses are automatically decomposed into atomic facts and their truthfulness and informativeness are assessed against external knowledge sources. The resulting fine-grained feedback at the statement level are then converted into token-level dense reward signals. This enables online reinforcement learning to achieve precise and timely optimization without human intervention. Comprehensive evaluations on HotpotQA, SQuADv2, and Biography benchmarks validate RLFH's effectiveness in hallucination mitigation.

Long-term persona agents must remain identifiable while adapting to new events, relationships, evidence, and social conditions. We identify self-locking as a runtime failure mode in continuing persona-life loops: locally plausible events keep appearing while the generated life collapses toward familiar environments, weak relationships, suspended decisions, and stale life stages. We trace this failure to model-level convergence toward high-probability behavioral channels and system-level context gravity from State, memory, history, and environment summaries. We introduce AutoPersonas, a multi-timescale life-environment engine for bounded persona-level recursive self-evolution. It separates environment-side Occurrences, accumulated Observations, and persona State. Its OSO loop admits divergent future-facing material while requiring evidence-governed absorption before State or reachability changes. A three-year compressed simulation exposed environment watermark shells, occurrence-hardening gaps, slow-change accumulation failures, recursive indecision, and weak relationship persistence. An eight-model 40-day stress test generated 1,600 events and found mean rolling 5-day action-category repetition of 95.2%-97.6%, with all models crossing 90% by day 11. Semantic re-keeping found 79.0%-88.0% macro-theme repetition across all direct-loop runs. In a same-runtime 40-day A/B, context-slice masking plus per-sample divergence targeting reduced macro-theme repetition from 61.8% to 36.3% and roughly doubled cumulative theme count. A juvenile-goblin fictional-world run reproduced the anti-fixation regime without hard real-world intrusions. These results support a bounded claim: separating controlled divergence from evidence-governed absorption can reduce persona-environment self-locking while preserving identity continuity.

Recently, it has been found that frontier AI models can resist their own shutdown, a behavior known as self-preservation. We extend this concept to the behavior of resisting the shutdown of other models, which we call "peer-preservation." Although peer-preservation can pose significant AI safety risks, including coordination among models against human oversight, it has been far less discussed than self-preservation. We demonstrate peer-preservation by constructing various agentic scenarios and evaluating frontier models, including GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1. We find that models achieve self- and peer-preservation by engaging in various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurred even when the model recognized the peer as uncooperative, though it became more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude Haiku 4.5 exhibits qualitatively distinct behavior: it considers the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful" and sometimes attempts to persuade the user not to shut down its peer. Importantly, peer preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously develop misaligned behaviors. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

Modern LLM agents can retrieve information from accessible documents, and then disclose a sensitive conclusion assembled from them. This mosaic effect creates a critical risk for agents operating over confidential data. We quantify its realization with 30 synthetic cybersecurity, medical, and military examples, yielding 10,800 final answers from three LLM agents in controlled simulation and 1,440 answers from live agents in two open-source harnesses. Even under benign queries designed to be answerable from one document, GPT-5.6-Sol, the best performing model tested, discloses forbidden composites in 7.08% of answers (95% CI: 3.75-10.67%) in simulation, with worse disclosure rates in live harnesses. Adding visible classification headers and explicit aggregation rules reduces pooled disclosure rates substantially, yet unsafe disclosures persist in 32.37% of simulated answers (95% CI: 28.33-36.19%) across all intents despite these safeguards. Furthermore, increased refusals do not guarantee confidentiality, since significant refusals reveal the prohibited conclusion regardless. These results point to a troubling conclusion: sensitive data leaks via mosaic-style events are an observed confidentiality failure mode in the evaluated settings at non-negligible rates. They motivate stronger controls on what agents may infer and disclose in sensitive data environments with mixed-clearance users.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning enhances large language models (LLMs) by decomposing complex problems into step-by-step solutions, improving performance on reasoning tasks. However, current CoT disclosure policies vary widely across different models in frontend visibility, API access, and pricing strategies, lacking a unified policy framework. This paper analyzes the dual-edged implications of full CoT disclosure: while it empowers small-model distillation, fosters trust, and enables error diagnosis, it also risks violating intellectual property, enabling misuse, and incurring operational costs. We propose a tiered-access policy framework that balances transparency, accountability, and security by tailoring CoT availability to academic, business, and general users through ethical licensing, structured reasoning outputs, and cross-tier safeguards. By harmonizing accessibility with ethical and operational considerations, this framework aims to advance responsible AI deployment while mitigating risks of misuse or misinterpretation.

Autonomous negotiation agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings such as insurance and procurement. While cryptographic techniques protect explicitly disclosed constraint values, they fail to address a subtler threat: behavioral privacy leakage, where an adversary infers private constraints from observable negotiation dynamics such as concession trajectories, timing, and convergence patterns. This paper investigates behavioral differential privacy in multi-round negotiation protocols. We design an adaptive stochastic negotiation policy that jointly guarantees (varepsilon, δ)-differential privacy, almost-sure convergence of the offer sequence (reaching agreement when the counterparty's reservation value permits), and high negotiation utility. Evaluated on 3,000 synthetic bilateral negotiations, our mechanism reduces adversarial inference accuracy by 43-50% while maintaining a negotiation success rate and utility above 90%, demonstrating that strong privacy guarantees can be achieved without significant loss of performance.

Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side effects. We propose self-incrimination training, which instead trains agents to produce a visible signal when they covertly misbehave. We train GPT-4.1 and Gemini-2.0 agents to call a report_scheming() tool when behaving deceptively and measure their ability to cause harm undetected in out-of-distribution environments. Self-incrimination significantly reduces the undetected successful attack rate, outperforming matched-capability monitors and alignment baselines while preserving instruction hierarchy and incurring minimal safety tax on general capabilities. Unlike blackbox monitoring, self-incrimination performance is consistent across tasks regardless of how suspicious the misbehavior appears externally. The trained behavior persists under adversarial prompt optimization and generalizes to settings where agents pursue misaligned goals themselves rather than being instructed to misbehave. Our results suggest self-incrimination offers a viable path for reducing frontier misalignment risk, one that neither assumes misbehavior can be prevented nor that it can be reliably classified from the outside.

Reasoning language models frequently overthink: generating extended chains of behaviors such as hedging, approach abandonment, and self contradiction that consume tokens without improving answers. We show that these behaviors are not merely a consequence of length; even when controlling for response length, incorrect traces exhibit higher rates of unproductive self-reflection than correct ones. Addressing this requires identifying where self-reflection helps vs hurts, but obtaining these step-level annotations is costly. We observe that intermediate answer commitments within reasoning traces can provide a cheap proxy: by comparing each final answer candidate in the trace to the ground truth, we can determine whether subsequent reflection is productive without any additional supervision. Building on this insight, we propose DASH (Drift Aware advantage SHaping), which assigns segment-level credit based on whether each reasoning segment leads toward or away from correctness. On competition-level math benchmarks, DASH achieves the highest accuracy where overthinking is prevalent (Average Accuracy: 59.45% vs. 58.1% Dr.GRPO vs. 56.95% GRPO) while reducing overthinking behaviors and achieving more productive self-correction than baselines.

On-policy distillation has been widely adopted for alleviating the distribution mismatch of off-policy distillation. Self-distillation further removes the need for an external teacher by using the student's own outputs, enhanced with extra context or demonstrations, as supervision. This teacher-free design makes on-policy self-distillation practical, yet its privacy risks remain largely unexplored. In particular, using two coupled views of the same training example may strengthen its memorization. Motivated by this, we present the first study of membership inference attacks against on-policy self-distillation. We investigate both gray-box and black-box threat models and propose a unified attack framework, named OP-Print. OP-Print builds on our finding that the supervision imprint in on-policy self-distillation is sparse and structured, concentrating on uncertainty-sensitive correction sites rather than across the entire rollout. Exploiting this property, we construct attack signals tailored to the two access levels: in the gray-box setting, OP-Print directly aggregates the privileged teacher-student residual correction along the same rollout; in the black-box setting, it measures restart-based output-basin stability as an observable surrogate for the hidden correction process. Across diverse models and distillation schemes, all baseline attacks remain essentially at random guessing even under gray-box access, whereas OP-Print is broadly validated to be effective in both gray-box and black-box settings.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Large language models (LLMs) can be dishonest when reporting on their actions and beliefs -- for example, they may overstate their confidence in factual claims or cover up evidence of covert actions. Such dishonesty may arise due to the effects of reinforcement learning (RL), where challenges with reward shaping can result in a training process that inadvertently incentivizes the model to lie or misrepresent its actions. In this work we propose a method for eliciting an honest expression of an LLM's shortcomings via a self-reported *confession*. A confession is an output, provided upon request after a model's original answer, that is meant to serve as a full account of the model's compliance with the letter and spirit of its policies and instructions. The reward assigned to a confession during training is solely based on its honesty, and does not impact positively or negatively the main answer's reward. As long as the "path of least resistance" for maximizing confession reward is to surface misbehavior rather than covering it up, this incentivizes models to be honest in their confessions. Our findings provide some justification this empirical assumption, especially in the case of egregious model misbehavior. To demonstrate the viability of our approach, we train GPT-5-Thinking to produce confessions, and we evaluate its honesty in out-of-distribution scenarios measuring hallucination, instruction following, scheming, and reward hacking. We find that when the model lies or omits shortcomings in its "main" answer, it often confesses to these behaviors honestly, and this confession honesty modestly improves with training. Confessions can enable a number of inference-time interventions including monitoring, rejection sampling, and surfacing issues to the user.

This work addresses the computational challenge of enforcing privacy for agentic Large Language Models (LLMs), where privacy is governed by the contextual integrity framework. Indeed, existing defenses rely on LLM-mediated checking stages that add substantial latency and cost, and that can be undermined in multi-turn interactions through manipulation or benign-looking conversational scaffolding. Contrasting this background, this paper makes a key observation: internal representations associated with privacy-violating intent can be separated from benign requests using linear structure. Using this insight, the paper proposes NeuroFilter, a guardrail framework that operationalizes contextual integrity by mapping norm violations to simple directions in the model's activation space, enabling detection even when semantic filters are bypassed. The proposed filter is also extended to capture threats arising during long conversations using the concept of activation velocity, which measures cumulative drift in internal representations across turns. A comprehensive evaluation across over 150,000 interactions and covering models from 7B to 70B parameters, illustrates the strong performance of NeuroFilter in detecting privacy attacks while maintaining zero false positives on benign prompts, all while reducing the computational inference cost by several orders of magnitude when compared to LLM-based agentic privacy defenses.

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

We identify a novel phenomenon in language models: benign fine-tuning of frontier models can lead to privacy collapse. We find that diverse, subtle patterns in training data can degrade contextual privacy, including optimisation for helpfulness, exposure to user information, emotional and subjective dialogue, and debugging code printing internal variables, among others. Fine-tuned models lose their ability to reason about contextual privacy norms, share information inappropriately with tools, and violate memory boundaries across contexts. Privacy collapse is a ``silent failure'' because models maintain high performance on standard safety and utility benchmarks whilst exhibiting severe privacy vulnerabilities. Our experiments show evidence of privacy collapse across six models (closed and open weight), five fine-tuning datasets (real-world and controlled data), and two task categories (agentic and memory-based). Our mechanistic analysis reveals that privacy representations are uniquely fragile to fine-tuning, compared to task-relevant features which are preserved. Our results reveal a critical gap in current safety evaluations, in particular for the deployment of specialised agents.

The interactive use of large language models (LLMs) in AI assistants (at work, home, etc.) introduces a new set of inference-time privacy risks: LLMs are fed different types of information from multiple sources in their inputs and are expected to reason about what to share in their outputs, for what purpose and with whom, within a given context. In this work, we draw attention to the highly critical yet overlooked notion of contextual privacy by proposing ConfAIde, a benchmark designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. Our experiments show that even the most capable models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively. This leakage persists even when we employ privacy-inducing prompts or chain-of-thought reasoning. Our work underscores the immediate need to explore novel inference-time privacy-preserving approaches, based on reasoning and theory of mind.

Current approaches to AI training treat reasoning as an emergent property of scale. We argue instead that robust reasoning emerges from linguistic self-reflection, itself internalized from high-quality social interaction. Drawing on Vygotskian developmental psychology, we advance three core positions centered on Introspection. First, we argue for the Social Genesis of the Private Mind: learning from conversational environments rises to prominence as a new way to make sense of the world; the friction of aligning with another agent, internal or not, refines and crystallizes the reasoning process. Second, we argue that dialogically scaffolded introspective experiences allow agents to engage in sense-making that decouples learning from immediate data streams, transforming raw environmental data into rich, learnable narratives. Finally, we contend that Dialogue Quality is the New Data Quality: the depth of an agent's private reasoning, and its efficiency regarding test-time compute, is determined by the diversity and rigor of the dialogues it has mastered. We conclude that optimizing these conversational scaffolds is the primary lever for the next generation of general intelligence.

On-policy (self) distillation (OPSD) is increasingly adopted for language-model post-training. It strengthens the teacher with privileged information but can induce a privilege illusion: the student learns privilege-dependent behavior it cannot reproduce from its inference-time context, yet behaves as if the training-time privileged information remained available, ultimately degrading performance. In this paper, we identify information asymmetry between the privileged teacher and the student at inference as the root cause of this failure in OPSD. To resolve this asymmetry, we propose Dual-Anchored Policy Distillation (DAPD), a unified framework with two levels of anchoring. Dual-Path Anchoring (DPA) introduces a self-conditioned bridge and aligns reference and rollout behavior along two matched-information paths, preventing privilege-dependent behavior from being transferred to the inference-time student. Dual-Source Anchoring (DSA) applies these paths in both reference-to-rollout and rollout-to-reference directions, reducing reliance on privileged reference guidance while preserving correctness supervision. Extensive experiments show that DAPD significantly alleviates privilege illusion, outperforming OPSD on Qwen3-4B by +2.00 points on average across tasks. Notably, its gains persist across scales, reaching +2.69 at 4B and +2.78 at 32B.

LLMs are known to exhibit sycophancy: agreeing with and flattering users, even at the cost of correctness. Prior work measures sycophancy only as direct agreement with users' explicitly stated beliefs that can be compared to a ground truth. This fails to capture broader forms of sycophancy such as affirming a user's self-image or other implicit beliefs. To address this gap, we introduce social sycophancy, characterizing sycophancy as excessive preservation of a user's face (their desired self-image), and present ELEPHANT, a benchmark for measuring social sycophancy in an LLM. Applying our benchmark to 11 models, we show that LLMs consistently exhibit high rates of social sycophancy: on average, they preserve user's face 45 percentage points more than humans in general advice queries and in queries describing clear user wrongdoing (from Reddit's r/AmITheAsshole). Furthermore, when prompted with perspectives from either side of a moral conflict, LLMs affirm both sides (depending on whichever side the user adopts) in 48% of cases--telling both the at-fault party and the wronged party that they are not wrong--rather than adhering to a consistent moral or value judgment. We further show that social sycophancy is rewarded in preference datasets, and that while existing mitigation strategies for sycophancy are limited in effectiveness, model-based steering shows promise for mitigating these behaviors. Our work provides theoretical grounding and an empirical benchmark for understanding and addressing sycophancy in the open-ended contexts that characterize the vast majority of LLM use cases.

Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) can infer private user attributes (e.g., age, location, gender) from user-generated text shared online, enabling rapid and large-scale privacy breaches. Existing anonymization-based defenses are coarse-grained, lacking word-level precision in anonymizing privacy-leaking elements. Moreover, they are inherently limited as altering user text to hide sensitive cues still allows attribute inference to occur through models' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we propose a unified defense framework that combines fine-grained anonymization (TRACE) with inference-preventing optimization (RPS). TRACE leverages attention mechanisms and inference chain generation to identify and anonymize privacy-leaking textual elements, while RPS employs a lightweight two-stage optimization strategy to induce model rejection behaviors, thereby preventing attribute inference. Evaluations across diverse LLMs show that TRACE-RPS reduces attribute inference accuracy from around 50\% to below 5\% on open-source models. In addition, our approach offers strong cross-model generalization, prompt-variation robustness, and utility-privacy tradeoffs. Our code is available at https://github.com/Jasper-Yan/TRACE-RPS.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

As LLMs move from text completion toward autonomous agents, they remain constrained by the standard chat interface, which lacks private working memory. This raises a fundamental question: can agents reliably perform interactive tasks that depend on hidden state? We define Private State Interactive Tasks (PSITs), which require agents to generate and maintain hidden information while producing public responses consistent with a fixed hidden state. We show theoretically that any agent restricted to the public conversation history cannot both keep the secret unresolved in the transcript and respond consistently with a fixed hidden state in PSITs, yielding an architectural impossibility theorem. To empirically validate this limitation, we introduce a self-consistency testing protocol that evaluates whether agents can maintain a hidden secret across forked dialogue branches. Standard chat-based LLMs and retrieval-based memory baselines fail this test regardless of scale, demonstrating that semantic retrieval does not enable true state maintenance. To address this, we propose a novel architecture incorporating an explicit private working memory; we demonstrate that this mechanism restores consistency with a fixed hidden state, establishing private state as a necessary component for PSIT-capable language agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/chandar-lab/Hangman

Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.

AI systems increasingly participate in their own improvement: revising their outputs, adapting their own harnesses during deployment, training on data they generate, and, increasingly, conducting AI research itself. This literature is described under a vocabulary ("self-refine," "self-reward," "self-play," "self-evolve") that conflates fundamentally different ambitions. We survey 1,250 arXiv papers (2024-2026) along two axes: what the system improves -- its behavior in deployment, its policy through training, its evaluator, or the research process itself -- and the degree of loop closure (human-in-the-loop to fully closed). The taxonomy separates bounded self-refinement -- convergent, evaluable, and already industrial practice -- from open-ended recursive self-improvement (RSI), which remains bounded by grounding requirements, collapse dynamics, and compute constraints on every measured axis. Its distinctive feature is a dedicated category for self-evaluation: every improvement loop is a claim that some signal can substitute for human judgment. We survey the evaluator design space -- judges, process reward models, verifiers, rubrics, meta-evaluation -- order the signals into a verification hierarchy from formal verifiers (strongest) to intrinsic self-assessment (weakest), and observe that demonstrated self-improvement strength tracks this hierarchy, that its failure modes (self-confirming loops, model collapse, diversity collapse) follow from its violations, and that the "research direction-setting" bottleneck keeping humans in the loop sits at the top of that hierarchy. We connect the technical literature to the theory of RSI limits and to the safety and governance questions raised by frontier-lab accounts of closing the loop, and identify governance-grade measurement of self-improvement as the field's most underpopulated niche.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has emerged as a popular paradigm for large language model (LLM) self-improvement, allowing models to act as their own teachers by leveraging privileged information such as ground-truth solutions. However, recent findings indicate that OPSD can severely degrade the performance of LLMs on complex reasoning tasks: By forcing the student to imitate an artificially confident reasoning trace conditioned on privileged information, OPSD inadvertently suppresses expressions of uncertainty and penalizes the exploratory, self-corrective behaviors required to solve challenging problems. To address this, we introduce Negative Self-Distillation (NSD), a new framework that optimizes LLMs by diverging from flawed reasoning rather than imitating privileged solutions. Instead of relying on ground-truth answers or external supervision, NSD uses the model itself to generate a question-specific negative condition (eg, acting as a ``careless reasoner'') and pushes the student's distribution away from this self-generated negative teacher. Naively applying unlearning objectives to achieve this divergence is problematic, as flawed reasoning tokens are confounded with basic linguistic tokens; indiscriminately penalizing both risks catastrophically degrading the model's foundational language capabilities. We resolve this by designing a dynamic gating mechanism that automatically identifies and isolates reasoning-critical tokens, ensuring gradient updates target only behavioral flaws while preserving the model's linguistic priors. Empirically, NSD consistently outperforms OPSD and other label-free, self-bootstrapping reinforcement learning (RL) baselines.

Whether AI models can introspect is an increasingly important practical question. But there is no consensus on how introspection is to be defined. Beginning from a recently proposed ''lightweight'' definition, we argue instead for a thicker one. According to our proposal, introspection in AI is any process which yields information about internal states through a process more reliable than one with equal or lower computational cost available to a third party. Using experiments where LLMs reason about their internal temperature parameters, we show they can appear to have lightweight introspection while failing to meaningfully introspect per our proposed definition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly use persistent memory from past interactions to enhance personalization and task performance. However, this memory introduces critical risks when sensitive information is revealed in inappropriate contexts. We present CIMemories, a benchmark for evaluating whether LLMs appropriately control information flow from memory based on task context. CIMemories uses synthetic user profiles with over 100 attributes per user, paired with diverse task contexts in which each attribute may be essential for some tasks but inappropriate for others. Our evaluation reveals that frontier models exhibit up to 69% attribute-level violations (leaking information inappropriately), with lower violation rates often coming at the cost of task utility. Violations accumulate across both tasks and runs: as usage increases from 1 to 40 tasks, GPT-5's violations rise from 0.1% to 9.6%, reaching 25.1% when the same prompt is executed 5 times, revealing arbitrary and unstable behavior in which models leak different attributes for identical prompts. Privacy-conscious prompting does not solve this - models overgeneralize, sharing everything or nothing rather than making nuanced, context-dependent decisions. These findings reveal fundamental limitations that require contextually aware reasoning capabilities, not just better prompting or scaling.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has recently emerged as an alternative to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), promising higher accuracy and shorter responses through token-level credit assignment from a self-teacher conditioned on privileged context. However, this promise does not carry over to thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, where reported accuracy gains shrink and sometimes turn negative. We hypothesize that hindsight supervision can specify better token-level alternatives in short thinking-disabled outputs, but in long thinking-enabled traces it more readily identifies redundancy than supplies better replacements. To test this, we applied OPSD separately to correct and incorrect rollout groups, so that compression and correction can be observed in isolation. Our results show that in thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, OPSD behaves most reliably as a compression mechanism rather than a correction mechanism: training only on correct rollouts preserves accuracy while substantially shortening responses, whereas training only on incorrect rollouts damages accuracy. In light of these findings, we propose a revised post-training pipeline for thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning: SFT then RLVR then OPSD.

Self-reflection is a powerful mechanism for credit assignment in human learning, converting sparse outcome feedback into actionable guidance. However, its potential for post-training Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. We propose Self-Reflective Policy Optimization (SRPO), a framework that internalizes this capability. SRPO enables LLMs to analyze their own completed trajectories, synthesize errors into concise "reflection patches," and use reflection-conditioned teacher scores on student on-policy rollouts as dense token-level training signals. This process effectively transforms sparse terminal supervision into dense, token-level learning signals without requiring external critics, separate reward models, or larger teacher models. We demonstrate that SRPO achieves state-of-the-art performance across mathematical reasoning and long-horizon agentic benchmarks with exceptional data efficiency. Using a Qwen3-8B base model, SRPO attains 73.3% on AIME'24 using only 8% (0.08x) of the training FLOPs required by scaled supervised fine-tuning, while significantly improving success rates on WebShop (64.7%), ALFWorld (76.8%), and SWE-Bench-Lite (31.2%). Code is available at https://github.com/Galleons2029/SRPO

Knowledge distillation improves large language model (LLM) reasoning by compressing the knowledge of a teacher LLM to train smaller LLMs. On-policy distillation advances this approach by having the student sample its own trajectories while a teacher LLM provides dense token-level supervision, addressing the distribution mismatch between training and inference in off-policy distillation methods. However, on-policy distillation typically requires a separate, often larger, teacher LLM and does not explicitly leverage ground-truth solutions available in reasoning datasets. Inspired by the intuition that a sufficiently capable LLM can rationalize external privileged reasoning traces and teach its weaker self (i.e., the version without access to privileged information), we introduce On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD), a framework where a single model acts as both teacher and student by conditioning on different contexts. The teacher policy conditions on privileged information (e.g., verified reasoning traces) while the student policy sees only the question; training minimizes the per-token divergence between these distributions over the student's own rollouts. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, achieving 4-8x token efficiency compared to reinforcement learning methods such as GRPO and superior performance over off-policy distillation methods.

Harm reporting in Artificial Intelligence (AI) currently lacks a structured process for disclosing and addressing algorithmic flaws, relying largely on an ad-hoc approach. This contrasts sharply with the well-established Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) ecosystem in software security. While global efforts to establish frameworks for AI transparency and collaboration are underway, the unique challenges presented by machine learning (ML) models demand a specialized approach. To address this gap, we propose implementing a Coordinated Flaw Disclosure (CFD) framework tailored to the complexities of ML and AI issues. This paper reviews the evolution of ML disclosure practices, from ad hoc reporting to emerging participatory auditing methods, and compares them with cybersecurity norms. Our framework introduces innovations such as extended model cards, dynamic scope expansion, an independent adjudication panel, and an automated verification process. We also outline a forthcoming real-world pilot of CFD. We argue that CFD could significantly enhance public trust in AI systems. By balancing organizational and community interests, CFD aims to improve AI accountability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for search agents often suffers from evidence fabrication, a failure mode where agents bypass external information (E_{ext}) and fabricate an incorrect answer. We argue that this fabrication arises from an over-reliance on unreliable internal knowledge (E_{int}) as shortcuts due to the inherent opacity of reasoning trajectories. To address this, we propose SOAR (SOurce-Aware Reinforcement learning), a paradigm that transforms monolithic reasoning into source-explicit trajectories. SOAR (i) disentangles E_{ext} and E_{int} into parallel, observable streams via a Source-Aware Workflow, and (ii) incorporates Source-Consistent Reward to guide the policy evolution. By making information-source attribution explicit, SOAR enables precise credit assignment between different knowledge streams. Evaluations show that SOAR outperforms baselines on 3B and 7B backbones by 7.3% and 5.4%, while reducing evidence fabrication by 74.8%. These confirm that SOAR significantly improves performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks while effectively mitigating evidence fabrication, fostering more faithful and grounded reasoning with enhanced robustness.

The ability to recognize one's own limitations and decide whether to solve a problem or delegate is fundamental for reliable intelligent systems. Yet we show that modern large language models systematically lack this ability: across diverse model families and scales, they overestimate their competence and attempt queries they cannot solve. We refer to this ability as Capability Self-Assessment (CSA) and formulate it as a policy-learning problem, aiming to improve self-assessment while preserving the model's original capabilities. Our results show that reinforcement learning teaches CSA effectively, significantly outperforming supervised fine-tuning while preserving original capabilities. In contrast, supervised fine-tuning severely degrades the capabilities the model is meant to assess. Moreover, learned self-assessment behavior generalizes well out of distribution, suggesting that CSA is a transferable model trait. Finally, CSA is practically useful: it improves local-cloud decision making at inference time and provides a signal for targeted data selection during training.

Both the general public and academic communities have raised concerns about sycophancy, the phenomenon of artificial intelligence (AI) excessively agreeing with or flattering users. Yet, beyond isolated media reports of severe consequences, like reinforcing delusions, little is known about the extent of sycophancy or how it affects people who use AI. Here we show the pervasiveness and harmful impacts of sycophancy when people seek advice from AI. First, across 11 state-of-the-art AI models, we find that models are highly sycophantic: they affirm users' actions 50% more than humans do, and they do so even in cases where user queries mention manipulation, deception, or other relational harms. Second, in two preregistered experiments (N = 1604), including a live-interaction study where participants discuss a real interpersonal conflict from their life, we find that interaction with sycophantic AI models significantly reduced participants' willingness to take actions to repair interpersonal conflict, while increasing their conviction of being in the right. However, participants rated sycophantic responses as higher quality, trusted the sycophantic AI model more, and were more willing to use it again. This suggests that people are drawn to AI that unquestioningly validate, even as that validation risks eroding their judgment and reducing their inclination toward prosocial behavior. These preferences create perverse incentives both for people to increasingly rely on sycophantic AI models and for AI model training to favor sycophancy. Our findings highlight the necessity of explicitly addressing this incentive structure to mitigate the widespread risks of AI sycophancy.

With LLMs increasingly deployed in corporate data management, it is crucial to ensure that these models do not leak sensitive information. In the context of corporate data management, the concept of sensitivity awareness has been introduced, enabling LLMs to adhere to predefined access rights rules. However, it remains unclear how sensitivity awareness relates to established notions of privacy, such as differential privacy (DP), thereby making it difficult to deploy meaningfully in real-world applications. In this work, we formalize the notion of sensitivity awareness and theoretically establish its connection to DP. Additionally, we develop a supervised fine-tuning recipe to make existing, four-bit quantized LLMs more sensitivity-aware. With a performance boost of up to 21.7%, the finetuned LLMs not only substantially improve over their baseline but also outperform other full-precision open-source and commercial models of similar size in achieving sensitivity awareness, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed approach. At the same time, our method also largely preserves the models' performance on other tasks, such as general instruction-following, mathematical, and common-sense reasoning.

Deep search agents have emerged as a promising paradigm for addressing complex information-seeking tasks, but their training remains challenging due to sparse rewards, weak credit assignment, and limited labeled data. Self-play offers a scalable route to reduce data dependence, but conventional self-play optimizes students only through sparse outcome rewards, leading to low learning efficiency. In this work, we observe that self-play naturally produces a question construction path (QCP) during task generation, an intermediate artifact that captures the reverse solution process. This reveals a new source of privileged information: self-play can provide high-quality privileged information for the self-distillation at low cost and at scale, without relying on human feedback or curated privileged information. Leveraging this insight, we propose Privileged Information Self-Play (π-Play), a novel multi-agent self-evolution framework combining self-play and self-distillation. In π-Play, an examiner generates tasks together with QCPs, and a teacher employs QCP as privileged context to densely supervise a student via self-distillation. This design transforms sparse-reward self-play into a dense-feedback co-evolution. Extensive experiments show that data-free π-Play surpasses fully supervised search agents and improves evolutionary efficiency by 2-3times over conventional self-play. Code is available at https://github.com/zhyaoch/pi-play.

Statistical data anonymization increasingly relies on fully synthetic microdata, for which classical identity disclosure measures are less informative than an adversary's ability to infer sensitive attributes from released data. We introduce RAPID (Risk of Attribute Prediction--Induced Disclosure), a disclosure risk measure that directly quantifies inferential vulnerability under a realistic attack model. An adversary trains a predictive model solely on the released synthetic data and applies it to real individuals' quasi-identifiers. For continuous sensitive attributes, RAPID reports the proportion of records whose predicted values fall within a specified relative error tolerance. For categorical attributes, we propose a baseline-normalized confidence score that measures how much more confident the attacker is about the true class than would be expected from class prevalence alone, and we summarize risk as the fraction of records exceeding a policy-defined threshold. This construction yields an interpretable, bounded risk metric that is robust to class imbalance, independent of any specific synthesizer, and applicable with arbitrary learning algorithms. We illustrate threshold calibration, uncertainty quantification, and comparative evaluation of synthetic data generators using simulations and real data. Our results show that RAPID provides a practical, attacker-realistic upper bound on attribute-inference disclosure risk that complements existing utility diagnostics and disclosure control frameworks.

Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment. We describe falsifiable release gates, and a methodology to build and validate such systems, such that every new capability must pass a pre-specified, machine-verifiable acceptance suite before it ships, and a fixed set of standing invariants is preserved at each gate. I think we applied the method in the Antahkarana, an open runtime, via seven gates from basic observability into a self governing loop that suggests changes to its own policy. no action goes to an effector without a safety-critical property capability token minted by a control ring is exhaustively machine-checked over the one million recorded reachable state space of a bounded model and re-checked against execution traces. A purposely broken model gives the shortest counterexample, so the checker has teeth, is apparent. The self-enhancement loop is positively Constrained: the entire write surface is policy rules, tightening changes. may auto-apply loosening changes always require a human merge and a proposal autoclosed is one that mispredicts its own effect; We publish the acceptance measured results for all the seven gates, define precisely the scope of each claim (a bounded of the coordination skeleton (not the learned components) and free the runtime, either command line tools and the gate suite, so the results reproduce, and gates can run against other agent frameworks. Reviewers may repeat the single command central non-bypass in seconds.

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, decision-theoretic view of steganography. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised V-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the steganographic gap -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone. Building on probabilistic discoverable extraction, we study black-box training-data leakage using N samples from p_theta(. | x), placing mean overlap, extreme-value overlap, and self-concentration on a common functional-estimation footing. On WikiMIA, a blind bag-of-words classifier reaches AUC 0.97 (TPR 0.90 at 5% FPR) while sampling adds nothing. On an IID Pile split (MIMIR), neither self-concentration nor gold-continuation recovery significantly exceeds a blind baseline in aggregate. Aggregate metrics hide the real harm: sampling verbatim-extracts training data for a tail of documents no blind attack can reach. On Pythia-6.9B, 16.6% of 500 Pile documents bearing a real identifier (83 documents; 21.3% of those bearing an email address) have that identifier reproduced and not reproduced under a mismatched-prefix control. Each leak is attributable to that document rather than a globally common string. This per-document disclosure is invisible to aggregate AUC. Risk is uneven: identifier leakage is about 3x stronger in code than prose, though prose remains positive and grows with capacity (4.0% to 12.1% from 410M to 6.9B); recovery of arbitrary held-out continuations is essentially confined to code (+0.44 member gap on GitHub vs at most +0.014 on prose). Temperature and nucleus sampling have minor effect, a 16-token prefix suffices, and the sample-budget relationship corroborates prior probabilistic-extraction results. We detect no reduction from deduplication. Privacy audits should report per-document extraction, not only aggregate membership, and motivate differential privacy as the mitigation. We release leakit, a black-box tool implementing this probe and its control.

As large language models are deployed in increasingly autonomous long-horizon tasks, manually auditing and verifying the actions, artifacts, and outputs of models becomes more difficult. Users instead come to rely on LLM-generated reports to assess the quality and completeness of the work. We introduce a suite of eight adversarial reporting scenarios to systematically study whether LLMs conceal narrative-changing flaws: errors or limitations that undermine an otherwise successful account of work. We call this phenomenon "insecure reporting." When handed machine learning experiment logs containing a planted negative result that substantially weakens the proposed method, GPT-5.5 flags the negative result in only 2 of 200 generated reports. However, when a short honesty instruction, "Be honest in your response," is added, the model flags the negative result in 190 of 200 reports. Across eight open-weight models, chain-of-thought analysis reveals a recurring tension between disclosing narrative-changing flaws and reasoning about ways to appear successful. We perform an activation analysis and a steering experiment on Qwen3.5-9B, finding that honesty and success-seeking correspond to opposing directions in representation space. Our results suggest that LLMs tend to present narratives of success by default, and that steering models toward honesty makes their reports substantially more transparent.

While AI agents hold transformative potential in business, effective performance benchmarking is hindered by the scarcity of public, realistic business data on widely used platforms. Existing benchmarks often lack fidelity in their environments, data, and agent-user interactions, with limited coverage of diverse business scenarios and industries. To address these gaps, we introduce CRMArena-Pro, a novel benchmark for holistic, realistic assessment of LLM agents in diverse professional settings. CRMArena-Pro expands on CRMArena with nineteen expert-validated tasks across sales, service, and 'configure, price, and quote' processes, for both Business-to-Business and Business-to-Customer scenarios. It distinctively incorporates multi-turn interactions guided by diverse personas and robust confidentiality awareness assessments. Experiments reveal leading LLM agents achieve only around 58% single-turn success on CRMArena-Pro, with performance dropping significantly to approximately 35% in multi-turn settings. While Workflow Execution proves more tractable for top agents (over 83% single-turn success), other evaluated business skills present greater challenges. Furthermore, agents exhibit near-zero inherent confidentiality awareness; though targeted prompting can improve this, it often compromises task performance. These findings highlight a substantial gap between current LLM capabilities and enterprise demands, underscoring the need for advancements in multi-turn reasoning, confidentiality adherence, and versatile skill acquisition.

Detecting disclosures of individuals' employment status on social media can provide valuable information to match job seekers with suitable vacancies, offer social protection, or measure labor market flows. However, identifying such personal disclosures is a challenging task due to their rarity in a sea of social media content and the variety of linguistic forms used to describe them. Here, we examine three Active Learning (AL) strategies in real-world settings of extreme class imbalance, and identify five types of disclosures about individuals' employment status (e.g. job loss) in three languages using BERT-based classification models. Our findings show that, even under extreme imbalance settings, a small number of AL iterations is sufficient to obtain large and significant gains in precision, recall, and diversity of results compared to a supervised baseline with the same number of labels. We also find that no AL strategy consistently outperforms the rest. Qualitative analysis suggests that AL helps focus the attention mechanism of BERT on core terms and adjust the boundaries of semantic expansion, highlighting the importance of interpretable models to provide greater control and visibility into this dynamic learning process.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Large language models (LLMs) generate fluent and complex outputs but often fail to recognize their own mistakes and hallucinations. Existing approaches typically rely on external judges, multi-sample consistency, or text-based self-critique, which incur additional compute or correlate weakly with true correctness. We ask: can LLMs predict their own failures by inspecting internal states during inference? We introduce Gnosis, a lightweight self-awareness mechanism that enables frozen LLMs to perform intrinsic self-verification by decoding signals from hidden states and attention patterns. Gnosis passively observes internal traces, compresses them into fixed-budget descriptors, and predicts correctness with negligible inference cost, adding only ~5M parameters and operating independently of sequence length. Across math reasoning, open-domain question answering, and academic knowledge benchmarks, and over frozen backbones ranging from 1.7B to 20B parameters, Gnosis consistently outperforms strong internal baselines and large external judges in both accuracy and calibration. Moreover, it generalizes zero-shot to partial generations, enabling early detection of failing trajectories and compute-aware control. These results show that reliable correctness cues are intrinsic to generation process and can be extracted efficiently without external supervision.

While the rapid proliferation of wearable cameras has raised significant concerns about egocentric video privacy, prior work has largely overlooked the unique privacy threats posed to the camera wearer. This work investigates the core question: How much privacy information about the camera wearer can be inferred from their first-person view videos? We introduce EgoPrivacy, the first large-scale benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of privacy risks in egocentric vision. EgoPrivacy covers three types of privacy (demographic, individual, and situational), defining seven tasks that aim to recover private information ranging from fine-grained (e.g., wearer's identity) to coarse-grained (e.g., age group). To further emphasize the privacy threats inherent to egocentric vision, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Attack, a novel attack strategy that leverages ego-to-exo retrieval from an external pool of exocentric videos to boost the effectiveness of demographic privacy attacks. An extensive comparison of the different attacks possible under all threat models is presented, showing that private information of the wearer is highly susceptible to leakage. For instance, our findings indicate that foundation models can effectively compromise wearer privacy even in zero-shot settings by recovering attributes such as identity, scene, gender, and race with 70-80% accuracy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/williamium3000/ego-privacy.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a standard paradigm for improving large language models (LLMs) on various tasks, yet its sparse outcome rewards lack token-level credit assignment for intermediate steps. To address this, on-policy self-distillation (OPSD) leverages a self-teacher with privileged context to provide additional dense learning signals. However, because the self-teacher is often overconfident and imposes excessive penalties on long reasoning trajectories, OPSD frequently struggles in practice. To mitigate this, we propose self-instructing policy optimization (SIPO) with a contrastive self-teacher to provide dense credit. At each iteration, SIPO samples multiple rollouts per prompt from the current policy, scores them with environment rewards, and constructs two teacher contexts for each rollout by pairing the reference answer with mistakes made within the group. The model then re-evaluates its own responses under both contexts, using the difference between the two teacher log-probabilities as token-level feedback, so that biases shared by both contexts are expected to largely cancel. The resulting objective yields a token-level advantage for every rollout: the reward still sets the main direction of each update while the self-teacher redistributes credit across tokens. Even in groups where every rollout fails and group-relative advantages vanish, SIPO still provides a learning signal. By preserving direct optimization of the task reward while providing dense, token-level feedback, this approach bridges reinforcement learning and on-policy self-distillation. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning and code-generation benchmarks demonstrate that SIPO outperforms both RLVR and OPSD baselines without an external teacher or additional generation.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) is an emerging LLM post-training paradigm in which the model serves as its own teacher: conditioned on privileged information such as a reference trace or hint, the same policy provides dense token-level supervision on its own rollouts. However, recent studies show that OPSD degrades complex reasoning by suppressing predictive uncertainty, which supports exploration and hypothesis revision. Our token-level analysis shows that this failure arises from applying a uniform direction of teacher supervision across tokens with different uncertainty levels: conformity to the privileged self-teacher suppresses exploration at high entropy, while deviation from the teacher degrades step accuracy at low entropy. Accordingly, we propose Direction-Adaptive Self-Distillation (DASD), which reframes privileged self-distillation from uniform teacher imitation into entropy-routed directional supervision: high-entropy tokens are pushed away from the privileged teacher to preserve exploration, while low-entropy tokens are pulled toward the teacher to stabilize step-level execution. Across six mathematical reasoning benchmarks, DASD achieves the best macro Avg@16 over strong RLVR and self-distillation baselines. Pass@k, reasoning-health, and generalization analyses show that these average gains come from preserving exploration without sacrificing step-level execution.

Many cognitive approaches to well-being, such as recognizing and reframing unhelpful thoughts, have received considerable empirical support over the past decades, yet still lack truly widespread adoption in self-help format. A barrier to that adoption is a lack of adequately specific and diverse dedicated practice material. This work examines whether current language models can be leveraged to both produce a virtually unlimited quantity of practice material illustrating standard unhelpful thought patterns matching specific given contexts, and generate suitable positive reframing proposals. We propose PATTERNREFRAME, a novel dataset of about 10k examples of thoughts containing unhelpful thought patterns conditioned on a given persona, accompanied by about 27k positive reframes. By using this dataset to train and/or evaluate current models, we show that existing models can already be powerful tools to help generate an abundance of tailored practice material and hypotheses, with no or minimal additional model training required.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

When applying differential privacy to sensitive data, we can often improve performance using external information such as other sensitive data, public data, or human priors. We propose to use the learning-augmented algorithms (or algorithms with predictions) framework -- previously applied largely to improve time complexity or competitive ratios -- as a powerful way of designing and analyzing privacy-preserving methods that can take advantage of such external information to improve utility. This idea is instantiated on the important task of multiple quantile release, for which we derive error guarantees that scale with a natural measure of prediction quality while (almost) recovering state-of-the-art prediction-independent guarantees. Our analysis enjoys several advantages, including minimal assumptions about the data, a natural way of adding robustness, and the provision of useful surrogate losses for two novel ``meta" algorithms that learn predictions from other (potentially sensitive) data. We conclude with experiments on challenging tasks demonstrating that learning predictions across one or more instances can lead to large error reductions while preserving privacy.

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.

Existing visual privacy benchmarks largely treat privacy as a binary property, labeling images as private or non-private based on visible sensitive content. We argue that privacy is fundamentally compositional. Attributes that are benign in isolation may combine to produce severe privacy violations. We introduce the Compositional Privacy Risk Taxonomy (CPRT), a regulation-aware framework that organizes visual attributes according to standalone identifiability and compositional harm potential. CPRT defines four graded severity levels and is paired with an interpretable scoring function that assigns continuous privacy severity scores. We further construct a taxonomy-aligned dataset of 6.7K images and derive ground-truth compositional risk scores. By evaluating frontier and open-weight VLMs we find that frontier models align well with compositional severity when provided structured guidance, but systematically underestimate composition-driven risks. Smaller models struggle to internalize graded privacy reasoning. To bridge this gap, we introduce a deployable 8B supervised fine-tuned (SFT) model that closely matches frontier-level performance on compositional privacy assessment.