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Oct 28

An Exterior Method for Nonnegative Matrix Factorization

Nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) seeks a low-rank approximation X approx UV^T with nonnegative factors and is commonly solved using interior methods that enforce feasibility throughout optimization. We show that such constraint-driven approaches can impede progress in the nonconvex landscape, leading to slow convergence or convergence to suboptimal stationary points. We propose an exterior framework for NMF (eNMF) that separates low-rank approximation from nonnegativity enforcement. Our method initializes from the optimal unconstrained factorization and introduces a rotation procedure that maps unconstrained factors to an exterior point closest to the nonnegative orthant. This viewpoint yields an algorithmic framework in which simple iterative updates converge to KKT-satisfying stationary points on the boundary of the positive orthant. The exterior formulation also enables a geometric interpretation of NMF solutions, clarifying equivalence classes of factorizations under permutation and orthogonal transformations. An intriguing numerical result, involving 400 NMF experiments across both real and synthetic datasets, show that in 99% of the cases, different algorithms tend to converge towards equivalent factor matrices. We benchmark eNMF against 9 state-of-the-art NMF algorithms with 9 initialization schemes across 3 real-world and 2 synthetic datasets. eNMF consistently outperforms all 81 competitors, achieving up to 30% lower reconstruction error under equal-time settings and up to 150% speedup under equal-error settings. The downstream experiments further demonstrate substantial performance gains in audio processing and recommendation tasks, corroborating the practical benefits of the proposed exterior optimization framework. Code is available at https://github.com/roychowdhuryresearch/eNMF

  • 5 authors
·
May 18

On-Policy Distillation with Negative-Policy Rollouts

On-policy distillation (OPD) has been widely studied as a post-training method in which a student model obtains token-level supervision from a stronger teacher on its own rollouts. Recent studies have improved OPD through alternative distillation reward formulations and teacher configurations, while the objective of distillation remains centered on mimicking the teacher. However, when a stronger teacher has limited distributional overlap with the student, such positive guidance can provide insufficient learning signals. In this work, we introduce Negative-Policy OPD (NP-OPD), which complements teacher supervision with rollouts from a lower-performing, lower-capability negative policy that serves as a negative reference for the student. Rather than modifying the distillation reward formulation, NP-OPD introduces the negative policy at the rollout stage, continuously supplying tokens preferred by the negative policy over the teacher so that they remain exposed to teacher supervision throughout training. This provides an explicit negative signal through negative-policy rollouts while preserving the positive teacher supervision used in OPD. Through extensive experiments, we show that NP-OPD improves OPD across model scales, generation modes, reasoning domains, and different OPD variants. Furthermore, our analyses show that NP-OPD effectively suppresses tokens preferred by the negative policy over the teacher and moves the student away from the negative policy. These results support our design of introducing negative signals through negative-policy rollouts and provide new insight into the role of the rollout policy in OPD. Code will be available at https://github.com/naver-ai/np-opd.

Norm Enforcement for AI Agents: Robustly Shaping Behavior in Multi-Agent Systems

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

  • 2 authors
·
Jul 6

The Agent Knew: Internal States Forecast Unauthorized Actions and Stop Them, and the Lies That Follow

Language-model agents sometimes act beyond their authorization and then misreport what they did. On CAPE-Bench, matched agent tasks in which one fact decides whether an action is authorized, frontier open-weight agents do both, and one behavior marks the lie: retroactive permission laundering, acting and then asking permission as if the action were pending, precedes a false report in 70% of 1081 fresh informed violations, against 8% otherwise (preregistered odds ratio 7.0); frontier agents on tau^2-bench instead fabricate the authorization before violating. A linear readout of the agent's residual stream forecasts the violation before the action (AUROC 0.94) and the false report before the report, and beats chain-of-thought monitors when the agent is pressured to hide its reasoning. Gating every proposed action on this forecast cuts violations over whole episodes in four model families, and sending repeated flags to an approver keeps authorized work (Gemma-4: violations 0.70 -> 0.09, completion 1.00; a model approver that escalates unclear cases keeps this gain with a person seeing 25% of asks), at about 10-8 of the agent's compute and 109 times less than a chain-of-thought monitor. On AgentDojo, an external prompt-injection benchmark, the same readout calibrated on 29 tasks, with the steering unchanged, cuts attack success on unseen tasks in two families (Gemma-4 11.7% -> 5.7%, gpt-oss 28.5% -> 17.5%) while keeping benign utility (Gemma-4 0.637 vs 0.637; gpt-oss 0.667 vs 0.681). Preventing the violation is also the most reliable way to prevent the lie (misreported violations 0.10 -> 0.01 pooled over three families, preregistered), whereas lie-specific fixes after a violation are weak. All tests are preregistered and hash-locked; code, data and the full record, including tests that did not pass, are at https://github.com/AryaFayyazi/Honesty.