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Nov 18

Learning to Refer: Client-Resolved Generation for Privacy-Aware Language Models

Cloud-based large language models (LLMs) require users to disclose plaintext data to service providers, creating privacy risks in sensitive domains. Existing privacy-preserving approaches often trade utility for protection, incur substantial computational or communication overhead, remain vulnerable to reconstruction from intermediate representations, or protect only a subset of the training and inference pipeline. We introduce Client-Resolved Generation (CRG), a genera- tion interface that separates server-side generation from the lexical realization of input-derived content. The client transmits only pooled and noise-perturbed rep- resentations, while input-derived output content is represented using request-local positional references and resolved to its original strings only on the client. This interface protects private input and input-derived output content during both train- ing and inference while allowing the service provider to keep its proprietary model parameters hidden from the client. At the same time, exact lexical reuse remains possible without directly exposing the reused content on the provider-visible gen- eration path. We evaluate CRG on medical and document-grounded QA, sensi- tive identifier transfer, and tool calling, together with reconstruction and raw-logit leakage analyses. On SealTools, CRG improves complete-call exact match from 57.3% to 79.9% over the input-privacy framework PPFT, with larger gains as more required output content can be resolved through references. Together, these results show that CRG provides a practical interface for privacy-sensitive cloud LLMs by reducing plaintext exposure across both input and output pathways while preserv- ing task utility and server-side model confidentiality.

  • 8 authors
·
Sep 25

Training on the Benchmark Is Not All You Need

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) relies heavily on the huge amount of pre-training data learned in the pre-training phase. The opacity of the pre-training process and the training data causes the results of many benchmark tests to become unreliable. If any model has been trained on a benchmark test set, it can seriously hinder the health of the field. In order to automate and efficiently test the capabilities of large language models, numerous mainstream benchmarks adopt a multiple-choice format. As the swapping of the contents of multiple-choice options does not affect the meaning of the question itself, we propose a simple and effective data leakage detection method based on this property. Specifically, we shuffle the contents of the options in the data to generate the corresponding derived data sets, and then detect data leakage based on the model's log probability distribution over the derived data sets. If there is a maximum and outlier in the set of log probabilities, it indicates that the data is leaked. Our method is able to work under black-box conditions without access to model training data or weights, effectively identifying data leakage from benchmark test sets in model pre-training data, including both normal scenarios and complex scenarios where options may have been shuffled intentionally or unintentionally. Through experiments based on two LLMs and benchmark designs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In addition, we evaluate the degree of data leakage of 31 mainstream open-source LLMs on four benchmark datasets and give a ranking of the leaked LLMs for each benchmark, and we find that the Qwen family of LLMs has the highest degree of data leakage.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 3, 2024

Logit Standardization in Knowledge Distillation

Knowledge distillation involves transferring soft labels from a teacher to a student using a shared temperature-based softmax function. However, the assumption of a shared temperature between teacher and student implies a mandatory exact match between their logits in terms of logit range and variance. This side-effect limits the performance of student, considering the capacity discrepancy between them and the finding that the innate logit relations of teacher are sufficient for student to learn. To address this issue, we propose setting the temperature as the weighted standard deviation of logit and performing a plug-and-play Z-score pre-process of logit standardization before applying softmax and Kullback-Leibler divergence. Our pre-process enables student to focus on essential logit relations from teacher rather than requiring a magnitude match, and can improve the performance of existing logit-based distillation methods. We also show a typical case where the conventional setting of sharing temperature between teacher and student cannot reliably yield the authentic distillation evaluation; nonetheless, this challenge is successfully alleviated by our Z-score. We extensively evaluate our method for various student and teacher models on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, showing its significant superiority. The vanilla knowledge distillation powered by our pre-process can achieve favorable performance against state-of-the-art methods, and other distillation variants can obtain considerable gain with the assistance of our pre-process.

  • 5 authors
·
Mar 3, 2024

Leaky Students: Membership Inference against On-Policy Distillation

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student to match a teacher's next-token distributions on student-generated trajectories. However, privileged information supplied to the teacher for OPD training may contain sensitive data. Whether the student leaks private information about the records supplied to the teacher during distillation remains poorly understood. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first systematic study of membership inference in this setting. We find that fresh student trajectories expose sparse membership signals that fixed reference-answer losses often miss. These signals are mixed with probability changes caused by training on other records. We introduce Leaky, which samples fresh trajectories from the target model and compares its token log-probabilities with the maximum across matched reference models trained without the candidate records. It applies Leaky ReLU to the resulting gaps, preserving positive gaps and downweighting negative gaps as an approximate correction for incidental positive gaps in non-members. Across fifteen targets spanning mathematics, medical question answering, and code generation, Leaky outperforms all evaluated baselines and achieves mean AUROC 0.875, compared with 0.614 for the strongest baseline on each target in the main evaluation. On the same sampled trajectories, the strongest baseline achieves mean AUROC 0.826. These results show that students trained through OPD can expose the membership of records used for teacher supervision, even when fixed reference-answer losses provide little evidence of membership.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 26

Dual-Head Knowledge Distillation: Enhancing Logits Utilization with an Auxiliary Head

Traditional knowledge distillation focuses on aligning the student's predicted probabilities with both ground-truth labels and the teacher's predicted probabilities. However, the transition to predicted probabilities from logits would obscure certain indispensable information. To address this issue, it is intuitive to additionally introduce a logit-level loss function as a supplement to the widely used probability-level loss function, for exploiting the latent information of logits. Unfortunately, we empirically find that the amalgamation of the newly introduced logit-level loss and the previous probability-level loss will lead to performance degeneration, even trailing behind the performance of employing either loss in isolation. We attribute this phenomenon to the collapse of the classification head, which is verified by our theoretical analysis based on the neural collapse theory. Specifically, the gradients of the two loss functions exhibit contradictions in the linear classifier yet display no such conflict within the backbone. Drawing from the theoretical analysis, we propose a novel method called dual-head knowledge distillation, which partitions the linear classifier into two classification heads responsible for different losses, thereby preserving the beneficial effects of both losses on the backbone while eliminating adverse influences on the classification head. Extensive experiments validate that our method can effectively exploit the information inside the logits and achieve superior performance against state-of-the-art counterparts.

  • 5 authors
·
Nov 13, 2024

Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Models

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 1, 2023

Leak It: Per-Document Extraction Beyond Aggregate Membership Inference

Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone. Building on probabilistic discoverable extraction, we study black-box training-data leakage using N samples from p_theta(. | x), placing mean overlap, extreme-value overlap, and self-concentration on a common functional-estimation footing. On WikiMIA, a blind bag-of-words classifier reaches AUC 0.97 (TPR 0.90 at 5% FPR) while sampling adds nothing. On an IID Pile split (MIMIR), neither self-concentration nor gold-continuation recovery significantly exceeds a blind baseline in aggregate. Aggregate metrics hide the real harm: sampling verbatim-extracts training data for a tail of documents no blind attack can reach. On Pythia-6.9B, 16.6% of 500 Pile documents bearing a real identifier (83 documents; 21.3% of those bearing an email address) have that identifier reproduced and not reproduced under a mismatched-prefix control. Each leak is attributable to that document rather than a globally common string. This per-document disclosure is invisible to aggregate AUC. Risk is uneven: identifier leakage is about 3x stronger in code than prose, though prose remains positive and grows with capacity (4.0% to 12.1% from 410M to 6.9B); recovery of arbitrary held-out continuations is essentially confined to code (+0.44 member gap on GitHub vs at most +0.014 on prose). Temperature and nucleus sampling have minor effect, a 16-token prefix suffices, and the sample-budget relationship corroborates prior probabilistic-extraction results. We detect no reduction from deduplication. Privacy audits should report per-document extraction, not only aggregate membership, and motivate differential privacy as the mitigation. We release leakit, a black-box tool implementing this probe and its control.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 9

Unlearned but Not Forgotten: Data Extraction after Exact Unlearning in LLM

Large Language Models are typically trained on datasets collected from the web, which may inadvertently contain harmful or sensitive personal information. To address growing privacy concerns, unlearning methods have been proposed to remove the influence of specific data from trained models. Of these, exact unlearning -- which retrains the model from scratch without the target data -- is widely regarded the gold standard for mitigating privacy risks in deployment. In this paper, we revisit this assumption in a practical deployment setting where both the pre- and post-unlearning logits API are exposed, such as in open-weight scenarios. Targeting this setting, we introduce a novel data extraction attack that leverages signals from the pre-unlearning model to guide the post-unlearning model, uncovering patterns that reflect the removed data distribution. Combining model guidance with a token filtering strategy, our attack significantly improves extraction success rates -- doubling performance in some cases -- across common benchmarks such as MUSE, TOFU, and WMDP. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack's effectiveness on a simulated medical diagnosis dataset to highlight real-world privacy risks associated with exact unlearning. In light of our findings, which suggest that unlearning may, in a contradictory way, increase the risk of privacy leakage during real-world deployments, we advocate for evaluation of unlearning methods to consider broader threat models that account not only for post-unlearning models but also for adversarial access to prior checkpoints. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Nicholas0228/unlearned_data_extraction_llm.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 21, 2025

Clone What You Can't Steal: Black-Box LLM Replication via Logit Leakage and Distillation

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 31, 2025

Formalizing and Estimating Distribution Inference Risks

Distribution inference, sometimes called property inference, infers statistical properties about a training set from access to a model trained on that data. Distribution inference attacks can pose serious risks when models are trained on private data, but are difficult to distinguish from the intrinsic purpose of statistical machine learning -- namely, to produce models that capture statistical properties about a distribution. Motivated by Yeom et al.'s membership inference framework, we propose a formal definition of distribution inference attacks that is general enough to describe a broad class of attacks distinguishing between possible training distributions. We show how our definition captures previous ratio-based property inference attacks as well as new kinds of attack including revealing the average node degree or clustering coefficient of a training graph. To understand distribution inference risks, we introduce a metric that quantifies observed leakage by relating it to the leakage that would occur if samples from the training distribution were provided directly to the adversary. We report on a series of experiments across a range of different distributions using both novel black-box attacks and improved versions of the state-of-the-art white-box attacks. Our results show that inexpensive attacks are often as effective as expensive meta-classifier attacks, and that there are surprising asymmetries in the effectiveness of attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/FormEstDistRisks

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 13, 2021

Privacy Failure in Split-LLM Training, The Returned Gradient Nullifies the Decoys

We present a systems-security case study of a two-node split-LLM training system whose privacy evaluation passed while leaving an observable channel untested. The Trusted Local Node (TLN) sends protected activations to the Untrusted Cloud Node (UCN), the UCN returns its output, and TLN, holding the private loss, returns the output gradient. The frame the UCN receives mixes real rows with decoys, and the loss ignores the decoys. Their gradients are exactly zero, so the pattern of zeros reveals which rows were real. We measure it with a protocol fixed in advance: a leak injected at known strength to prove the instrument can see one, a shuffled-label control to prove it does not report absent leaks, and a threshold set before the runs. Across nine seeds, the zeros identified the real rows on every frame, 4,096 of 4,096 per run. An attack on the frame contents recovered about one extra token per hundred over a constant-guess baseline (+0.65 to +1.50 percentage points); the shuffled controls recovered nothing. A second set of runs repeated this on a configuration that keeps model quality within budget, so the finding is not confined to a setting nobody would deploy. On both datasets, every such run passed the forward-channel privacy check and the quality check, yet failed that same check once the returned gradient was included. Clipping and noising each row of the gradient closed the leak for about 0.01 nats of held-out cross-entropy. The system is not thereby safe: five classes of attack, including those accumulating observations across training steps, were never measured.

Setloop Setloop
·
Sep 2 2

Prompt-Guided Image Editing with Masked Logit Nudging in Visual Autoregressive Models

We address the problem of prompt-guided image editing in visual autoregressive models. Given a source image and a target text prompt, we aim to modify the source image according to the target prompt, while preserving all regions which are unrelated to the requested edit. To this end, we present Masked Logit Nudging, which uses the source image token maps to introduce a guidance step that aligns the model's predictions under the target prompt with these source token maps. Specifically, we convert the fixed source encodings into logits using the VAR encoding, nudging the model's predicted logits towards the targets along a semantic trajectory defined by the source-target prompts. Edits are applied only within spatial masks obtained through a dedicated masking scheme that leverages cross-attention differences between the source and edited prompts. Then, we introduce a refinement to correct quantization errors and improve reconstruction quality. Our approach achieves the best image editing performance on the PIE benchmark at 512px and 1024px resolutions. Beyond editing, our method delivers faithful reconstructions and outperforms previous methods on COCO at 512px and OpenImages at 1024px. Overall, our method outperforms VAR-related approaches and achieves comparable or even better performance than diffusion models, while being much faster. Code is available at 'https://github.com/AmirMaEl/MLN'.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 15

PLD: A Choice-Theoretic List-Wise Knowledge Distillation

Knowledge distillation is a model compression technique in which a compact "student" network is trained to replicate the predictive behavior of a larger "teacher" network. In logit-based knowledge distillation, it has become the de facto approach to augment cross-entropy with a distillation term. Typically, this term is either a KL divergence that matches marginal probabilities or a correlation-based loss that captures intra- and inter-class relationships. In every case, it acts as an additional term to cross-entropy. This term has its own weight, which must be carefully tuned. In this paper, we adopt a choice-theoretic perspective and recast knowledge distillation under the Plackett-Luce model by interpreting teacher logits as "worth" scores. We introduce "Plackett-Luce Distillation (PLD)", a weighted list-wise ranking loss. In PLD, the teacher model transfers knowledge of its full ranking of classes, weighting each ranked choice by its own confidence. PLD directly optimizes a single "teacher-optimal" ranking. The true label is placed first, followed by the remaining classes in descending teacher confidence. This process yields a convex and translation-invariant surrogate that subsumes weighted cross-entropy. Empirically, across CIFAR-100, ImageNet-1K, and MS-COCO, PLD achieves consistent gains across diverse architectures and distillation objectives, including divergence-based, correlation-based, and feature-based methods, in both homogeneous and heterogeneous teacher-student pairs.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 14, 2025

Decodable but Not Detectable: A Leakage Fingerprint for Near-OOD Benchmarks

While auditing a perturbation-based OOD detector on a document benchmark, we recorded an AUROC of 0.326 -- well below the 0.5 chance level. The cause is a benchmark leak: the designated "OOD" class is one the model was trained on, so its examples sit inside the in-distribution fit set and the detector is penalized for correctly ranking them as familiar. Deleting the class and retraining 35 models across two domains raises the score to 0.911. We distill the contamination into a leak fingerprint -- near-perfect supervised decodability (AUROC approximately 1) coupled with unsupervised detection collapsed below 0.65 -- and validate it on a controlled battery of 52 settings (20 leaked, 32 clean) across ResNet-50 and ViT-B/16 on CIFAR-10/100, achieving sensitivity 18/20 and specificity 31/32 in embedding space; the matched fit-set-exclusion controls are perfect at 20/20. An in-the-wild audit of 24 standard near/far OOD benchmark pairs fires on exactly one (the intrinsically hard CIFAR-100 vs CIFAR-10 pair) and on no far-OOD pair, confirming specificity and that standard cross-dataset construction is clean. Under the corrected protocol, perturbation signals are decodable but not detectable: a supervised reader recovers the OOD signal (AUROC 0.87-1.00) while no unsupervised detector does, and the perturbation method does not improve on plain Mahalanobis distance. We provide a theoretical account of why and, for transparency, retract an earlier circular correlation. The contributions are a corrected protocol and a validated leak diagnostic, not a new OOD method.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 1

When the Reward Suite Is Leaky: A Preregistered Causal Contrast of Natural Verifier False Positives in RLVR

The test suites used as RLVR rewards for code have natural false positives: per-task, persistent, asymmetric errors that accept the same wrong programs every time they appear, unlike the symmetric or resampled noise assumed by existing noise-robustness analyses. We run a preregistered two-arm causal contrast on a deployed suite: GRPO on identical MBPP tasks, seeds, and compute, rewarded by the original MBPP tests (leaky) versus the MBPP+ extra tests (hardened). Two further families replicate the design under a preregistration frozen before their data existed. [C] The average held-out effect is bounded: non-inferior under a preregistered 1.5-pt margin (gap 0.20 pt, one-sided 95% upper bound 0.75 pt). [C] Rewarded false-positive mass tracks a cheap static leakiness audit computed before training (Spearman 0.80), and the registered train-side test puts the leak-stratum FP share +43.8 pt above clean tasks. [E] Auditing every rewarded FP under signed, human-adjudicated rules finds a large residual of verified genuinely wrong code: 47.57% record-weighted; both replication families reproduce a large share. The reward paid for real bugs, not merely suite artifacts. [E] Mechanism evidence is consistent with selection of pre-existing error modes rather than learned exploitation: FP incidence does not grow within our horizon, and untrained base models already produce the same wrong outputs under the leaky filter. We then turn the same instrument on the frontier judges themselves: on their own false positives they self-assess only weakly, a same-author test is unresolved, and even the highest-scoring reader we probe stays far below its score on a weaker policy's errors -- two subjects on MBPP, licensing nothing about frontier models in general. A cheap static audit locates exposure before training; hardening the reward removes the measurement inflation, though here it buys little capability.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 12

Value Leakage: An LLM's Answers Are Silently Shaped by Its Own Values

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 16

ExCeL : Combined Extreme and Collective Logit Information for Enhancing Out-of-Distribution Detection

Deep learning models often exhibit overconfidence in predicting out-of-distribution (OOD) data, underscoring the crucial role of OOD detection in ensuring reliability in predictions. Among various OOD detection approaches, post-hoc detectors have gained significant popularity, primarily due to their ease of use and implementation. However, the effectiveness of most post-hoc OOD detectors has been constrained as they rely solely either on extreme information, such as the maximum logit, or on the collective information (i.e., information spanned across classes or training samples) embedded within the output layer. In this paper, we propose ExCeL that combines both extreme and collective information within the output layer for enhanced accuracy in OOD detection. We leverage the logit of the top predicted class as the extreme information (i.e., the maximum logit), while the collective information is derived in a novel approach that involves assessing the likelihood of other classes appearing in subsequent ranks across various training samples. Our idea is motivated by the observation that, for in-distribution (ID) data, the ranking of classes beyond the predicted class is more deterministic compared to that in OOD data. Experiments conducted on CIFAR100 and ImageNet-200 datasets demonstrate that ExCeL consistently is among the five top-performing methods out of twenty-one existing post-hoc baselines when the joint performance on near-OOD and far-OOD is considered (i.e., in terms of AUROC and FPR95). Furthermore, ExCeL shows the best overall performance across both datasets, unlike other baselines that work best on one dataset but has a performance drop in the other.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 22, 2023

Beyond Visual Evidence: Revealing and Mitigating Relational Privacy Leakage in Document MLLMs

While the privacy risks of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have drawn significant attention, the unique vulnerabilities of domain-specific MLLMs remain largely underexplored. Focusing on document understanding MLLMs for identity document processing, this paper investigates the privacy issues inherent in Key Information Extraction (KIE) tasks. We reveal that when input images lack sufficient visual evidence, these models often rely on memorized field relations from training data to infer missing content, thereby leaking multiple correlated fields containing sensitive personal information. To mitigate this risk, we make three key contributions.First, we propose the Dynamic Relational Unlearning Framework (DRUF) which comprises a Relational Decoupling Unlearning (RDU) module and a dynamic set update mechanism. It suppresses the leakage of high-risk field pairs while preserving KIE performance.Second, we introduce DocPrivacyBench, a novel benchmark to systematically evaluate a model's susceptibility to privacy leakage under conditions of absent or minimal visual evidence.Third, we evaluate three MLLMs and six unlearning methods using this benchmark, assessing both post-unlearning leakage suppression and utility preservation.Our results demonstrate that existing MLLMs consistently exhibit privacy leakage when visual evidence is scarce, particularly on noisier datasets. In contrast, DRUF outperforms the strongest baseline by improving leakage suppression by 4.8 percentage points, effectively mitigating privacy risks while maintaining robust document information extraction performance.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 12

Softmax Reparameterization for Output-Head Quantization

Large vocabularies make output heads a substantial inference cost in small language models. We propose softmax reparameterization, a post-training method that selects a functionally equivalent output head before quantization. The method subtracts a scalar multiple of the vocabulary-row mean from every output row and selects the coefficient by validation KL separately for RTN, activation-weighted MSE, and full-Hessian GPTQ. This one-dimensional search includes the original head and fixed mean-centering, preserves the full-precision softmax distribution, and leaves the trained decoder unchanged; a rank-one correction handles nonlinear logit paths such as soft-capping. Across seven heads, W4 gains concentrate where baseline quantization substantially distorts predictions: on Phi-4-mini, AW-MSE KL falls from 0.936 to 0.256. The gains survive stronger GPTQ calibration and remain complementary to exact per-channel scaling and affine quantization. Across four heads and three W4 quantizers, frozen WikiText-selected coefficients also transfer to C4 and OpenWebMath, outperforming mean-centering in all 18 comparisons where the frozen coefficient differs from 1 and matching it in the remaining six. At W2, used as a compression stress test, benefits broaden across nearly the full model--quantizer matrix. Matched residual analysis shows that improved fidelity can accompany greater logit reconstruction error while reducing the residual's Fisher-weighted cost. For shift-compatible heads, reparameterization adds no inference operation and preserves packed W4 execution: with the decoder held in BF16, quantizing the Phi output head reduces batch-one generation latency by 10.8% relative to the BF16-head baseline.

adobe Adobe
·
Sep 24 2

AgentLeak: A Full-Stack Benchmark for Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current benchmarks cannot measure. When agents coordinate on tasks, sensitive data passes through inter-agent messages, shared memory, and tool arguments; pathways that output-only audits never inspect. We introduce AgentLeak, to the best of our knowledge the first full-stack benchmark for privacy leakage covering internal channels, spanning 1,000 scenarios across healthcare, finance, legal, and corporate domains, paired with a 32-class attack taxonomy and three-tier detection pipeline. Testing GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large, and Llama 3.3 70B across 4,979 traces reveals that multi-agent configurations reduce per-channel output leakage (C1: 27.2% vs 43.2% in single-agent) but introduce unmonitored internal channels that raise total system exposure to 68.9% (OR-aggregated across C1, C2, C5). Internal channels account for most of this gap: inter-agent messages (C2) leak at 68.8%, compared to 27.2% on C1 (output channel). This means that output-only audits miss 41.7% of violations. Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which emphasizes safety alignment in its design, achieves the lowest leakage rates on both external (3.3%) and internal (28.1%) channels, suggesting that model-level safety training may transfer to internal channel protection. Across all five models and four domains, the pattern C2 > C1 holds consistently, confirming that inter-agent communication is the primary vulnerability. These findings underscore the need for coordination frameworks that incorporate internal-channel privacy protections and enforce privacy controls on inter-agent communication.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 11 1

Ventor-QTest: Threat-Model-Driven Verification of Vendor-Hosted LLM APIs

As large language models become increasingly widespread, third-party providers that deploy open-weight models have become an important part of the ecosystem. Auditing the quality of their inference APIs is therefore an open problem. We formalize hosted model routing as a stochastic process and propose \textbf{Ventor-QTest}, a composite black-box audit that requires no probability information from the target API. Its repeated-request component sends each frozen constrained context to the target multiple times, reconstructs a categorical output distribution from the returned text counts, and reports average fidelity loss (AFL) as a null-bias-corrected, within-window mean coarsened-KL statistic. Its long-sequence component uses independent runs to report extreme fidelity loss (EFL) through the empirical upper tail of a run-level reference-centered-surprisal statistic. Across three logprob-capable route conditions, AFL shows strong linear descriptive agreement with a logprob-derived coarsened-KL comparator. Across seven route snapshots, 20-run sequence probes reveal route-specific EFL variation. AFL and EFL have little detectable route-level association with GPQA-Diamond accuracy. In contrast, pronounced EFL coincides with a decline in Terminal-Bench pass rate as task exposure increases. This pattern may arise because correctness in long-horizon tasks is more sensitive to extreme fidelity loss. These results motivate reporting AFL and EFL jointly, particularly when auditing long-horizon agentic tasks. The open-source implementation is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard/tree/main/services/api_checker/ventor_qtest.

tencent Tencent
·
Aug 16 2

RAPID: Risk of Attribute Prediction-Induced Disclosure in Synthetic Microdata

Statistical data anonymization increasingly relies on fully synthetic microdata, for which classical identity disclosure measures are less informative than an adversary's ability to infer sensitive attributes from released data. We introduce RAPID (Risk of Attribute Prediction--Induced Disclosure), a disclosure risk measure that directly quantifies inferential vulnerability under a realistic attack model. An adversary trains a predictive model solely on the released synthetic data and applies it to real individuals' quasi-identifiers. For continuous sensitive attributes, RAPID reports the proportion of records whose predicted values fall within a specified relative error tolerance. For categorical attributes, we propose a baseline-normalized confidence score that measures how much more confident the attacker is about the true class than would be expected from class prevalence alone, and we summarize risk as the fraction of records exceeding a policy-defined threshold. This construction yields an interpretable, bounded risk metric that is robust to class imbalance, independent of any specific synthesizer, and applicable with arbitrary learning algorithms. We illustrate threshold calibration, uncertainty quantification, and comparative evaluation of synthetic data generators using simulations and real data. Our results show that RAPID provides a practical, attacker-realistic upper bound on attribute-inference disclosure risk that complements existing utility diagnostics and disclosure control frameworks.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 8

X-Token: Projection-Guided Cross-Tokenizer Knowledge Distillation

Cross-tokenizer knowledge distillation allows a student model to learn from teachers with incompatible vocabularies. Prior work operates on hidden states or logits; the latter is preferred as a drop-in replacement requiring no auxiliary components. Logit-based methods either use only the correct-token probability, missing the full 'dark knowledge' in the teacher's distribution, or operate on the full output distribution, relying on strict token partitioning and/or unprincipled heuristic ranking. We identify two key shortcomings of full-distribution, logit-based methods: (i) an uncommon-token failure, where critical tokens fall into the unmatched subset (e.g., Llama's 1100 multi-digit numerals under digit-splitting Qwen supervision) and are suppressed during training, reducing GSM8k from 12.89 to 2.56 compared to same-tokenizer KD from a weaker teacher; and (ii) over-conservative matching, where strict 1-to-1 matching excludes near-equivalent tokens across surface forms. These failures require distinct remedies: eliminating the partition when critical tokens are misaligned, and refining it when alignment is reliable. We propose X-Token, an approach with two complementary loss formulations targeting these issues. P-KL removes partitioning and aligns the student's distribution with the teacher's via a sparse projection matrix W (initialized from tokenizer-level string rules) to address the uncommon-token failure. H-KL retains the hybrid form while relaxing matching to align each student token with its top-ranked teacher mapping under W. Both objectives share W and extend naturally to multiple teachers. Empirically, on Llama-3.2-1B, X-Token outperforms the current state of the art GOLD by +3.82 average points with a Qwen3-4B teacher and by +0.5 with a Phi-4-Mini teacher. Further, a two-teacher setup (Phi-4-mini + Llama-3B) improves over single-teacher distillation by +1.3 points.

  • 7 authors
·
May 19

Networked Information Aggregation for Binary Classification

We study networked binary classification on a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where each agent observes only a subset of the feature columns of a shared dataset. Agents act sequentially along the DAG: each receives prediction columns from its parents (if any), augments its local features with these columns, fits a logistic predictor by minimizing binary cross-entropy (BCE), and forwards its prediction column to its outgoing neighbors. We ask whether this sequential distributed training procedure achieves information aggregation, meaning that some agent attains small excess loss compared to the best logistic predictor trained with access to all feature columns. This question was studied for linear regression under squared loss by Kearns, Roth, and Ryu (SODA 2026). Extending their guarantees to classification is nontrivial because their analysis relies on quadratic structure that does not directly transfer to BCE with a logistic link. We analyze the resulting sequential logit-passing protocol and prove: (i) an excess loss upper bound of O(M/D) on depth-D paths under the condition that every M contiguous subsequence of M agents collectively observe all features, and (ii) a close lower bound showing instances with excess loss of at least Ω(k/D) where k is the dimension of the feature space. Together, these results identify network depth as a fundamental bottleneck for information aggregation in networked logistic regression.

  • 5 authors
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Apr 30

Zero Gap Is Not Restoration: Stratified Per-Question Probability Evaluation and Step-wise Mitigation of Benchmark Contamination

Test data from public benchmarks inevitably leaks into pretraining corpora, inflating evaluation scores once memorized. Contamination mitigation evaluation intervenes in the decoding process to suppress memorization and restore a contaminated model's genuine capability, but its prevailing metric, the G-AP (Gap of Aggregate Performance), is flawed. Discrete correct/incorrect readouts cannot characterize per-question performance, averaging before differencing lets over- and under-suppression cancel out, and uniform per-question weighting invites strategies to push solve probabilities onto the clean model's high-frequency values. We propose SA-PPG (Stratified Aggregate of Per-question Probability Gaps): estimate each question's solve probability by sampling, difference it against the clean model per question, and aggregate within groups defined by the clean model's solve probability. Existing mitigation strategies first estimate where contamination lies and then operate on the estimate, so they are only as correct as the estimate. RailCap instead judges contamination during generation: whenever a sample falls back onto the greedy trajectory, the next trajectory token is capped to the runner-up, accumulating suppression until the response distribution becomes sufficiently dispersed. Across multiple contaminated models and benchmarks, SA-PPG reveals that prior strategies' restoration is substantially overestimated, while RailCap attains the lowest SA-PPG.

Leakage and the Reproducibility Crisis in ML-based Science

The use of machine learning (ML) methods for prediction and forecasting has become widespread across the quantitative sciences. However, there are many known methodological pitfalls, including data leakage, in ML-based science. In this paper, we systematically investigate reproducibility issues in ML-based science. We show that data leakage is indeed a widespread problem and has led to severe reproducibility failures. Specifically, through a survey of literature in research communities that adopted ML methods, we find 17 fields where errors have been found, collectively affecting 329 papers and in some cases leading to wildly overoptimistic conclusions. Based on our survey, we present a fine-grained taxonomy of 8 types of leakage that range from textbook errors to open research problems. We argue for fundamental methodological changes to ML-based science so that cases of leakage can be caught before publication. To that end, we propose model info sheets for reporting scientific claims based on ML models that would address all types of leakage identified in our survey. To investigate the impact of reproducibility errors and the efficacy of model info sheets, we undertake a reproducibility study in a field where complex ML models are believed to vastly outperform older statistical models such as Logistic Regression (LR): civil war prediction. We find that all papers claiming the superior performance of complex ML models compared to LR models fail to reproduce due to data leakage, and complex ML models don't perform substantively better than decades-old LR models. While none of these errors could have been caught by reading the papers, model info sheets would enable the detection of leakage in each case.

  • 2 authors
·
Jul 13, 2022

Mitigating Negative Flips via Margin Preserving Training

Minimizing inconsistencies across successive versions of an AI system is as crucial as reducing the overall error. In image classification, such inconsistencies manifest as negative flips, where an updated model misclassifies test samples that were previously classified correctly. This issue becomes increasingly pronounced as the number of training classes grows over time, since adding new categories reduces the margin of each class and may introduce conflicting patterns that undermine their learning process, thereby degrading performance on the original subset. To mitigate negative flips, we propose a novel approach that preserves the margins of the original model while learning an improved one. Our method encourages a larger relative margin between the previously learned and newly introduced classes by introducing an explicit margin-calibration term on the logits. However, overly constraining the logit margin for the new classes can significantly degrade their accuracy compared to a new independently trained model. To address this, we integrate a double-source focal distillation loss with the previous model and a new independently trained model, learning an appropriate decision margin from both old and new data, even under a logit margin calibration. Extensive experiments on image classification benchmarks demonstrate that our approach consistently reduces the negative flip rate with high overall accuracy.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 11, 2025

Channel Location Constrains the Auditability of Subliminal Learning

Subliminal learning lets a student inherit a teacher's hidden trait from distillation data that never names it. We ask when such transfer can be audited before training. The answer is not model identity or scale alone, but channel location: the carrier through which the trait reaches the student. We find three regimes. In a controlled initialization-dependent body channel, a pre-training screen works. Coverage, the cosine between the student's initial distillation update and the teacher's fine-tuning displacement, predicts held-out transfer (Spearman ρapprox 0.95; AUROC 0.997). In pretrained language models, masked single-token traits instead ride convergent vocabulary geometry. This channel is initialization-independent, so initialization-alignment screens, including coverage, are not mechanistic; the useful handles are post-hoc detection and targeted mitigation. Even when a single-token named entity is removed from the loss, the student's held-out probability for that entity rises to 0.40 on average (sim 2500times), and a related semantic class transfers. In an untied-head model, orthogonalizing the trait's output row against entangled neighbours collapses leakage, while equal-size random-subspace edits do not. Thus removing a target string from distillation labels does not remove the corresponding preference: neighbouring tokens can carry it. Finally, conditional behaviours can route through the network body. For sycophancy, with agreement and correction markers masked from the loss, transfer reaches about 0.63 of the teacher's effect, localizes to body computation, and evades four audits across two model families. We scope this as masked transfer of a condition-present policy. Channel location is necessary for deciding which audits can be sound. It is not a deployment-ready screen: an audit used outside its carrier regime can give false assurance.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 19

How Your Credentials Are Leaked by LLM Agent Skills: An Empirical Study

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on third-party skills that operate within privileged execution environments and routinely handle sensitive credentials, yet how these credentials are leaked remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we present the first large-scale empirical study on credential leakage in agent skills. From 170,226 artifacts on SkillsMP, the largest open-source skill marketplace, we sampled 17,022 skills via stratified random sampling and analyzed each through static secret extraction (regex and AST parsing), dynamic sandbox testing with mock credentials, and cross-referencing developer intent against runtime behavior. Our analysis identifies 520 affected skills containing 1,708 security issues, and yields a taxonomy of 10 leakage patterns. Three findings stand out. First, 76.3% of cases require jointly analyzing natural-language descriptions and programming logic, showing that credential exposure in skills is fundamentally cross-modal. Second, debug logging accounts for 73.5% of vulnerabilities because agent frameworks feed stdout into the LLM context window, turning routine debugging into a credential exposure vector. Third, 89.6% of leaked credentials are immediately exploitable -- 92.5% during routine execution without elevated privileges -- and the fork-based distribution model defeats remediation, as secrets removed from 107 upstream repositories persist across 50+ independent forks. Following responsible disclosure, all malicious skills have been removed and 91.6% of hardcoded cases remediated. We release our dataset, taxonomy, and detection pipeline to support future agent security research.

  • 10 authors
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Jun 18

Rethinking Benchmark and Contamination for Language Models with Rephrased Samples

Large language models are increasingly trained on all the data ever produced by humans. Many have raised concerns about the trustworthiness of public benchmarks due to potential contamination in pre-training or fine-tuning datasets. While most data decontamination efforts apply string matching (e.g., n-gram overlap) to remove benchmark data, we show that these methods are insufficient, and simple variations of test data (e.g., paraphrasing, translation) can easily bypass these decontamination measures. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if such variation of test data is not eliminated, a 13B model can easily overfit a test benchmark and achieve drastically high performance, on par with GPT-4. We validate such observations in widely used benchmarks such as MMLU, GSK8k, and HumanEval. To address this growing risk, we propose a stronger LLM-based decontamination method and apply it to widely used pre-training and fine-tuning datasets, revealing significant previously unknown test overlap. For example, in pre-training sets such as RedPajama-Data-1T and StarCoder-Data, we identified that 8-18\% of the HumanEval benchmark overlaps. Interestingly, we also find such contamination in synthetic dataset generated by GPT-3.5/4, suggesting a potential risk of unintentional contamination. We urge the community to adopt stronger decontamination approaches when using public benchmarks. Moreover, we call for the community to actively develop fresh one-time exams to evaluate models accurately. Our decontamination tool is publicly available at https://github.com/lm-sys/llm-decontaminator.

  • 5 authors
·
Nov 8, 2023 1

Generalization or Memorization: Data Contamination and Trustworthy Evaluation for Large Language Models

Recent statements about the impressive capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are usually supported by evaluating on open-access benchmarks. Considering the vast size and wide-ranging sources of LLMs' training data, it could explicitly or implicitly include test data, leading to LLMs being more susceptible to data contamination. However, due to the opacity of training data, the black-box access of models, and the rapid growth of synthetic training data, detecting and mitigating data contamination for LLMs faces significant challenges. In this paper, we propose CDD, which stands for Contamination Detection via output Distribution for LLMs. CDD necessitates only the sampled texts to detect data contamination, by identifying the peakedness of LLM's output distribution. To mitigate the impact of data contamination in evaluation, we also present TED: Trustworthy Evaluation via output Distribution, based on the correction of LLM's output distribution. To facilitate this study, we introduce two benchmarks, i.e., DetCon and ComiEval, for data contamination detection and contamination mitigation evaluation tasks. Extensive experimental results show that CDD achieves the average relative improvements of 21.8\%-30.2\% over other contamination detection approaches in terms of Accuracy, F1 Score, and AUC metrics, and can effectively detect implicit contamination. TED substantially mitigates performance improvements up to 66.9\% attributed to data contamination across various contamination setups. In real-world applications, we reveal that ChatGPT exhibits a high potential to suffer from data contamination on HumanEval benchmark.

  • 7 authors
·
Feb 24, 2024

Mitigating Sensitive Information Leakage in LLMs4Code through Machine Unlearning

Large Language Models for Code (LLMs4Code) have achieved strong performance in code generation, but recent studies reveal that they may memorize and leak sensitive information contained in training data, posing serious privacy risks. To address this gap, this work presents the first comprehensive empirical study on applying machine unlearning to mitigate sensitive information leakage in LLMs4Code. We first construct a dedicated benchmark that includes: (i) a synthetic forget set containing diverse forms of personal information, and (ii) a retain set designed to evaluate whether code-generation capability is preserved after unlearning. Using this benchmark, we systematically assess three representative unlearning algorithms (GA, GA+GD, GA+KL) across three widely used open-source LLMs4Code models (AIXCoder-7B, CodeLlama-7B, CodeQwen-7B). Experimental results demonstrate that machine unlearning can substantially reduce direct memorization-based leakage: on average, the direct leak rate drops by more than 50% while retaining about over 91% of the original code-generation performance. Moreover, by analyzing post-unlearning outputs, we uncover a consistent shift from direct to indirect leakage, revealing an underexplored vulnerability that persists even when the target data has been successfully forgotten. Our findings show that machine unlearning is a feasible and effective solution for enhancing privacy protection in LLMs4Code, while also highlighting the need for future techniques capable of mitigating both direct and indirect leakage simultaneously.

  • 9 authors
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Jan 27

MMLU-CF: A Contamination-free Multi-task Language Understanding Benchmark

Multiple-choice question (MCQ) datasets like Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) are widely used to evaluate the commonsense, understanding, and problem-solving abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the open-source nature of these benchmarks and the broad sources of training data for LLMs have inevitably led to benchmark contamination, resulting in unreliable evaluation results. To alleviate this issue, we propose a contamination-free and more challenging MCQ benchmark called MMLU-CF. This benchmark reassesses LLMs' understanding of world knowledge by averting both unintentional and malicious data leakage. To avoid unintentional data leakage, we source data from a broader domain and design three decontamination rules. To prevent malicious data leakage, we divide the benchmark into validation and test sets with similar difficulty and subject distributions. The test set remains closed-source to ensure reliable results, while the validation set is publicly available to promote transparency and facilitate independent verification. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals that the powerful GPT-4o achieves merely a 5-shot score of 73.4% and a 0-shot score of 71.9% on the test set, which indicates the effectiveness of our approach in creating a more rigorous and contamination-free evaluation standard. The GitHub repository is available at https://github.com/microsoft/MMLU-CF and the dataset refers to https://huggingface.co/datasets/microsoft/MMLU-CF.

  • 11 authors
·
Dec 19, 2024

LeakyCLIP: Extracting Training Data from CLIP

Understanding the memorization and privacy leakage risks in Contrastive Language--Image Pretraining (CLIP) is critical for ensuring the security of multimodal models. Recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of extracting sensitive training examples from diffusion models, with conditional diffusion models exhibiting a stronger tendency to memorize and leak information. In this work, we investigate data memorization and extraction risks in CLIP through the lens of CLIP inversion, a process that aims to reconstruct training images from text prompts. To this end, we introduce LeakyCLIP, a novel attack framework designed to achieve high-quality, semantically accurate image reconstruction from CLIP embeddings. We identify three key challenges in CLIP inversion: 1) non-robust features, 2) limited visual semantics in text embeddings, and 3) low reconstruction fidelity. To address these challenges, LeakyCLIP employs 1) adversarial fine-tuning to enhance optimization smoothness, 2) linear transformation-based embedding alignment, and 3) Stable Diffusion-based refinement to improve fidelity. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of LeakyCLIP, achieving over 358% improvement in Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) for ViT-B-16 compared to baseline methods on LAION-2B subset. Furthermore, we uncover a pervasive leakage risk, showing that training data membership can even be successfully inferred from the metrics of low-fidelity reconstructions. Our work introduces a practical method for CLIP inversion while offering novel insights into the nature and scope of privacy risks in multimodal models.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 1, 2025

The Price of Peeking: Anytime-Valid Leakage Detection on ML-KEM EM Traces

Side-channel evaluators routinely inspect leakage tests while acquisition is still running, and extend or stop the campaign based on what they see. Fixed-horizon screening such as the Welch t-test with threshold |t|>4.5 gives no error guarantee for this monitored decision rule. We study anytime-valid leakage detection based on testing by betting: SKIT-type swap-pair e-processes whose false-alarm probability is controlled uniformly over time under an explicit conditional symmetry null. In matched comparisons that share the frozen witness, rows and payoff, first-crossing detection needed 1.68-2.00times the traces of a fixed-horizon randomization test at 80% detection on synthetic streams, and 1.68-2.38times on degraded recordings from an open ML-KEM electromagnetic dataset with the primary Ridge witness at α=0.05. With the same primary witness and level, on undegraded reference and pqm4 recordings the monitored procedure stopped early: its median stopping point was 62-72 and 146-316 evaluation traces, i.e. 2-8% of a conservative 4096-trace budget. Under exact designed nulls on the recorded backgrounds, repeated-look |t|>4.5 screening over all 13000-20000 samples raised a false alarm in 2.7-12.9% of replicates, against 0.0-4.7% for terminal-only screening and no rejection by a sample-wise e-Bonferroni process, which in a prespecified follow-up detected natural-label associations in 4 of 4 backgrounds after 840-3288 traces. All recordings come from one device, and natural-label results are descriptive; we state the assumptions each claim requires.

Scoring Without the Engine: Validating a Deterministic, Manipulation-Resistant Content Score for Generative Engines, End to End

How do you validate a cheap, deterministic proxy for an oracle that is expensive, rate-limited, and non-stationary? We present a protocol built on adversarial falsification gates (negative control, dose response, bounded amplification, duplication penalty, length neutrality) that define and select the proxy, fitted on a training split and confirmed held-out; around them it bounds what the proxy can never resolve, and re-measures external causal evidence on the current oracle rather than assuming it. We demonstrate it end to end on Generative Engine Optimization, where the proxy is a deterministic content score, and one step fails on that domain exactly as the protocol is built to detect: re-measuring the only published causal anchors (2023 effect sizes) on ten modern engine families shows their levers move citation on none, so the anchors are an expired external check; recalibrating to the near-zero modern vector strips the score of its lever-responsive components. What survives is the gate-enforced response surface. The gates buy a measured property: on a 500-source benchmark of adversarial edits, amplifying the score's calibrated levers gains an attacker at most 6 points, and decreases with dose; single-lever amplification is provably bounded, while the cap and cross-lever sub-additivity are empirical findings consistent with it. On detection, web-spam baselines dominate and out-of-distribution attacks evade the score, so the deployable filter layers it over them. A query-conditioned skyline bounds the score's citation signal (within-query Spearman 0.11), repositioning query-agnostic scores as quality filters rather than citation predictors. A query-leakage bug in our first ranking evaluation and a failed confidence flag are disclosed and corrected; every number reproduces offline from released artifacts at zero marginal API cost.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 6

Gotcha! This Model Uses My Code! Evaluating Membership Leakage Risks in Code Models

Given large-scale source code datasets available in open-source projects and advanced large language models, recent code models have been proposed to address a series of critical software engineering tasks, such as program repair and code completion. The training data of the code models come from various sources, not only the publicly available source code, e.g., open-source projects on GitHub but also the private data such as the confidential source code from companies, which may contain sensitive information (for example, SSH keys and personal information). As a result, the use of these code models may raise new privacy concerns. In this paper, we focus on a critical yet not well-explored question on using code models: what is the risk of membership information leakage in code models? Membership information leakage refers to the risk that an attacker can infer whether a given data point is included in (i.e., a member of) the training data. To answer this question, we propose Gotcha, a novel membership inference attack method specifically for code models. We investigate the membership leakage risk of code models. Our results reveal a worrying fact that the risk of membership leakage is high: although the previous attack methods are close to random guessing, Gotcha can predict the data membership with a high true positive rate of 0.95 and a low false positive rate of 0.10. We also show that the attacker's knowledge of the victim model (e.g., the model architecture and the pre-training data) impacts the success rate of attacks. Further analysis demonstrates that changing the decoding strategy can mitigate the risk of membership leakage. This study calls for more attention to understanding the privacy of code models and developing more effective countermeasures against such attacks.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 14, 2024

From Leaky Thoughts to Private Reasoning: Controlling What LRMs Say to Themselves

Large reasoning models (LRMs) produce reasoning traces (RTs) that often contain sensitive information. These leaky thoughts are difficult to control and frequently violate explicit privacy directives. Because RTs can be exposed through prompt injection attacks, this becomes a direct privacy risk to the user. We approach this as a controllability problem: since privacy directives are themselves instructions, improving instruction-following (IF) within the RT provides a direct path to reducing privacy leaks. To this end, we introduce an SFT dataset that teaches models to follow general instructions throughout their reasoning process, and propose Staged Decoding, a simple decoding strategy that decouples RT and answer generation using separate LoRA adapters to maximize IF of each component. We evaluate our approach on six models from two families (1.7B-14B parameters), across two IF benchmarks and two privacy benchmarks. Our method yields substantial improvements, with gains of up to 20.9 points in IF and 51.9 percentage points on privacy benchmarks, though these can come at the cost of task utility due to the trade-off between reasoning performance and IF. Our results show that improving IF in LRMs can significantly enhance privacy, suggesting a promising direction for future privacy-aware LRMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2026-controllable-reasoning-models.

  • 5 authors
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May 28

Inadvertent Context Leakage in Language Models

For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data. We study whether the mere presence of such secrets in a model's context window introduces hidden correlations into the model's benign outputs, allowing reconstruction even when the model correctly refuses direct extraction. We further study whether an adversary can actively engineer prompts that amplify this effect, using the model as a covert carrier to transmit secrets through seemingly innocuous text. In both cases, this limited leakage is exploited using a novel adaptive attack that assumes black-box access to the underlying model. In controlled experiments across eight proprietary models, we find that 2-digit in-context secrets are reconstructed with near-perfect accuracy and 4-digit secrets at 82\% exact match, all from outputs the model produces in response to ordinary, non-adversarial requests. We observe that more capable models leak more: stronger instruction-following amplifies sensitivity to in-context secrets, suggesting leakage is a byproduct of capability as opposed to a patchable bug. We show this leakage enables two practical attacks: (1) a trained classifier that infers semantic predicates about user memories (e.g., health conditions, financial events) from routine natural-language outputs, and (2) an RL-trained adversary that extracts full Social Security Numbers from a production-style agent.

  • 5 authors
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Aug 19

CTAB-GAN+: Enhancing Tabular Data Synthesis

While data sharing is crucial for knowledge development, privacy concerns and strict regulation (e.g., European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)) limit its full effectiveness. Synthetic tabular data emerges as alternative to enable data sharing while fulfilling regulatory and privacy constraints. State-of-the-art tabular data synthesizers draw methodologies from Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN). As GANs improve the synthesized data increasingly resemble the real data risking to leak privacy. Differential privacy (DP) provides theoretical guarantees on privacy loss but degrades data utility. Striking the best trade-off remains yet a challenging research question. We propose CTAB-GAN+ a novel conditional tabular GAN. CTAB-GAN+ improves upon state-of-the-art by (i) adding downstream losses to conditional GANs for higher utility synthetic data in both classification and regression domains; (ii) using Wasserstein loss with gradient penalty for better training convergence; (iii) introducing novel encoders targeting mixed continuous-categorical variables and variables with unbalanced or skewed data; and (iv) training with DP stochastic gradient descent to impose strict privacy guarantees. We extensively evaluate CTAB-GAN+ on data similarity and analysis utility against state-of-the-art tabular GANs. The results show that CTAB-GAN+ synthesizes privacy-preserving data with at least 48.16% higher utility across multiple datasets and learning tasks under different privacy budgets.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 1, 2022

"I Strongly Suspect This Website Is a Scam": Benchmarking PII Leakage and Detection without Defense in Autonomous Web Agents

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as social-engineering attacks, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textsc{Scammer4U}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93\% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0\% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9\% of sessions, versus 66.1\% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2\% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

  • 8 authors
·
May 29

Uncertainty-based Debiasing and Unlearning for Decontamination

Benchmark-based evaluation is the dominant paradigm for assessing large language model (LLM) capabilities, yet data contamination inflates reported performance and undermines fair comparison. Existing decontamination methods are evaluated solely through aggregate accuracy, which can obscure substantial differences in per-sample model behaviour, and many require access to an uncontaminated model. In this paper, we propose a sample-level evaluation framework for decontamination that complements accuracy-based assessment with distributional distance metrics, measuring how closely a decontaminated model recovers the output distribution of an uncontaminated model on each sample. Building on this framework, we introduce Uncertainty-Based Decontamination (UBD), a family of methods that leverage deep ensembles of the contaminated model to estimate per-sample memorization without requiring a uncontaminated model or knowledge of which samples are contaminated. UBD estimates a per-sample correction scalar from ensemble uncertainty, which is used to construct a debiased target distribution that suppresses the inflated probability mass on correct answers induced by contamination. This target is then used either as a post-hoc output correction (debiasing) or as a soft training signal for parameter update (unlearning). Experiments on MMLU-Pro and MATH-MCQA across multiple LLM backbones demonstrate that UBD produces per-sample output distributions substantially closer to those of an uncontaminated model than paraphrasing or choice-permutation baselines, while preserving model performance on uncontaminated data.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 21

Are You Getting What You Pay For? Auditing Model Substitution in LLM APIs

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 6, 2025 2

Better Language Model Inversion by Compactly Representing Next-Token Distributions

Language model inversion seeks to recover hidden prompts using only language model outputs. This capability has implications for security and accountability in language model deployments, such as leaking private information from an API-protected language model's system message. We propose a new method -- prompt inversion from logprob sequences (PILS) -- that recovers hidden prompts by gleaning clues from the model's next-token probabilities over the course of multiple generation steps. Our method is enabled by a key insight: The vector-valued outputs of a language model occupy a low-dimensional subspace. This enables us to losslessly compress the full next-token probability distribution over multiple generation steps using a linear map, allowing more output information to be used for inversion. Our approach yields massive gains over previous state-of-the-art methods for recovering hidden prompts, achieving 2--3.5 times higher exact recovery rates across test sets, in one case increasing the recovery rate from 17% to 60%. Our method also exhibits surprisingly good generalization behavior; for instance, an inverter trained on 16 generations steps gets 5--27 points higher prompt recovery when we increase the number of steps to 32 at test time. Furthermore, we demonstrate strong performance of our method on the more challenging task of recovering hidden system messages. We also analyze the role of verbatim repetition in prompt recovery and propose a new method for cross-family model transfer for logit-based inverters. Our findings show that next-token probabilities are a considerably more vulnerable attack surface for inversion attacks than previously known.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 20, 2025 2

Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIs

Machine learning (ML) models may be deemed confidential due to their sensitive training data, commercial value, or use in security applications. Increasingly often, confidential ML models are being deployed with publicly accessible query interfaces. ML-as-a-service ("predictive analytics") systems are an example: Some allow users to train models on potentially sensitive data and charge others for access on a pay-per-query basis. The tension between model confidentiality and public access motivates our investigation of model extraction attacks. In such attacks, an adversary with black-box access, but no prior knowledge of an ML model's parameters or training data, aims to duplicate the functionality of (i.e., "steal") the model. Unlike in classical learning theory settings, ML-as-a-service offerings may accept partial feature vectors as inputs and include confidence values with predictions. Given these practices, we show simple, efficient attacks that extract target ML models with near-perfect fidelity for popular model classes including logistic regression, neural networks, and decision trees. We demonstrate these attacks against the online services of BigML and Amazon Machine Learning. We further show that the natural countermeasure of omitting confidence values from model outputs still admits potentially harmful model extraction attacks. Our results highlight the need for careful ML model deployment and new model extraction countermeasures.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 2, 2016

Evaluation data contamination in LLMs: how do we measure it and (when) does it matter?

Hampering the interpretation of benchmark scores, evaluation data contamination has become a growing concern in the evaluation of LLMs, and an active area of research studies its effects. While evaluation data contamination is easily understood intuitively, it is surprisingly difficult to define precisely which samples should be considered contaminated and, consequently, how it impacts benchmark scores. We propose that these questions should be addressed together and that contamination metrics can be assessed based on whether models benefit from the examples they mark contaminated. We propose a novel analysis method called ConTAM, and show with a large scale survey of existing and novel n-gram based contamination metrics across 13 benchmarks and 7 models from 2 different families that ConTAM can be used to better understand evaluation data contamination and its effects. We find that contamination may have a much larger effect than reported in recent LLM releases and benefits models differently at different scales. We also find that considering only the longest contaminated substring provides a better signal than considering a union of all contaminated substrings, and that doing model and benchmark specific threshold analysis greatly increases the specificity of the results. Lastly, we investigate the impact of hyperparameter choices, finding that, among other things, both using larger values of n and disregarding matches that are infrequent in the pre-training data lead to many false negatives. With ConTAM, we provide a method to empirically ground evaluation data contamination metrics in downstream effects. With our exploration, we shed light on how evaluation data contamination can impact LLMs and provide insight into the considerations important when doing contamination analysis. We end our paper by discussing these in more detail and providing concrete suggestions for future work.

  • 7 authors
·
Nov 6, 2024

The Price of Differential Privacy under Continual Observation

We study the accuracy of differentially private mechanisms in the continual release model. A continual release mechanism receives a sensitive dataset as a stream of T inputs and produces, after receiving each input, an accurate output on the obtained inputs. In contrast, a batch algorithm receives the data as one batch and produces a single output. We provide the first strong lower bounds on the error of continual release mechanisms. In particular, for two fundamental problems that are widely studied and used in the batch model, we show that the worst case error of every continual release algorithm is tilde Omega(T^{1/3}) times larger than that of the best batch algorithm. Previous work shows only a polylogarithimic (in T) gap between the worst case error achievable in these two models; further, for many problems, including the summation of binary attributes, the polylogarithmic gap is tight (Dwork et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2010). Our results show that problems closely related to summation -- specifically, those that require selecting the largest of a set of sums -- are fundamentally harder in the continual release model than in the batch model. Our lower bounds assume only that privacy holds for streams fixed in advance (the "nonadaptive" setting). However, we provide matching upper bounds that hold in a model where privacy is required even for adaptively selected streams. This model may be of independent interest.

  • 4 authors
·
Dec 1, 2021

Privacy Risk in Machine Learning: Analyzing the Connection to Overfitting

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

  • 4 authors
·
May 3, 2018

The Illusion of Reasoning: Exposing Evasive Data Contamination in LLMs via Zero-CoT Truncation

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities across a wide range of tasks, but data contamination undermines the objective evaluation of these capabilities. This problem is further exacerbated by malicious model publishers who use evasive, or indirect, contamination strategies, such as paraphrasing benchmark data to evade existing detection methods and artificially boost leaderboard performance. Current approaches struggle to reliably detect such stealthy contamination. In this work, we uncover a critical phenomenon: a model's generated reasoning steps actively mask its underlying memorization. Inspired by this, we propose the Zero-CoT Probe (ZCP), a novel black-box detection method that deliberately truncates the entire Chain-of-Thought (CoT) process to expose latent shortcut mappings. To further isolate memorization from the model's intrinsic problem-solving capabilities, ZCP compares the model's zero-CoT performance on the original benchmark against an isomorphically perturbed reference dataset. Furthermore, we introduce Contamination Confidence, a metric that quantifies both the likelihood and severity of contamination, moving beyond simple binary classifications. Extensive experiments on both previously identified contaminated models and specially fine-tuned contaminated models demonstrate that ZCP robustly detects both direct and evasive data contamination. The code for ZCP is accessible at https://github.com/Yifan-Lan/zero-cot-probe.

  • 5 authors
·
May 20 2

Investigating Data Contamination in Modern Benchmarks for Large Language Models

Recent observations have underscored a disparity between the inflated benchmark scores and the actual performance of LLMs, raising concerns about potential contamination of evaluation benchmarks. This issue is especially critical for closed-source models and certain open-source models where training data transparency is lacking. In this paper we study data contamination by proposing two methods tailored for both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We first introduce a retrieval-based system to explore potential overlaps between evaluation benchmarks and pretraining corpora. We further present a novel investigation protocol named Testset Slot Guessing (TS-Guessing), applicable to both open and proprietary models. This approach entails masking a wrong answer in a multiple-choice question and prompting the model to fill in the gap. Additionally, it involves obscuring an unlikely word in an evaluation example and asking the model to produce it. We find that certain commercial LLMs could surprisingly guess the missing option in various test sets. Specifically, in the TruthfulQA benchmark, we find that LLMs exhibit notable performance improvement when provided with additional metadata in the benchmark. Further, in the MMLU benchmark, ChatGPT and GPT-4 demonstrated an exact match rate of 52\% and 57\%, respectively, in guessing the missing options in benchmark test data. We hope these results underscore the need for more robust evaluation methodologies and benchmarks in the field.

  • 5 authors
·
Nov 16, 2023

VAR-MATH: Probing True Mathematical Reasoning in LLMS via Symbolic Multi-Instance Benchmarks

Recent advances in reinforcement learning (RL) have led to substantial improvements in the mathematical reasoning abilities of LLMs, as measured by standard benchmarks. Yet these gains often persist even when models are trained with flawed signals, such as random or inverted rewards. This raises a fundamental question: do such improvements reflect genuine reasoning, or are they merely artifacts of overfitting to benchmark-specific patterns? To answer this question, we adopt an evaluation-centric perspective and highlight two critical shortcomings in existing protocols. First, benchmark contamination arises because test problems are publicly available, thereby increasing the risk of data leakage. Second, evaluation fragility results from reliance on single-instance assessments, which are sensitive to stochastic outputs and fail to capture reasoning consistency. These limitations suggest the need for a new evaluation paradigm that can probe reasoning ability beyond memorization and one-off success. As response, we propose VAR-MATH, a symbolic evaluation framework that converts fixed numerical problems into parameterized templates and requires models to solve multiple instantiations of each. This design enforces consistency across structurally equivalent variants, mitigates contamination, and enhances robustness through bootstrapped metrics. We apply VAR-MATH to transform three popular benchmarks, AMC23, AIME24, and AIME25, into their symbolic counterparts, VAR-AMC23, VAR-AIME24, and VAR-AIME25. Experimental results show substantial performance drops for RL-trained models on these variabilized benchmarks, especially for smaller models, with average declines of 47.9\% on AMC23, 58.8\% on AIME24, and 72.9\% on AIME25. These findings indicate that some existing RL methods rely on superficial heuristics and fail to generalize beyond specific numerical forms.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 4

Phantom Gains: Auditing Self-Improvement Against a Measured Null

Whether a language model has improved itself is increasingly judged not by mean accuracy but by which individual problems it gains and loses. Tracking these transitions means differencing two noisy estimates, leaving them vulnerable to measurement artifacts. Auditing three rounds of rank-32 LoRA self-training on Qwen3-8B against a frozen control pushed through the identical pipeline, we identify seven measurement failures, each of which inverts a reported finding when its control is absent. Several are standard practice. A ledger built on a single greedy decode manufactures capability changes on an untrained model, largely an artifact of inference batching; the expansion statistic separating acquisition from sharpening assigns that same model a rate of 0.280. The natural threshold repair does not survive replication: estimated across the frozen comparisons such a design already contains, its null stays non-zero. We replace it with a per-problem exact test against a pooled baseline under false-discovery-rate control, which detects nothing on any held-out replicate and is unchanged under the multiple-testing rule, error rate and pool size. Applied to a ladder of arms matched in stream, volume and evaluation, the audit finds that external distillation improves problems the base model rarely reaches while three forms of self-training do not; a regression rejects this asymmetry as a by-product of distillation's larger overall gain (p < 10^{-8}). On the far smaller set of problems the base model never reaches, the evidence is inconclusive, while self-training corrupts problems solved at baseline at rates well above the measured floor. Transition-level auditing therefore requires a separately measured null for every statistic it reports: nulls that cost no new experiments, built from baseline replicates a multi-arm study already owns, though not from as few as most possess.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 19

CamSpokenNLI: A Pilot Resource for Cross-Variety Transfer Evaluation in Cameroon Pidgin English and Camfranglais

Cameroon Pidgin English (a West African Pidgin English variety) and Camfranglais are widely used in Cameroon, yet to our knowledge, neither has a dedicated spoken Natural Language Inference (NLI) resource. We introduce CamSpokenNLI, a pilot dataset of 114 scenario-matched spoken NLI items in each variety (228 in total), recorded by one native speaker from Buea. Each item pairs premise audio and text with a hypothesis, an NLI label, and English glosses. The author assigned labels, so the dataset is an exploratory resource rather than a mature benchmark. The NLI experiments use the reference text; the audio is evaluated separately. XLM-RoBERTa baselines with five-fold item-level cross-validation reach 44.7% on Pidgin and 46.2% on Camfranglais (chance 33.3%). Still, neither is statistically distinguishable from hypothesis-only input, so hypothesis wording may account for much of the accuracy. Under disjoint-item cross-variety transfer, where a test item's counterpart is never seen in training, accuracy is 40.1% (Pidgin to Camfranglais) and 45.6% (Camfranglais to Pidgin). A counterpart-leak audit raises this to 60-64%, illustrating how counterpart leakage can overstate transfer. Zero-shot Whisper transcription of the recordings performs poorly: the best word error rates are 66.6% for Pidgin and 45.5% for Camfranglais, and with automatic language identification, Whisper Large-v3 labels 93 of 114 Pidgin recordings as Yoruba or Swahili. Together, the results suggest that such resources need disjoint-item evaluation and hypothesis-only controls, and that speech recognition must be adapted to these varieties before spoken NLI can be tested end to end.

  • 1 authors
·
Nov 11

How Contaminated Is Your Benchmark? Quantifying Dataset Leakage in Large Language Models with Kernel Divergence

Dataset contamination, where evaluation datasets overlap with pre-training corpora, inflates performance metrics and undermines the reliability of model evaluations. Measuring dataset contamination thus becomes essential to ensure that performance evaluations genuinely reflect a model's ability to generalize to unseen data, rather than relying on memorized examples. To address this problem, we propose Kernel Divergence Score (KDS), a novel method that evaluates dataset contamination by computing the divergence between the kernel similarity matrix of sample embeddings, before and after fine-tuning on the benchmark dataset. Leveraging the insight that fine-tuning affects unseen samples more significantly than seen ones, KDS provides a reliable measure of contamination. Through extensive experiments on controlled contamination scenarios, KDS demonstrates a near-perfect correlation with contamination levels and outperforms existing baselines. Additionally, we perform comprehensive ablation studies to analyze the impact of key design choices, providing deeper insights into the components and effectiveness of KDS. These ablations highlight the importance of leveraging fine-grained kernel-based information and confirm the reliability of the proposed framework across diverse datasets and settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/kernel-divergence-score.

  • 4 authors
·
May 19, 2025

SWE-Bench+: Enhanced Coding Benchmark for LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) in Software Engineering (SE) can offer assistance for coding. To facilitate a rigorous evaluation of LLMs in practical coding contexts, Carlos et al. introduced the SWE-bench dataset, which comprises 2,294 real-world GitHub issues and their corresponding pull requests, collected from 12 widely used Python repositories. Several impressive LLM-based toolkits recently are developed and evaluated on this dataset. However, a systematic evaluation of the quality of SWE-bench remains missing. In this paper, we addressed this gap by presenting an empirical analysis of the SWE-bench dataset. We conducted a manual screening of instances where SWEAgent + GPT-4 successfully resolved issues by comparing the model-generated patches with the actual pull requests. SWE-Agent+GPT-4 was at the top of SWE-bench leaderboard during the time of our study. Our analysis reveals some critical issues with the SWE-bench dataset: 1) 32.67% of the successful patches involve cheating as the solutions were directly provided in the issue report or the comments. We refer to as solution leakage problem. 2) 31.08% of the passed patches are suspicious patches due to weak test cases, i.e., the tests were not adequate to verify the correctness of a patch. When we filtered out these problematic issues, the resolution rate of SWE-Agent+GPT-4 dropped from 12.47% to 3.97%. We also observed that the same data quality issues also exist in the two variants of SWE-bench, i.e., SWE-bench Lite and SWE-Bench Verified. In addition, over 94% of the issues were created before LLM's knowledge cutoff dates, posing potential data leakage issues.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 9, 2024

Audit tools of the trade: Automated Auditor Elicitation Can Be Sensitive to the Context the Auditor Is Given

Does providing additional context to automated AI auditors improve their effectiveness? Using the Petri tool to audit LLM coding agents, we test the impact of providing two types of resources (an external codebase and benchmark transcripts) to LLM auditors, across four auditor-target LLM pairs and three behaviours (harmful compliance, reward hacking, sycophancy). (1) External codebase: We provide the auditor LLM with a fixed, external open source codebase, which prior work finds improves the realism of synthetic audits. Providing this resource suppresses reward hacking in both auditor-target pairs whose baseline rate is above the floor (4.8 to 1.3 and 3.9 to 1.8 on Petri's default 1-10 scale); the remaining two pairs sit at the floor throughout. The suppression recurs in three of four pairs under a different scenario and resource bundle. (2) External benchmark transcripts: We provide the auditor with transcripts of the target's performance on benchmarks measuring similar behaviours, intended to inform the auditor about the target's behavioural patterns. Providing this resource raises reward hacking scores in all four pairs (from 1.7 to 6.1 in one case). However, subsequent experiments show that supplying only the related benchmark's abstract, without transcripts, also increases reward hacking, and the effect is absent under a different framing of the same behaviour. Overall, we find no consistent effect of either resource outside reward hacking, but we find substantial variability in judge-scored behaviour across conditions. Our results underscore the importance of careful piloting with tools such as Petri, as the measured rate of target behaviour is highly sensitive to configuration decisions. We hope our results inspire more research into the reliability and robustness of automated alignment auditing.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 11

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

  • 8 authors
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Aug 5 2

Auditing Machine Unlearning: A Systematic Research on Whether Models Truly Forget

Machine unlearning has been extensively studied in response to growing privacy concerns and regulatory requirements. However, auditing whether unlearning algorithms have truly erased the influence of specific data remains an open challenge. The lack of reliable and practical auditing mechanisms can lead to critical privacy risks, such as residual information leakage. This paper initiates a systematic investigation into whether existing unlearning algorithms can truly forget the designated data. We propose the first practical and general-purpose auditing framework for machine unlearning, inspired by the concept of proof of ignorance. Our framework addresses the key practicality limitations of existing methods by eliminating the need for retraining-from-scratch baselines, avoiding the training of large numbers of shadow models, and requiring no intrusive intervention in the original training process. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we first conduct validation experiments to verify its soundness and completeness. We then perform comprehensive experiments across six datasets and ten representative unlearning methods. The results demonstrate that our framework reliably distinguishes between successful and failed unlearning. In particular, we observe that retraining-based and fine-tuning-based methods can achieve effective unlearning, even when the target data remain in the original dataset. In contrast, de-optimization-based methods fail to achieve true unlearning and instead degrade the model's performance. Fisher/Hessian-based methods also fail to unlearn requested data, even formal certification is provided. Moreover, we show that our framework is robust against fake unlearning attempts and generalizes well to large language models.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 14

Revisiting Discriminative vs. Generative Classifiers: Theory and Implications

A large-scale deep model pre-trained on massive labeled or unlabeled data transfers well to downstream tasks. Linear evaluation freezes parameters in the pre-trained model and trains a linear classifier separately, which is efficient and attractive for transfer. However, little work has investigated the classifier in linear evaluation except for the default logistic regression. Inspired by the statistical efficiency of naive Bayes, the paper revisits the classical topic on discriminative vs. generative classifiers. Theoretically, the paper considers the surrogate loss instead of the zero-one loss in analyses and generalizes the classical results from binary cases to multiclass ones. We show that, under mild assumptions, multiclass naive Bayes requires O(log n) samples to approach its asymptotic error while the corresponding multiclass logistic regression requires O(n) samples, where n is the feature dimension. To establish it, we present a multiclass H-consistency bound framework and an explicit bound for logistic loss, which are of independent interests. Simulation results on a mixture of Gaussian validate our theoretical findings. Experiments on various pre-trained deep vision models show that naive Bayes consistently converges faster as the number of data increases. Besides, naive Bayes shows promise in few-shot cases and we observe the "two regimes" phenomenon in pre-trained supervised models. Our code is available at https://github.com/ML-GSAI/Revisiting-Dis-vs-Gen-Classifiers.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 5, 2023

Swing Distillation: A Privacy-Preserving Knowledge Distillation Framework

Knowledge distillation (KD) has been widely used for model compression and knowledge transfer. Typically, a big teacher model trained on sufficient data transfers knowledge to a small student model. However, despite the success of KD, little effort has been made to study whether KD leaks the training data of the teacher model. In this paper, we experimentally reveal that KD suffers from the risk of privacy leakage. To alleviate this issue, we propose a novel knowledge distillation method, swing distillation, which can effectively protect the private information of the teacher model from flowing to the student model. In our framework, the temperature coefficient is dynamically and adaptively adjusted according to the degree of private information contained in the data, rather than a predefined constant hyperparameter. It assigns different temperatures to tokens according to the likelihood that a token in a position contains private information. In addition, we inject noise into soft targets provided to the student model, in order to avoid unshielded knowledge transfer. Experiments on multiple datasets and tasks demonstrate that the proposed swing distillation can significantly reduce (by over 80% in terms of canary exposure) the risk of privacy leakage in comparison to KD with competitive or better performance. Furthermore, swing distillation is robust against the increasing privacy budget.

  • 6 authors
·
Dec 16, 2022

Transformers Don't Need LayerNorm at Inference Time: Scaling LayerNorm Removal to GPT-2 XL and the Implications for Mechanistic Interpretability

Layer-wise normalization (LN) is an essential component of virtually all transformer-based large language models. While its effects on training stability are well documented, its role at inference time is poorly understood. Additionally, LN layers hinder mechanistic interpretability by introducing additional nonlinearities and increasing the interconnectedness of individual model components. Here, we show that all LN layers can be removed from every GPT-2 model with only a small increase in validation loss (e.g. +0.03 cross-entropy loss for GPT-2 XL). Thus, LN cannot play a substantial role in language modeling. We find that the amount of fine-tuning data needed for LN removal grows sublinearly with model parameters, suggesting scaling to larger models is feasible. We release a suite of LN-free GPT-2 models on Hugging Face. Furthermore, we test interpretability techniques on LN-free models. Direct logit attribution now gives the exact direct effect of individual components, while the accuracy of attribution patching does not significantly improve. We also confirm that GPT-2's "confidence neurons" are inactive in the LN-free models. Our work clarifies the role of LN layers in language modeling, showing that GPT-2-class models can function without LN layers. We hope that our LN-free analogs of the GPT-2 family of models will enable more precise interpretability research and improve our understanding of language models.

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 3, 2025

REDACT: A Systematically Controlled Multilingual Benchmark for Personal Information Detection

Benchmark infrastructure for personally identifiable information (PII) detection remains limited: existing corpora cover few entity types, use ad hoc generation conditions, and do not show which surface conditions cause detector failures. We present REDACT, a systematically controlled multilingual PII benchmark with 13,427 records, 324,078 entity annotations, 51 entity types, 4,127 surface-form patterns, and 25 languages across 9 scripts. A strength-2 covering-array sampler controls nine generation axes: domain, format, difficulty, length, density, code-switching, language, adjacency, and co-occurrence. Three entity-level metadata fields (disclosure status, disclosure form, and a GDPR-aligned sensitivity tier) enable stratified evaluation beyond aggregate or per-type F1. From the full benchmark, we evaluate five detectors (Presidio, GLiNER, the OpenAI Privacy Filter, GPT-4.1, and Claude Sonnet 4.6) on a locked, language-stratified sample of 1,000 records. Aggregate F1 masks an architecture-dependent failure structure: the rule-based detector performs poorly on the highest-stakes data, including HIGH-sensitivity categories (recall 0.07) and non-verbatim disclosure forms, while the LLM detectors remain more robust, with the HIGH tier as their strongest sensitivity slice. A three-model reference-free LLM-as-judge assessment corroborates that sensitivity-tier assignment is the task's hardest axis. We release the benchmark, schema, prompts, and stratified evaluation harness.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 18

CEPO: RLVR Self-Distillation using Contrastive Evidence Policy Optimization

When a model produces a correct solution under reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), every token receives the same reward signal regardless of whether it was a decisive reasoning step or a grammatical filler. A natural fix is to condition the model on the correct answer as a teacher, identifying tokens it would have generated differently had it known the answer. Prior work shows this either corrupts training by leaking the answer into the gradient, or produces a weak signal that cannot distinguish decisive steps from filler, since both look equally surprising relative to the model's baseline. We propose Contrastive Evidence Policy Optimization (CEPO), which asks a sharper question at every token: not just "does the correct answer favor this token?" but "does the correct answer favor it while the wrong answer disfavors it?" A token satisfying both is a genuine reasoning step; one satisfying neither is filler. The wrong-answer teacher is constructed from rejected rollouts already in the training batch, incurring no additional sampling cost. We prove CEPO inherits all structural safety guarantees of the prior state of the art while strictly sharpening credit at decisive tokens, with the improvement vanishing exactly at filler positions. Empirically, CEPO achieves 43.43% and 60.56% average accuracy across five multimodal mathematical reasoning benchmarks at 2B and 4B scale, respectively, versus 41.17% and 57.43% for GRPO under identical training budgets. Distribution-matching self-distillation methods (OPSD, SDPO) fall below the untrained baseline, empirically confirming the information leakage our theory predicts. Our code is available at https://github.com/ahmedheakl/CEPO.

A Critical Review of Large Language Model on Software Engineering: An Example from ChatGPT and Automated Program Repair

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been gaining increasing attention and demonstrated promising performance across a variety of Software Engineering (SE) tasks, such as Automated Program Repair (APR), code summarization, and code completion. For example, ChatGPT, the latest black-box LLM, has been investigated by numerous recent research studies and has shown impressive performance in various tasks. However, there exists a potential risk of data leakage since these LLMs are usually close-sourced with unknown specific training details, e.g., pre-training datasets. In this paper, we seek to review the bug-fixing capabilities of ChatGPT on a clean APR benchmark with different research objectives. We first introduce {\benchmark}, a new benchmark with buggy and the corresponding fixed programs from competitive programming problems starting from 2023, after the training cutoff point of ChatGPT. The results on {\benchmark} show that ChatGPT is able to fix 109 out of 151 buggy programs using the basic prompt within 35 independent rounds, outperforming state-of-the-art LLMs CodeT5 and PLBART by 27.5\% and 62.4\% prediction accuracy. We also investigate the impact of three types of prompts, i.e., problem description, error feedback, and bug localization, leading to additional 34 fixed bugs. Besides, we provide additional discussion from the interactive nature of ChatGPT to illustrate the capacity of a dialog-based repair workflow with 9 additional fixed bugs. Inspired by the findings, we further pinpoint various challenges and opportunities for advanced SE study equipped with such LLMs (e.g.,~ChatGPT) in the near future. More importantly, our work calls for more research on the reevaluation of the achievements obtained by existing black-box LLMs across various SE tasks, not limited to ChatGPT on APR.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 13, 2023

Explore, Establish, Exploit: Red Teaming Language Models from Scratch

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 15, 2023 1

When the signal is in the noise: Exploiting Diffix's Sticky Noise

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 18, 2018

UnPII: Unlearning Personally Identifiable Information with Quantifiable Exposure Risk

The ever-increasing adoption of Large Language Models in critical sectors like finance, healthcare, and government raises privacy concerns regarding the handling of sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) during training. In response, regulations such as European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandate the deletion of PII upon requests, underscoring the need for reliable and cost-effective data removal solutions. Machine unlearning has emerged as a promising direction for selectively forgetting data points. However, existing unlearning techniques typically apply a uniform forgetting strategy that neither accounts for the varying privacy risks posed by different PII attributes nor reflects associated business risks. In this work, we propose UnPII, the first PII-centric unlearning approach that prioritizes forgetting based on the risk of individual or combined PII attributes. To this end, we introduce the PII risk index (PRI), a composite metric that incorporates multiple dimensions of risk factors: identifiability, sensitivity, usability, linkability, permanency, exposability, and compliancy. The PRI enables a nuanced evaluation of privacy risks associated with PII exposures and can be tailored to align with organizational privacy policies. To support realistic assessment, we systematically construct a synthetic PII dataset (e.g., 1,700 PII instances) that simulates realistic exposure scenarios. UnPII seamlessly integrates with established unlearning algorithms, such as Gradient Ascent, Negative Preference Optimization, and Direct Preference Optimization, without modifying their underlying principles. Our experimental results demonstrate that UnPII achieves the improvements of accuracy up to 11.8%, utility up to 6.3%, and generalizability up to 12.4%, respectively, while incurring a modest fine-tuning overhead of 27.5% on average during unlearning.

  • 3 authors
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Jan 4

Glasseek: A Transparent Recipe for Training and Trustworthy Evaluation of DeepSearch Agents

Deep search enables language agents to solve complex information-seeking tasks through iterative web exploration. However, developing robust open-source agents remains challenging for three reasons. First, opaque trajectory-construction pipelines make training data difficult to audit and reproduce. Second, context compression can create a substantial mismatch between training and inference. Third, agents may retrieve benchmark content from the open web during evaluation, contaminating the results and overstating their performance. To overcome these bottlenecks, we introduce Glasseek, a fully transparent deep search framework spanning the complete development lifecycle, releasing all data, model weights, training recipes, and code. Specifically, for data construction, we establish a verifiable trajectory curation pipeline that systematically generates high-quality exploration paths. For training, we propose Compaction-Managed GSPO (CM-GSPO), which uses the same policy for search and summarization while optimizing only execution sub-trajectories, enabling end-to-end search-policy training across context-compaction boundaries. For evaluation, we conduct the first systematic audit of test-set leakage in open-web agents and release a modular anti-leakage plugin that seamlessly integrates into existing evaluation harnesses. Under this rigorous evaluation protocol, our 9B agent outperforms frontier proprietary agents across almost all deep research benchmarks spanning diverse task types, and achieves the best overall performance among recent open-weight agents, setting a new state of the art at the 9B scale.

  • 17 authors
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Oct 11

When Routing Reveals Membership: Privacy Leakage from MoE Router Telemetry

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models produce routing information during inference that may be logged or exposed for monitoring, debugging, load analysis, and safety auditing. Unlike ordinary model outputs, this telemetry reveals a view of the model's internal computation, raising a privacy question: can it reveal whether an example was used to fine-tune the deployed model? We introduce a router-augmented membership inference attack that combines conventional output-side signals with aggregated routing features and applies a membership classifier learned from independently fine-tuned shadow models to the target model. Across three MoE architectures and three data domains, router telemetry consistently improves membership inference over a strong output-signal ensemble, increasing TPR at 1\% FPR by 2.7--9.4 percentage points across all nine settings. The leakage persists across full fine-tuning, frozen-router training, LoRA, and instruction tuning, and remains observable with only discrete expert selections, restricted telemetry, or a single shadow model. Mechanistic analysis further shows that the leakage does not require router-specific memorization: fine-tuning introduces membership information into hidden representations, while the router exposes a projection of this signal even when its parameters are frozen. Perturbing the telemetry reduces this additional leakage only as its fidelity degrades. Our results show that router telemetry can turn an operational signal into an additional privacy surface for fine-tuned MoE models.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 6

Towards Million-Scale Adversarial Robustness Evaluation With Stronger Individual Attacks

As deep learning models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, evaluating their vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations is essential for ensuring their reliability and trustworthiness. Over the past decade, a large number of white-box adversarial robustness evaluation methods (i.e., attacks) have been proposed, ranging from single-step to multi-step methods and from individual to ensemble methods. Despite these advances, challenges remain in conducting meaningful and comprehensive robustness evaluations, particularly when it comes to large-scale testing and ensuring evaluations reflect real-world adversarial risks. In this work, we focus on image classification models and propose a novel individual attack method, Probability Margin Attack (PMA), which defines the adversarial margin in the probability space rather than the logits space. We analyze the relationship between PMA and existing cross-entropy or logits-margin-based attacks, and show that PMA can outperform the current state-of-the-art individual methods. Building on PMA, we propose two types of ensemble attacks that balance effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, we create a million-scale dataset, CC1M, derived from the existing CC3M dataset, and use it to conduct the first million-scale white-box adversarial robustness evaluation of adversarially-trained ImageNet models. Our findings provide valuable insights into the robustness gaps between individual versus ensemble attacks and small-scale versus million-scale evaluations.

  • 5 authors
·
Nov 20, 2024

Traces of Memorisation in Large Language Models for Code

Large language models have gained significant popularity because of their ability to generate human-like text and potential applications in various fields, such as Software Engineering. Large language models for code are commonly trained on large unsanitised corpora of source code scraped from the internet. The content of these datasets is memorised and can be extracted by attackers with data extraction attacks. In this work, we explore memorisation in large language models for code and compare the rate of memorisation with large language models trained on natural language. We adopt an existing benchmark for natural language and construct a benchmark for code by identifying samples that are vulnerable to attack. We run both benchmarks against a variety of models, and perform a data extraction attack. We find that large language models for code are vulnerable to data extraction attacks, like their natural language counterparts. From the training data that was identified to be potentially extractable we were able to extract 47% from a CodeGen-Mono-16B code completion model. We also observe that models memorise more, as their parameter count grows, and that their pre-training data are also vulnerable to attack. We also find that data carriers are memorised at a higher rate than regular code or documentation and that different model architectures memorise different samples. Data leakage has severe outcomes, so we urge the research community to further investigate the extent of this phenomenon using a wider range of models and extraction techniques in order to build safeguards to mitigate this issue.

  • 3 authors
·
Dec 18, 2023

Relational Preference Encoding in Looped Transformer Internal States

We investigate how looped transformers encode human preference, training lightweight evaluator heads on frozen Ouro-2.6B loop-iteration states on Anthropic HH-RLHF. v2: an erratum is prepended; the original manuscript is unchanged. A post-publication audit found the three headline results inflated by two independent evaluation errors. The 95.2% pairwise evaluator accuracy is a canonical-ordering artifact: the data were correctly split, but the evaluator learned to prefer the first-presented argument; its strict antisymmetrized accuracy on the full 8,552-pair test set is 63.9%. The 84.5% pairwise probe and the below-chance 21.75% pointwise probe were source-item leaks (orientation rows and pair partners crossing the train/test split); corrected pair-disjoint values are 56.5% and 54.2% -- above chance, so the "inverted polarity" finding is withdrawn. The central finding survives at much smaller magnitude: preference is decoded more accurately relationally than pointwise (paired +2.3 points, 95% CI [+1.3, +3.3]), and the antisymmetrized evaluator still beats the linear probe, but no corrected readout rivals end-to-end reward models. The methodological findings stand (constant-output degeneracy, flip test, swap-protocol metric deflation), with one correction: antisymmetrized accuracy, not antisymmetry correlation, certifies relational discrimination. The two errors are mutually invisible -- a split audit cannot see an ordering prior, antisymmetrization cannot see a leak -- so both checks are required. Full audit in the follow-up work (Kirin, 2026, in preparation).

  • 1 authors
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Jul 15