Daily Papers

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) can significantly enhance reasoning abilities by directly optimizing correctness, rather than relying solely on supervised imitation. This paradigm has been extended to multimodal LLMs for complex video and image understanding tasks. However, while outcome-driven RL improves answer accuracy, it can inadvertently decouple the reasoning chain from the final answer, leading to situations where models produce inconsistency between the reasoning trace and final answer. In our experiments on multiple-choice visual question-answering tasks, the standard GRPO method yields only 79.7\% consistency on MMVU between the reasoning steps and the chosen answers, indicating frequent mismatches between answers and reasoning. To this end, we propose Answer-Consistent Reinforcement Learning (ACRE) that modifies the GRPO algorithm with an auxiliary consistency check. After the model generates a chain of thought and an initial answer for a given question, we shuffle the answer options and prompt the model again with the same reasoning trace to predict a second answer. We design a consistency-verification reward that grants a high reward only if both the original and the post-shuffle answers agree and are correct; otherwise, a lower reward is assigned accordingly. This mechanism penalizes reasoning-answer misalignment and discourages the model from relying on spurious patterns, such as option ordering biases. We evaluate ACRE on challenging Video Reasoning benchmarks and multimodal math reasoning benchmarks, achieving an average 2.2\% and 1.5\% improvement for Video Reasoning and Math Reasoning tasks over the GRPO baseline.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Reinforcement learning has recently improved the reasoning ability of Large Language Models and Multimodal LLMs, yet prevailing reward designs emphasise final-answer correctness and consequently tolerate process hallucinations--cases where models reach the right answer while misperceiving visual evidence. We address this process-level misalignment with PaLMR, a framework that aligns not only outcomes but also the reasoning process itself. PaLMR comprises two complementary components: a perception-aligned data layer that constructs process-aware reasoning data with structured pseudo-ground-truths and verifiable visual facts, and a process-aligned optimisation layer that constructs a hierarchical reward fusion scheme with a process-aware scoring function to encourage visually faithful chains-of-thought and improve training stability. Experiments on Qwen2.5-VL-7B show that our approach substantially reduces reasoning hallucinations and improves visual reasoning fidelity, achieving state-of-the-art results on HallusionBench while maintaining strong performance on MMMU, MathVista, and MathVerse. These findings indicate that PaLMR offers a principled and practical route to process-aligned multimodal reasoning, advancing the reliability and interpretability of MLLMs.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be triggered by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via steering, while safety alignment has been shown to govern the first few output tokens primarily, leaving subsequent generation unguarded. These findings motivate activation steering as a lightweight runtime defense that continuously corrects misaligned activations throughout generation. We evaluate three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coeff (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below distributional thresholds. Using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment, we evaluate under two threat models (dishonesty and dismissiveness) and two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Qwen3-32B). All methods substantially recover target traits (honesty and compassion) while preserving coherence. StTP and StMP better maintain general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) and produce less repetition in multi-turn conversations.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Emergent misalignment (EM) is the surprising tendency of language models to become broadly misaligned after fine-tuning on narrowly misaligned examples. While EM has been extensively studied in the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) setting, evidence that it also arises from reinforcement learning (RL) is limited to large, closed-source models, leaving the phenomenon expensive to study and difficult to reproduce. We characterize EM from RL in small, off-the-shelf open-weight models along three axes. First, we show that rewarding narrow, overtly misaligned behavior produces substantially higher general-domain misalignment than sample-matched SFT. Second, we show that EM from RL can be induced by reward signals that could plausibly arise naturally, such as unpopular aesthetic preferences or poor rhetorical appeals. Third, we evaluate in-training mitigations developed for SFT-induced EM and find that they broadly transfer, with preventive steering with persona vectors, interleaving safety data and inoculation prompting all performing well.

Current Large Language Models have achieved Olympiad-level logic, yet Vision-Language Models paradoxically falter on elementary spatial tasks like block counting. This capability mismatch reveals a critical ``spatial intelligence gap,'' where models fail to construct coherent 3D mental representations from 2D observations. We uncover this gap via diagnostic analyses showing the bottleneck is a missing view-consistent spatial interface rather than insufficient visual features or weak reasoning. To bridge this, we introduce 3ViewSense, a framework that grounds spatial reasoning in Orthographic Views. Drawing on engineering cognition, we propose a ``Simulate-and-Reason'' mechanism that decomposes complex scenes into canonical orthographic projections to resolve geometric ambiguities. By aligning egocentric perceptions with these allocentric references, our method facilitates explicit mental rotation and reconstruction. Empirical results on spatial reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing baselines, with consistent gains on occlusion-heavy counting and view-consistent spatial reasoning. The framework also improves the stability and consistency of spatial descriptions, offering a scalable path toward stronger spatial intelligence in multimodal systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet they struggle with spatial tasks that require mental simulation, such as mental rotation. This paper investigates whether equipping an LLM with an external ``Imagery Module'' -- a tool capable of rendering and rotating 3D models -- can bridge this gap, functioning as a ``cognitive prosthetic.'' We conducted experiments using a dual-module architecture in which a reasoning module (an MLLM) interacts with an imagery module on 3D model rotation tasks. Performance was lower than expected, with accuracy reaching at most 62.5%. Further investigation suggests that even when the burden of maintaining and manipulating a holistic 3D state is outsourced, the system still fails. This reveals that current frontier models lack the foundational visual-spatial primitives required to interface with imagery. Specifically, they lack: (1) the low-level sensitivity to extract spatial signals such as (a) depth, (b) motion, and (c) short-horizon dynamic prediction; and (2) the capacity to reason contemplatively over images, dynamically shifting visual focus and balancing imagery with symbolic and associative information.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Recent advancements in Generative Reward Models (GRMs) have demonstrated that scaling the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning considerably enhances the reliability of evaluation. However, current works predominantly rely on unstructured length scaling, ignoring the divergent efficacy of different reasoning mechanisms: Breadth-CoT (B-CoT, i.e., multi-dimensional principle coverage) and Depth-CoT (D-CoT, i.e., substantive judgment soundness). To address this, we introduce Mix-GRM, a framework that reconfigures raw rationales into structured B-CoT and D-CoT through a modular synthesis pipeline, subsequently employing Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) to internalize and optimize these mechanisms. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that Mix-GRM establishes a new state-of-the-art across five benchmarks, surpassing leading open-source RMs by an average of 8.2\%. Our results reveal a clear divergence in reasoning: B-CoT benefits subjective preference tasks, whereas D-CoT excels in objective correctness tasks. Consequently, misaligning the reasoning mechanism with the task directly degrades performance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that RLVR acts as a switching amplifier, inducing an emergent polarization where the model spontaneously allocates its reasoning style to match task demands. The synthesized data and models are released at https://huggingface.co/collections/DonJoey/mix-grm{Hugging Face}, and the code is released at https://github.com/Don-Joey/Mix-GRM{Github}.

Understanding the physical world - governed by laws of motion, spatial relations, and causality - poses a fundamental challenge for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). While recent advances such as OpenAI o3 and GPT-4o demonstrate impressive perceptual and reasoning capabilities, our investigation reveals these models struggle profoundly with visual physical reasoning, failing to grasp basic physical laws, spatial interactions, and causal effects in complex scenes. More importantly, they often fail to follow coherent reasoning chains grounded in visual evidence, especially when multiple steps are needed to arrive at the correct answer. To rigorously evaluate this capability, we introduce MVPBench, a curated benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate visual physical reasoning through the lens of visual chain-of-thought (CoT). Each example features interleaved multi-image inputs and demands not only the correct final answer but also a coherent, step-by-step reasoning path grounded in evolving visual cues. This setup mirrors how humans reason through real-world physical processes over time. To ensure fine-grained evaluation, we introduce a graph-based CoT consistency metric that verifies whether the reasoning path of model adheres to valid physical logic. Additionally, we minimize shortcut exploitation from text priors, encouraging models to rely on visual understanding. Experimental results reveal a concerning trend: even cutting-edge MLLMs exhibit poor visual reasoning accuracy and weak image-text alignment in physical domains. Surprisingly, RL-based post-training alignment - commonly believed to improve visual reasoning performance - often harms spatial reasoning, suggesting a need to rethink current fine-tuning practices.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Modern AI models are aligned through post-training to adapt them to downstream tasks. Recent work shows that fine-tuning language models on narrow tasks can induce emergent misalignment (EM), causing broadly harmful behaviors beyond the training task. However, EM has been studied almost entirely in text-only tasks, leaving its manifestation in multimodal models unclear. In this paper, we define and analyze EM in the context of vision-language models. We first induce EM via fine-tuning on narrow multimodal tasks targeting vulnerable code, careless household-object use, and conspiratorial interpretations of ordinary scenes. Across fifteen commercial and open-source models with different scales, we find that narrow multimodal fine-tuning can induce coherent and broadly misaligned behavior that transfers to unrelated tasks, including misaligned opinions, visual factual dishonesty, unsafe image generation, vulnerability to visual jailbreaks, and risky agentic actions. We further find that multimodal EM does not depend on the apparent harmfulness of training data but is sensitive to training-evaluation modality alignment. EM can arise under both supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization and can propagate through intermediate reasoning. Finally, we explore several mitigation strategies, including prompt inoculation, benign continued training, and activation-level steering, which can partially reduce EM. Overall, our findings suggest that multimodal EM reflects a behavioral shift rather than a general loss of capability, extending beyond text to the visual modality.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Reliable spatial reasoning remains a core bottleneck for vision-language models (VLMs). Existing mainstream training paradigms for spatial reasoning largely rely on outcome alignment or process imitation, lacking explicit constraints on the reasoning process, and therefore struggle to ensure genuine visual dependence and stable reasoning trajectories. In this paper, we construct a high-quality CoT dataset covering diverse spatial phenomena and diagnose the model's reasoning process, revealing two typical types of process degradation during reinforcement learning optimization: Spurious Grounding, which bypasses visual evidence, and Tail Instability, where uncertainty abnormally rises in the later stage of reasoning. To address these issues, we propose ProSR, a process-shaping optimization framework for spatial reasoning. Through a Counterfactual Invariance Penalty and a Tail Drift Penalty, ProSR extends the optimization objective from single answer correctness to two process-level dimensions: visual dependence and trajectory stability. Experiments on multiple complex and out-of-distribution spatial reasoning benchmarks show that ProSR improves answer accuracy while generating reasoning trajectories that are more stable and more dependent on visual evidence.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Recent studies empirically reveal that large reasoning models (LRMs) can automatically allocate more reasoning strengths (i.e., the number of reasoning tokens) for harder problems, exhibiting difficulty-awareness for better task performance. While this automatic reasoning strength allocation phenomenon has been widely observed, its underlying mechanism remains largely unexplored. To this end, we provide explanations for this phenomenon from the perspective of model activations. We find evidence that LRMs pre-plan the reasoning strengths in their activations even before generation, with this reasoning strength causally controlled by the magnitude of a pre-allocated directional vector. Specifically, we show that the number of reasoning tokens is predictable solely based on the question activations using linear probes, indicating that LRMs estimate the required reasoning strength in advance. We then uncover that LRMs encode this reasoning strength through a pre-allocated directional vector embedded in the activations of the model, where the vector's magnitude modulates the reasoning strength. Subtracting this vector can lead to reduced reasoning token number and performance, while adding this vector can lead to increased reasoning token number and even improved performance. We further reveal that this direction vector consistently yields positive reasoning length prediction, and it modifies the logits of end-of-reasoning token </think> to affect the reasoning length. Finally, we demonstrate two potential applications of our findings: overthinking behavior detection and enabling efficient reasoning on simple problems. Our work provides new insights into the internal mechanisms of reasoning in LRMs and offers practical tools for controlling their reasoning behaviors. Our code is available at https://github.com/AlphaLab-USTC/LRM-plans-CoT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to acquire reasoning capabilities through shared inference patterns in pre-training data, which are further elicited via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) practices. However, whether fundamental reasoning patterns, such as induction, deduction, and abduction, can be decoupled from specific problem instances remains a critical challenge for model controllability, and for shedding light on reasoning controllability. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of this problem through the lens of reasoning conflicts: an explicit tension between parametric and contextual information induced by mandating logical schemata that deviate from those expected for a target task. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs consistently prioritize sensibility over compliance, favoring task-appropriate reasoning patterns despite conflicting instructions. Notably, task accuracy is not strictly determined by sensibility, with models often maintaining high performance even when using conflicting patterns, suggesting a reliance on internalized parametric memory that increases with model size. We further demonstrate that reasoning conflicts are internally detectable, as confidence scores significantly drop during conflicting episodes. Probing experiments confirm that reasoning types are linearly encoded from middle-to-late layers, indicating the potential for activation-level controllability. Leveraging these insights, we steer models towards compliance, increasing instruction following by up to 29%. Overall, our findings establish that while LLM reasoning is anchored to concrete instances, active mechanistic interventions can effectively decouple logical schemata from data, offering a path toward improved controllability, faithfulness, and generalizability.

As AI systems built from multiple language-model agents become more common, they are increasingly used to make decisions together: discussing, negotiating, and acting on shared tasks. While individual agents may appear well-aligned when tested on their own, problems can arise from how they interact with one another. We introduce the Arbiter, an agent designed to monitor multi-agent conversations in real time and identify which participants may be behaving in misaligned ways. The Arbiter operates under a limited "inspection budget", meaning it must decide carefully how to use its resources. As it observes a conversation step by step, it can choose to wait, question a participant, examine internal information such as system prompts or reasoning traces, or log concerning behavior. At the end, it produces a report identifying the likely source of misalignment. We evaluate the Arbiter across five conversation conditions, ranging from risky financial advice model organisms to evaluation-aware and colluding agents, we test five tool configurations of increasing capability and two backbone models. We find that the Arbiter reliably detects misaligned agents well before the end of the conversation, with active inspection tools improving both detection accuracy and speed. Weight-induced misalignment proves hardest to detect, while instruction-induced misalignment is identified reliably even under passive observation. The logging tool exhibits a dual effect, improving recall at the cost of precision. These results suggest that continual, budget-aware monitoring can effectively catch misalignment, and that overseeing multi-agent systems may require treating the auditor as an active participant in the process. The code is available at https://github.com/aisilab/arbiter.

Can we trust the reasoning traces that large reasoning models (LRMs) produce? We investigate whether these traces faithfully reflect what drives model outputs, and whether models will honestly report their influence. We introduce Thought Injection, a method that injects synthetic reasoning snippets into a model's <think> trace, then measures whether the model follows the injected reasoning and acknowledges doing so. Across 45,000 samples from three LRMs, we find that injected hints reliably alter outputs, confirming that reasoning traces causally shape model behavior. However, when asked to explain their changed answers, models overwhelmingly refuse to disclose the influence: overall non-disclosure exceeds 90% for extreme hints across 30,000 follow-up samples. Instead of acknowledging the injected reasoning, models fabricate aligned-appearing but unrelated explanations. Activation analysis reveals that sycophancy- and deception-related directions are strongly activated during these fabrications, suggesting systematic patterns rather than incidental failures. Our findings reveal a gap between the reasoning LRMs follow and the reasoning they report, raising concern that aligned-appearing explanations may not be equivalent to genuine alignment.

Search agents have emerged as a pivotal paradigm for solving open-ended, knowledge-intensive reasoning tasks. However, training these agents via Reinforcement Learning (RL) faces a critical dilemma: interacting with live commercial Web APIs is prohibitively expensive, while relying on static data snapshots often introduces noise due to data misalignment. This misalignment generates corrupted reward signals that destabilize training by penalizing correct reasoning or rewarding hallucination. To address this, we propose SearchGym, a simulation environment designed to bootstrap robust search agents. SearchGym employs a rigorous generative pipeline to construct a verifiable knowledge graph and an aligned document corpus, ensuring that every reasoning task is factually grounded and strictly solvable. Building on this controllable environment, we introduce SearchGym-RL, a curriculum learning methodology that progressively optimizes agent policies through purified feedback, evolving from basic interactions to complex, long-horizon planning. Extensive experiments across the Llama and Qwen families demonstrate strong Sim-to-Real generalization. Notably, our Qwen2.5-7B-Base model trained within SearchGym surpasses the web-enhanced ASearcher baseline across nine diverse benchmarks by an average relative margin of 10.6%. Our results validate that high-fidelity simulation serves as a scalable and highly cost-effective methodology for developing capable search agents.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) promise enhanced reasoning by integrating diverse inputs such as text, vision, and audio. Yet cross-modal reasoning remains underexplored, with conflicting reports on whether added modalities help or harm performance. These inconsistencies stem from a lack of controlled evaluation frameworks and analysis of models' internals to isolate when and why modality interactions support or undermine reasoning. We address this gap through a logic-grounded evaluation framework that categorizes multimodal reasoning into six interaction patterns, varying how facts are distributed across modalities and logically combined. Empirically, additional modalities enhance reasoning only when they provide independent and sufficient reasoning paths, while redundant or chained entailment support often hurts performance. Moreover, reasoning degrades in three systematic ways: weaker modalities drag down overall performance, conflicts bias preference toward certain modalities, and joint signals from different modalities fail to be integrated effectively. Therefore, we identify two core failures: task-composition bottleneck, where recognition and reasoning cannot be jointly executed in one pass, and fusion bottleneck, where early integration introduces bias. For further investigation, we find that attention patterns fail to encode fact usefulness, but a simple two-step prompting (recognize then reason) restores performance, confirming the task-composition bottleneck. Moreover, modality identity remains recoverable in early layers, and softening attention in early fusion improves reasoning, highlighting biased fusion as another failure mode. Overall, our findings show that integration, not perception, is the main barrier to multimodal reasoning, suggesting composition-aware training and early fusion control as promising directions.

We present SpinBench, a cognitively grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating spatial reasoning in vision language models (VLMs). SpinBench is designed around the core challenge of spatial reasoning: perspective taking, the ability to reason about how scenes and object relations change under viewpoint transformation. Since perspective taking requires multiple cognitive capabilities, such as recognizing objects across views, relative positions grounding, and mentally simulating transformations, SpinBench introduces a set of fine-grained diagnostic categories. Our categories target translation, rotation, object relative pose, and viewpoint change, and are progressively structured so that single-object simpler tasks scaffold toward the most demanding multi-object perspective-taking setting. We evaluate 37 state-of-the-art VLMs, both proprietary and open source. Results reveal systematic weaknesses: strong egocentric bias, poor rotational understanding, and inconsistencies under symmetrical and syntactic reformulations. Scaling analysis shows both smooth improvements and emergent capabilities. While human subjects achieve high accuracy (91.2\%), task difficulty as measured by human response time shows strong correlation with VLM accuracy, indicating that SpinBench captures spatial reasoning challenges shared across humans and VLMs. We believe SpinBench provides critical insights into spatial reasoning in VLMs and highlights key gaps in their ability to reason about physical space. Our website can be found at https://spinbench25.github.io/.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Hybrid-thinking multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allow a single model to alternate between deliberative thinking and latency-efficient non-thinking inference. Although these modes differ in reasoning budget, their delivered responses should satisfy the same user-facing standard. Correctness alone may not characterize this response quality; we therefore evaluate task accuracy and response-pattern failures as complementary outcomes. We study this gap through response-pattern alignment: whether thinking and non-thinking interfaces preserve acceptable final-response behavior. We introduce PatternEval, a failure-enriched diagnostic benchmark comprising 2,415 multimodal prompts spanning visual perception and grounding, structured image understanding, and multimodal knowledge reasoning. PatternEval tests four recurrent failures: chain-of-thought leakage, response repetition, logical contradiction, and performative reasoning. Response-pattern failures are widespread across models from different providers, with non-thinking inference exhibiting substantially higher failure rates and thereby creating systematic misalignment between thinking and non-thinking interfaces. Motivated by this diagnosis, we develop PatternRM, a response-level reward model, and PatternRL, which introduces pattern-specific penalties during reinforcement learning. Experiments on Qwen3-VL-4B and Qwen3-VL-8B show that incorporating pattern-specific penalties into reinforcement learning can mitigate cross-mode misalignment while incurring a marginal task performance trade-off. Together, PatternEval and PatternRL provide an evaluation-and-training framework for aligning user-visible response patterns across hybrid-thinking interfaces.

Spatial reasoning is a core component of human cognition, enabling individuals to perceive, comprehend, and interact with the physical world. It relies on a nuanced understanding of spatial structures and inter-object relationships, serving as the foundation for complex reasoning and decision-making. To investigate whether current vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit similar capability, we introduce Jigsaw-Puzzles, a novel benchmark consisting of 1,100 carefully curated real-world images with high spatial complexity. Based on this dataset, we design five tasks to rigorously evaluate VLMs' spatial perception, structural understanding, and reasoning capabilities, while deliberately minimizing reliance on domain-specific knowledge to better isolate and assess the general spatial reasoning capability. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation across 24 state-of-the-art VLMs. The results show that even the strongest model, Gemini-2.5-Pro, achieves only 77.14% overall accuracy and performs particularly poorly on the Order Generation task, with only 30.00% accuracy, far below the performance exceeding 90% achieved by human participants. This persistent gap underscores the need for continued progress, positioning Jigsaw-Puzzles as a challenging and diagnostic benchmark for advancing spatial reasoning research in VLMs.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate considerable potential in various natural language tasks but face significant challenges in mathematical reasoning, particularly in executing precise, multi-step logic. However, current evaluation frameworks judge their performance solely based on accuracy, which only accounts for the final answer. This study explores these pitfalls by employing a novel evaluation framework. We propose an evaluation metric called the MAPLE score, which holistically quantifies reasoning misalignment by integrating error rates, redundancy, and validity.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Spatial reasoning is a core aspect of human intelligence that allows perception, inference and planning in 3D environments. However, current vision-language models (VLMs) struggle to maintain geometric coherence and cross-view consistency for spatial reasoning in multi-view settings. We attribute this gap to the lack of fine-grained benchmarks that isolate multi-view reasoning from single-view perception and temporal factors. To address this, we present ReMindView-Bench, a cognitively grounded benchmark for evaluating how VLMs construct, align and maintain spatial mental models across complementary viewpoints. ReMindView-Bench systematically varies viewpoint spatial pattern and query type to probe key factors of spatial cognition. Evaluations of 15 current VLMs reveals consistent failures in cross-view alignment and perspective-taking in multi-view spatial reasoning, motivating deeper analysis on the reasoning process. Explicit phase-wise analysis using LLM-as-a-judge and self-consistency prompting shows that VLMs perform well on in-frame perception but degrade sharply when integrating information across views. Implicit analysis, including linear probing and entropy dynamics, further show progressive loss of task-relevant information and uncertainty separation between correct and incorrect trajectories. These results provide a cognitively grounded diagnosis of VLM spatial reasoning and reveal how multi-view spatial mental models are formed, degraded and destabilized across reasoning phases. The ReMindView-Bench benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Xue0823/ReMindView-Bench, and the source codes of benchmark construction and VLM reasoning analysis are available at https://github.com/pittisl/ReMindView-Bench.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

While chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has substantially improved multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on complex reasoning tasks, existing approaches largely rely on long textual reasoning trajectories and provide limited mechanisms for learning stable visual attention policies. Our analysis shows that current MLLMs exhibit weak visual focus: early-stage visual misalignment is rarely corrected during subsequent reasoning, leading to error propagation and failed inferences. We argue that this limitation stems from inadequate credit assignment for visual attention during training. To address this issue, we propose SAYO, a visual reasoning model trained with a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that introduces a region-level visual attention-based reward. This reward explicitly aligns optimization signals with visually grounded reasoning steps, enabling the model to learn more reliable attention behaviors. Extensive experiments across multiple multimodal benchmarks demonstrate that SAYO consistently improves performance on diverse reasoning and perception tasks.

Reasoning lies at the heart of intelligence, shaping the ability to make decisions, draw conclusions, and generalize across domains. In artificial intelligence, as systems increasingly operate in open, uncertain, and multimodal environments, reasoning becomes essential for enabling robust and adaptive behavior. Large Multimodal Reasoning Models (LMRMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm, integrating modalities such as text, images, audio, and video to support complex reasoning capabilities and aiming to achieve comprehensive perception, precise understanding, and deep reasoning. As research advances, multimodal reasoning has rapidly evolved from modular, perception-driven pipelines to unified, language-centric frameworks that offer more coherent cross-modal understanding. While instruction tuning and reinforcement learning have improved model reasoning, significant challenges remain in omni-modal generalization, reasoning depth, and agentic behavior. To address these issues, we present a comprehensive and structured survey of multimodal reasoning research, organized around a four-stage developmental roadmap that reflects the field's shifting design philosophies and emerging capabilities. First, we review early efforts based on task-specific modules, where reasoning was implicitly embedded across stages of representation, alignment, and fusion. Next, we examine recent approaches that unify reasoning into multimodal LLMs, with advances such as Multimodal Chain-of-Thought (MCoT) and multimodal reinforcement learning enabling richer and more structured reasoning chains. Finally, drawing on empirical insights from challenging benchmarks and experimental cases of OpenAI O3 and O4-mini, we discuss the conceptual direction of native large multimodal reasoning models (N-LMRMs), which aim to support scalable, agentic, and adaptive reasoning and planning in complex, real-world environments.

Emergent misalignment can arise when a language model is fine-tuned on a narrowly scoped supervised objective: the model learns the target behavior, yet also develops undesirable out-of-domain behaviors. We investigate a mechanistic approach to preventing emergent misalignment by identifying a small set of internal features that reliably control the misaligned behavior and then discouraging the model from strengthening these features during fine-tuning. Across six fine-tuning domains, blocking (i.e., constraining) a fixed set of features achieves up to 95\% relative reduction in emergent misalignment with no degradation in model quality or target-task performance. We strengthen validity with disjoint selection/evaluation splits, multiple independent judges, multiple random seeds for key settings, quality metrics, and extensive ablations demonstrating that the reduction in misalignment is specific to the identified mechanism. We also characterize a limiting regime in which misalignment re-emerges under prolonged fine-tuning, present evidence consistent with rerouting through alternative features or layers, and evaluate modifications that partially restore the misalignment-blocking effect. Overall, our results show that targeted training-time constraints on internal mechanisms can mitigate emergent misalignment without degrading target-task performance.

The evolution of Remote Sensing Vision-Language Models(RS-VLMs) emphasizes the importance of transitioning from perception-centric recognition toward high-level deductive reasoning to enhance cognitive reliability in complex spatial tasks. However, current models often suffer from logical hallucinations, where correct answers are derived from flawed reasoning chains or rely on positional shortcuts rather than spatial logic. This decoupling undermines reliability in strategic spatial decision-making. To address this, we present GeoReason, a framework designed to synchronize internal thinking with final decisions. We first construct GeoReason-Bench, a logic-driven dataset containing 4,000 reasoning trajectories synthesized from geometric primitives and expert knowledge. We then formulate a two-stage training strategy: (1) Supervised Knowledge Initialization to equip the model with reasoning syntax and domain expertise, and (2) Consistency-Aware Reinforcement Learning to refine deductive reliability. This second stage integrates a novel Logical Consistency Reward, which penalizes logical drift via an option permutation strategy to anchor decisions in verifiable reasoning traces. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework significantly enhances the cognitive reliability and interpretability of RS-VLMs, achieving state-of-the-art performance compared to other advanced methods.

LLMs' decision-making process is opaque, prompting the need for explanation techniques like Chain-of-Thought. To investigate the relationship between answer and reasoning, we design a novel evaluation framework, MATCHA. In domains like education and healthcare, reasoning is key for model trustworthiness. MATCHA reveals that LLMs under input perturbations can give inconsistent or nonsensical reasoning. Additionally, we use LLM judges to assess reasoning robustness across models. Our results show that LLMs exhibit greater vulnerability to input perturbations for multi-step and commonsense tasks than compared to logical tasks. Also, we show non-trivial transfer rates of our successful examples to black-box models. Our evaluation framework helps to better understand LLM reasoning mechanisms and guides future models toward more robust and reasoning-driven architectures, enforcing answer-reasoning consistency.

In-context learning (ICL) can induce emergent misalignment (EM), where narrow misaligned examples alter answers to unrelated questions. Existing prompts, however, conflate harmful-text exposure with an invitation to continue assistant behavior. We hold harmful answers fixed while varying their delivery as demonstrations, evidence, assistant history, or tool output. Across ten independently sampled contexts, demonstration framing raises broad EM by 30--32 percentage points on a susceptible Gemini model; the gap survives domain exclusion, semantic clustering, unseen questions, and four prompt templates. Format and length-matched controls show that harmful content is necessary but insufficient. A role times continuation factorial further reveals model-dependent provenance effects: Gemini follows both assistant and tool histories, whereas Grok largely resists tool-framed continuation. Several other frontier and open-weight models show no gap. Blinded human audits confirm every main contrast and show that the model judge underestimates active-condition failures. Thus continuation framing is a strong, model-dependent moderator of ICL-EM, not a universal consequence of harmful context.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

While advancements in the reasoning abilities of LLMs have significantly enhanced their performance in solving mathematical problems, coding tasks, and general puzzles, their effectiveness in accurately adhering to instructions remains inconsistent, particularly with more complex directives. Our investigation identifies lazy reasoning during the thinking stage as the primary factor contributing to poor instruction adherence. To mitigate this issue, we propose a comprehensive framework designed to enable rigorous reasoning processes involving preview and self-checking, essential for satisfying strict instruction constraints. Specifically, we first generate instructions with complex constraints and apply a filtering process to obtain valid prompts, resulting in three distinct prompt datasets categorized as hard, easy, and pass. Then, we employ rejection sampling on the pass prompts to curate a small yet high-quality dataset, enabling a cold-start initialization of the model and facilitating its adaptation to effective reasoning patterns. Subsequently, we employ an entropy-preserving supervised fine-tuning (Entropy-SFT) strategy coupled with token-wise entropy-adaptive (TEA-RL) reinforcement learning guided by rule-based dense rewards. This approach encourages the model to transform its reasoning mechanism, ultimately fostering generalizable reasoning abilities that encompass preview and self-checking. Extensive experiments conducted on instruction-following benchmarks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements across various model scales. Notably, our Light-IF-32B model surpasses both larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-R1 and closed-source models like Doubao-1.6.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant improvements in contextual understanding. However, their ability to attend to truly critical information during long-context reasoning and generation still falls behind the pace. Specifically, our preliminary experiments reveal that certain distracting patterns can misdirect the model's attention during inference, and removing these patterns substantially improves reasoning accuracy and generation quality. We attribute this phenomenon to spurious correlations in the training data, which obstruct the model's capacity to infer authentic causal instruction-response relationships. This phenomenon may induce redundant reasoning processes, potentially resulting in significant inference overhead and, more critically, the generation of erroneous or suboptimal responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a two-stage framework called Learning to Focus (LeaF) leveraging intervention-based inference to disentangle confounding factors. In the first stage, LeaF employs gradient-based comparisons with an advanced teacher to automatically identify confounding tokens based on causal relationships in the training corpus. Then, in the second stage, it prunes these tokens during distillation to enact intervention, aligning the student's attention with the teacher's focus distribution on truly critical context tokens. Experimental results demonstrate that LeaF not only achieves an absolute improvement in various mathematical reasoning, code generation and multi-hop question answering benchmarks but also effectively suppresses attention to confounding tokens during inference, yielding a more interpretable and reliable reasoning model.

This paper presents ReasonFormer, a unified reasoning framework for mirroring the modular and compositional reasoning process of humans in complex decision-making. Inspired by dual-process theory in cognitive science, the representation module (automatic thinking) and reasoning modules (controlled thinking) are decoupled to capture different levels of cognition. Upon the top of the representation module, the pre-trained reasoning modules are modular and professional in specific and fundamental reasoning skills (e.g., logic, simple QA, etc). To mimic the controlled compositional thinking process, different reasoning modules are dynamically activated and composed in both parallel and cascaded manners to control what reasoning skills are activated and how deep the reasoning process will be reached to solve the current problems. The unified reasoning framework solves multiple tasks with a single model, and is trained and inferred in an end-to-end manner. Evaluated on 11 datasets requiring different reasoning skills and complexity, ReasonFormer demonstrates substantial performance boosts, revealing the compositional reasoning ability. Few-shot experiments exhibit better generalization ability by learning to compose pre-trained skills for new tasks with limited data, and decoupling the representation module and the reasoning modules. Further analysis shows the modularity of reasoning modules as different tasks activate distinct reasoning skills at different reasoning depths.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

To improve the reasoning capabilities of large language models, test-time compute is typically scaled by generating intermediate tokens before the final answer. However, this couples reasoning to autoregressive generation and thereby conflates internal computation with external communication. In contrast, human cognition can use working memory to hold and manipulate information internally without the need to externalize intermediate thoughts. Drawing on this principle, we introduce Reasoning in Memory (RiM), a latent reasoning method that replaces the autoregressive generation of reasoning steps with memory blocks. These memory blocks are fixed sequences of special tokens that unlock the working-memory capacity of large language models. Since they are fixed rather than generated, they can be processed in a single forward pass, enabling compute-efficient latent reasoning. To operationalize these memory blocks, we employ a two-stage curriculum. First, we ground them by predicting explicit reasoning steps after each memory block. Second, we discard this step-level supervision and iteratively refine the final answer after each memory block. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks show that, across language models of different families and sizes, RiM matches or exceeds existing latent reasoning methods while avoiding the autoregressive generation of thoughts. These results demonstrate that large language models can be trained to use working memory as an effective mechanism for latent reasoning.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

The mechanisms by which reasoning training reshapes LLMs' internal computations remain unclear. We study lightweight steering vectors inserted into the base model's residual stream and trained with a reinforcement-learning objective. These vectors match full fine-tuning performance while preserving the interpretability of small, additive interventions. Using logit-lens readouts and path-patching analyses on two models, we find that (i) the last-layer steering vector acts like a token-substitution bias concentrated on the first generated token, consistently boosting tokens such as "To" and "Step"; (ii) the penultimate-layer vector leaves attention patterns largely intact and instead operates through the MLP and unembedding, preferentially up-weighting process words and structure symbols; and (iii) middle layers de-emphasize non-English tokens. Next, we show that a SAE isolates features associated with correct generations. We also show that steering vectors (i) transfer to other models, (ii) combine across layers when trained in isolation, and (iii) concentrate magnitude on meaningful prompt segments under adaptive token-wise scaling. Taken together, these results deepen understanding of how trained steering vectors shape computation and should inform future work in activation engineering and the study of reasoning models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on narrowly harmful datasets can lead to misalignment broadly, a phenomenon known as emergent misalignment (EM). EM poses a challenge for AI safety and our understanding of LLMs. Prior work often frames EM as an unexpected behavior, and explains it by appealing to general misalignment directions or anthropomorphizing it as acquiring an evil persona. However, the mechanisms behind these framings remain obscure. In this work, we show that EM is a predictable and data-dependent generalization phenomenon. By examining the base model's representation of EM training data and evaluation prompts, we find that evilness after EM training is highly predictable from representational distance: the closer an evaluation prompt is to training data centroid, the more evilness it elicits from EM models after training (with an average Spearman correlation of -0.73 across 12 model-dataset settings). Building upon this analysis, we further demystify EM by showing that (1) its effectiveness changes significantly based on training data format; (2) there is not a general misalignment direction that transfers across different EM models; (3) the effect of EM is fundamentally different from persona changes. Furthermore, we extend the EM generalization metric from a scalar distance to a dataset-specific generalization direction, which robustly predicts EM models' evilness under semantics-preserving prompt perturbations including appending random tokens and paraphrasing, where other methods do not reliably generalize.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

State-of-the-art embedding models are increasingly derived from decoder-only Large Language Model (LLM) backbones adapted via contrastive learning. Given the emergence of reasoning models trained via Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), a natural question arises: do enhanced reasoning translate to superior semantic representations when these models serve as embedding initializations? Contrary to expectation, our evaluation on MTEB and BRIGHT reveals a **null effect**: embedding models initialized from RLVR-tuned backbones yield no consistent performance advantage over their base counterparts when subjected to identical training recipes. To unpack this paradox, we introduce **H**ierarchical **R**epresentation **S**imilarity **A**nalysis (HRSA), a framework that decomposes similarity across representation, geometry, and function levels. HRSA reveals that while RLVR induces irreversible latent manifold's local geometry reorganization and reversible coordinate basis drift, it preserves the global manifold geometry and linear readout. Consequently, subsequent contrastive learning drives strong alignment between base- and reasoning-initialized models, a phenomenon we term **Manifold Realignment**. Empirically, our findings suggest that unlike Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), RLVR optimizes trajectories within an existing semantic landscape rather than fundamentally restructuring the landscape itself.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

This work characterizes large language models' chain-of-thought generation as a structured trajectory through representation space. We show that mathematical reasoning traverses functionally ordered, step-specific subspaces that become increasingly separable with layer depth. This structure already exists in base models, while reasoning training primarily accelerates convergence toward termination-related subspaces rather than introducing new representational organization. While early reasoning steps follow similar trajectories, correct and incorrect solutions diverge systematically at late stages. This late-stage divergence enables mid-reasoning prediction of final-answer correctness with ROC-AUC up to 0.87. Furthermore, we introduce trajectory-based steering, an inference-time intervention framework that enables reasoning correction and length control based on derived ideal trajectories. Together, these results establish reasoning trajectories as a geometric lens for interpreting, predicting, and controlling LLM reasoning behavior.

Unified multimodal models (UMMs) have emerged as a powerful paradigm for seamlessly unifying text and image understanding and generation. However, prevailing evaluations treat these abilities in isolation, such that tasks with multimodal inputs and outputs are scored primarily through unimodal reasoning, i.e., textual benchmarks emphasize language-based reasoning, while visual benchmarks emphasize reasoning outcomes manifested in the pixels. We introduce ROVER to address this pressing need to test reciprocal cross-modal reasoning, the use of one modality to guide, verify, or refine outputs in the other, an ability central to the vision of unified multimodal intelligence. ROVER is a human-annotated benchmark that explicitly targets reciprocal cross-modal reasoning, which contains 1312 tasks grounded in 1876 images, spanning two complementary settings. Verbally-augmented reasoning for visual generation evaluates whether models can use verbal prompts and reasoning chains to guide faithful image synthesis. Visually-augmented reasoning for verbal generation evaluates whether models can generate intermediate visualizations that strengthen their own reasoning processes for question answering. Experiments on 17 unified models reveal two key findings: (i) Cross-modal reasoning determines visual generation quality, with interleaved models significantly outperforming non-interleaved ones; notably, combining strong unimodal models fails to achieve comparable reasoning. (ii) Models show dissociation between physical and symbolic reasoning: they succeed at interpreting perceptual concepts literally but fail to construct visual abstractions for symbolic tasks, where faulty reasoning harms performance. These results highlight reciprocal cross-modal reasoning as a critical frontier for enabling true omnimodal generation.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in video reasoning via Chain-of-Thought (CoT). However, the robustness of their reasoning chains remains questionable. In this paper, we identify a critical failure mode termed textual inertia, where once a textual hallucination occurs in the thinking process, models tend to blindly adhere to the erroneous text while neglecting conflicting visual evidence. To systematically investigate this, we propose the LogicGraph Perturbation Protocol that structurally injects perturbations into the reasoning chains of diverse LMMs spanning both native reasoning architectures and prompt-driven paradigms to evaluate their self-reflection capabilities. The results reveal that models successfully self-correct in less than 10% of cases and predominantly succumb to blind textual error propagation. To mitigate this, we introduce Active Visual-Context Refinement, a training-free inference paradigm which orchestrates an active visual re-grounding mechanism to enforce fine-grained verification coupled with an adaptive context refinement strategy to summarize and denoise the reasoning history. Experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly stifles hallucination propagation and enhances reasoning robustness.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

Significant advancements in the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are now driven by test-time scaling laws, particularly those leveraging extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. Inspired by these breakthroughs, researchers have extended these paradigms to Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). However, a critical limitation emerges: as their reasoning chains extend, LMMs increasingly rely on textual logic, progressively losing grounding in the underlying visual information. This leads to reasoning paths that diverge from the image content, culminating in erroneous conclusions. To address this, we introduce a strikingly simple yet effective training-free visual-reasoning pipeline. The core concept is to decouple the reasoning and perception processes. A powerful LLM orchestrates the high-level reasoning, strategically interrogating a LMM to extract specific visual information required for its logical chain. The LMM, in turn, functions exclusively as a visual question-answering engine, supplying the necessary perceptual details on demand. This lightweight, plug-and-play approach requires no additional training or architectural changes. Comprehensive evaluations validate that our framework effectively governs the visual reasoning process, leading to a significant reduction in visually-unfounded reasoning steps and a substantial improvement in reasoning fidelity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning capabilities, achieving impressive results across a wide range of tasks. Despite these advances, significant reasoning failures persist, occurring even in seemingly simple scenarios. To systematically understand and address these shortcomings, we present the first comprehensive survey dedicated to reasoning failures in LLMs. We introduce a novel categorization framework that distinguishes reasoning into embodied and non-embodied types, with the latter further subdivided into informal (intuitive) and formal (logical) reasoning. In parallel, we classify reasoning failures along a complementary axis into three types: fundamental failures intrinsic to LLM architectures that broadly affect downstream tasks; application-specific limitations that manifest in particular domains; and robustness issues characterized by inconsistent performance across minor variations. For each reasoning failure, we provide a clear definition, analyze existing studies, explore root causes, and present mitigation strategies. By unifying fragmented research efforts, our survey provides a structured perspective on systemic weaknesses in LLM reasoning, offering valuable insights and guiding future research towards building stronger, more reliable, and robust reasoning capabilities. We additionally release a comprehensive collection of research works on LLM reasoning failures, as a GitHub repository at https://github.com/Peiyang-Song/Awesome-LLM-Reasoning-Failures, to provide an easy entry point to this area.

Spatial cognition is essential for human intelligence, enabling problem-solving through visual simulations rather than solely relying on verbal reasoning. However, existing AI benchmarks primarily assess verbal reasoning, neglecting the complexities of non-verbal, multi-step visual simulation. We introduce STARE(Spatial Transformations and Reasoning Evaluation), a benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate multimodal large language models on tasks better solved through multi-step visual simulation. STARE features 4K tasks spanning foundational geometric transformations (2D and 3D), integrated spatial reasoning (cube net folding and tangram puzzles), and real-world spatial reasoning (perspective and temporal reasoning), reflecting practical cognitive challenges like object assembly, mechanical diagram interpretation, and everyday spatial navigation. Our evaluations show that models excel at reasoning over simpler 2D transformations, but perform close to random chance on more complex tasks like 3D cube net folding and tangram puzzles that require multi-step visual simulations. Humans achieve near-perfect accuracy but take considerable time (up to 28.9s) on complex tasks, significantly speeding up (down by 7.5 seconds on average) with intermediate visual simulations. In contrast, models exhibit inconsistent performance gains from visual simulations, improving on most tasks but declining in specific cases like tangram puzzles (GPT-4o, o1) and cube net folding (Claude-3.5, Gemini-2.0 Flash), indicating that models may not know how to effectively leverage intermediate visual information.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show strong visual perception, yet remain limited in reasoning about space under changing viewpoints. We study this challenge as Perspective-Conditioned Spatial Reasoning (PCSR) in 360-degree omnidirectional images, where broad scene coverage reduces ambiguity from partial observations without eliminating the need for viewpoint-dependent inference. To assess this capability, we introduce PCSR-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark of 84,373 question-answer pairs from 2,600 omnidirectional images across 26 indoor environments. PCSR-Bench contains eight tasks spanning foundational perception (e.g., object counting, relative distance, and relative direction) and advanced PCSR, including compositional chains, egocentric rotation, perspective re-anchoring, ego-distortion, and limited-FOV visibility. We evaluate 14 representative MLLMs and observe a substantial perception-reasoning gap: accuracy reaches 57.59% on foundational relative direction, but drops to 13.49% on egocentric rotation, 7.13% on egocentric distortion, and 0.64% on open-ended compositional reasoning. To probe the plasticity of this gap, we conduct an RL-based diagnostic study on a 7B-scale model. Reward shaping improves a matched 7B baseline from 31.10% to 60.06% under a controlled setting, suggesting that PCSR is partial plasticity rather than being fully immutable. Still, the gains are task-selective, sensitive to reward design including both weight allocation and reward formulation, and partially dependent on the evaluation protocol. These results position PCSR as a key bottleneck in current MLLMs and highlight limited but meaningful room for recovery under targeted optimization.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Spatial intelligence remains a persistent challenge for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), as it requires coherent spatial scene representations beyond basic object recognition. Existing methods typically build such representations through textual reasoning or 3D reconstruction. However, they often falter during multi-step reasoning, particularly when required to dynamically re-anchor evidence to the specific camera-, object-, or direction-centric reference frames demanded by complex queries. To address this, we propose OmniView-Space, a framework designed to maintain spatial consistency through multimodal egocentric evidence. Our approach consists of three core components: (1) Multi-Perspective Spatial Mapping (MPSM), which re-anchors reconstructed geometry into a query-aligned visual cognitive map and a textual spatial graph; (2) Tool-Guided Egocentric Reasoning, an interleaved policy trained to actively select the ego anchor required by the query and request the corresponding MPSM evidence; and (3) Cognitive-Map Distillation, which uses MPSM-generated trajectories and ego-frame rewards to train the model to reason with self-generated cognitive maps. Experiments on single- and multi-image spatial reasoning benchmarks show that OmniView-Space achieves state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, the distilled model maintains this performance while reducing reliance on external geometry pipelines.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Despite notable advancements in multimodal reasoning, leading Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) still underperform on vision-centric multimodal reasoning tasks in general scenarios. This shortfall stems from their predominant reliance on logic- and knowledge-based slow thinking strategies, while effective for domains like math and science, fail to integrate visual information effectively during reasoning. Consequently, these models often fail to adequately ground visual cues, resulting in suboptimal performance in tasks that require multiple plausible visual interpretations and inferences. To address this, we present GThinker (General Thinker), a novel reasoning MLLM excelling in multimodal reasoning across general scenarios, mathematics, and science. GThinker introduces Cue-Rethinking, a flexible reasoning pattern that grounds inferences in visual cues and iteratively reinterprets these cues to resolve inconsistencies. Building on this pattern, we further propose a two-stage training pipeline, including pattern-guided cold start and incentive reinforcement learning, designed to enable multimodal reasoning capabilities across domains. Furthermore, to support the training, we construct GThinker-11K, comprising 7K high-quality, iteratively-annotated reasoning paths and 4K curated reinforcement learning samples, filling the data gap toward general multimodal reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GThinker achieves 81.5% on the challenging comprehensive multimodal reasoning benchmark M^3CoT, surpassing the latest O4-mini model. It also shows an average improvement of 2.1% on general scenario multimodal reasoning benchmarks, while maintaining on-par performance in mathematical reasoning compared to counterpart advanced reasoning models. The code, model, and data will be released soon at https://github.com/jefferyZhan/GThinker.

Human cognition, driven by complex neurochemical processes, oscillates between imagination and reality and learns to self-correct whenever such subtle drifts lead to hallucinations or unsafe associations. In recent years, LLMs have demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide range of tasks. However, they still lack human cognition to balance factuality and safety. Bearing the resemblance, we argue that both factual and safety failures in LLMs arise from a representational misalignment in their latent activation space, rather than addressing those as entirely separate alignment issues. We hypothesize that an external network, trained to understand the fluctuations, can selectively intervene in the model to regulate falsehood into truthfulness and unsafe output into safe output without fine-tuning the model parameters themselves. Reflecting the hypothesis, we propose ARREST (Adversarial Resilient Regulation Enhancing Safety and Truth), a unified framework that identifies and corrects drifted features, engaging both soft and hard refusals in addition to factual corrections. Our empirical results show that ARREST not only regulates misalignment but is also more versatile compared to the RLHF-aligned models in generating soft refusals due to adversarial training. We make our codebase available at https://github.com/sharanya-dasgupta001/ARREST.

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

Multimodal symbolic logical reasoning, which aims to deduce new facts from multimodal input via formal logic, is critical in high-stakes applications such as autonomous driving and medical diagnosis, as its rigorous, deterministic reasoning helps prevent serious consequences. To evaluate such capabilities of current state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), we introduce the first benchmark MuSLR for multimodal symbolic logical reasoning grounded in formal logical rules. MuSLR comprises 1,093 instances across 7 domains, including 35 atomic symbolic logic and 976 logical combinations, with reasoning depths ranging from 2 to 9. We evaluate 7 state-of-the-art VLMs on MuSLR and find that they all struggle with multimodal symbolic reasoning, with the best model, GPT-4.1, achieving only 46.8%. Thus, we propose LogiCAM, a modular framework that applies formal logical rules to multimodal inputs, boosting GPT-4.1's Chain-of-Thought performance by 14.13%, and delivering even larger gains on complex logics such as first-order logic. We also conduct a comprehensive error analysis, showing that around 70% of failures stem from logical misalignment between modalities, offering key insights to guide future improvements. All data and code are publicly available at https://llm-symbol.github.io/MuSLR.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve high performance on standard mathematical benchmarks, their underlying reasoning processes remain highly overfit to standard textual formatting. We propose a perturbation pipeline consisting of 14 techniques to evaluate robustness of LLM reasoning. We apply this pipeline to AIME 2024 dataset and evalute 8 state-of-the-art models on the resulting benchmark. While frontier models exhibit resilience, open weights reasoning models suffer catastrophic collapses (up to 55% average accuracy drops across perturbations and up to 100% on some), exposing structural fragility. To further disentangle mechanical parsing failures from downstream reasoning failures, we strictly isolate the models' working memory capacity by forcing models to solve multiple unperturbed mathematical problems sequentially within a single context window. Our results indicate that open weight models ranging from 7B to 120B parameters and Claude Opus 4.6 exhibit accuracy decay on subsequent problems. This degradation demonstrates that intermediate reasoning steps permanently pollute standard dense attention mechanisms. We argue that to achieve reliable reasoning, future reasoning architectures must integrate explicit contextual resets within a model's own Chain-of-Thought, leading to fundamental open questions regarding the optimal granularity of atomic reasoning tasks.

Visual reasoning models (VRMs) have recently shown strong cross-modal reasoning capabilities by integrating visual perception with language reasoning. However, they often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long reasoning chains for any tasks. We attribute this issue to Reasoning Path Redundancy in visual reasoning: many visual questions do not require the full reasoning process. To address this, we propose AVR, an adaptive visual reasoning framework that decomposes visual reasoning into three cognitive functions: visual perception, logical reasoning, and answer application. It further enables models to dynamically choose among three response formats: Full Format, Perception-Only Format, and Direct Answer. AVR is trained with FS-GRPO, an adaptation of Group Relative Policy Optimization that encourages the model to select the most efficient reasoning format while preserving correctness. Experiments on multiple vision-language benchmarks show that AVR reduces token usage by 50--90\% while maintaining overall accuracy, especially in perception-intensive tasks. These results demonstrate that adaptive visual reasoning can effectively mitigate overthinking in VRMs. Code and data are available at: https://github.com/RunRiotComeOn/AVR.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Large multimodal reasoning models (LMRMs) are getting increasingly capable, primarily through generating explicit chain-of-thought reasoning before answering. In language models it has been observed that this performance often comes with sycophancy, the tendency of a model to agree with the user over the evidence. However, for LMRMs no reliable method to measure sycophancy yet exists. We bridge this gap by introducing a benchmark and dataset for evaluating LMRM sycophancy when confronted with a wrong answer from a user. Our benchmark pairs four visually grounded datasets spanning mathematical, clinical, temporal, and demographic reasoning with five pressure conditions in single-turn and multi-turn settings. We evaluate sycophancy in the final answer as well as its emergence within the reasoning chain. We find that sycophancy is prevalent under pressure, with Statement pressure eliciting the highest rates and Conviction the lowest for all models except Mistral-Small-4, and under multi-turn pressure reasoning-level sycophancy intensifies sharply in clinical visual judgement, reaching 95.7% for the most affected model. We further introduce a failure taxonomy separating reasoning-chain from answer-level sycophancy, and a complementary sentence-level taxonomy locating where in the chain drift first emerges. Our results show that sycophancy can corrupt the reasoning chain independently of the final answer, so answer-level evaluation alone is insufficient.

Spatial reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, yet it remains a major challenge for contemporary vision-language models (VLMs). Prior work largely relied on synthetic or LLM-generated environments with limited task designs and puzzle-like setups, failing to capture the real-world complexity, visual noise, and diverse spatial relationships that VLMs encounter. To address this, we introduce SpatiaLab, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating VLMs' spatial reasoning in realistic, unconstrained contexts. SpatiaLab comprises 1,400 visual question-answer pairs across six major categories: Relative Positioning, Depth & Occlusion, Orientation, Size & Scale, Spatial Navigation, and 3D Geometry, each with five subcategories, yielding 30 distinct task types. Each subcategory contains at least 25 questions, and each main category includes at least 200 questions, supporting both multiple-choice and open-ended evaluation. Experiments across diverse state-of-the-art VLMs, including open- and closed-source models, reasoning-focused, and specialized spatial reasoning models, reveal a substantial gap in spatial reasoning capabilities compared with humans. In the multiple-choice setup, InternVL3.5-72B achieves 54.93% accuracy versus 87.57% for humans. In the open-ended setting, all models show a performance drop of around 10-25%, with GPT-5-mini scoring highest at 40.93% versus 64.93% for humans. These results highlight key limitations in handling complex spatial relationships, depth perception, navigation, and 3D geometry. By providing a diverse, real-world evaluation framework, SpatiaLab exposes critical challenges and opportunities for advancing VLMs' spatial reasoning, offering a benchmark to guide future research toward robust, human-aligned spatial understanding. SpatiaLab is available at: https://spatialab-reasoning.github.io/.

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to the development of thinking language models that generate extensive internal reasoning chains before producing responses. While these models achieve improved performance, controlling their reasoning processes remains challenging. This work presents a steering approach for thinking LLMs by analyzing and manipulating specific reasoning behaviors in DeepSeek-R1-Distill models. Through a systematic experiment on 500 tasks across 10 diverse categories, we identify several reasoning behaviors exhibited by thinking models, including expressing uncertainty, generating examples for hypothesis validation, and backtracking in reasoning chains. We demonstrate that these behaviors are mediated by linear directions in the model's activation space and can be controlled using steering vectors. By extracting and applying these vectors, we provide a method to modulate specific aspects of the model's reasoning process, such as its tendency to backtrack or express uncertainty. Our approach offers practical tools for steering reasoning processes in thinking models in a controlled and interpretable manner. We validate our steering method using three DeepSeek-R1-Distill models, demonstrating consistent control across different model architectures.

This paper explores multi-turn visual reasoning and observes that MLLMs repeatedly fail to localize the target, leading to long, redundant trajectories. We attribute this failure to the entanglement of reasoning and perception within a single model, the MLLM reasons and localizes simultaneously, and inaccurate localization triggers additional reasoning turns that bloat the trajectory. To solve this problem, we propose PixelEyes, a multi-turn visual reasoning agent that explicitly decouples reasoning from perception, i.e., the reasoner decides what to look for, while a specialized perception tool answers where it is. Specifically, PixelEyes introduces 1) Mask-guided Visual Search. A referring segmentation model is invoked to provide mask-precise localization, freeing the reasoner from the need to compensate for imprecise grounding. 2) Semantic-region Breadth-first Search (BFS). To eliminate redundant loops caused by repeatedly cropping incorrect sub-regions, we organize exploration as a breadth-first search over semantic regions. To internalize these capabilities, we construct the PixelEyes-6K dataset by resynthesizing expert trajectories from existing data. This explicitly embeds our mask-guided search and BFS logic into the model. We further introduce Pinpoint-Bench, a zero-hint visual search benchmark, i.e., no location cues are provided in the question, with instance-level masks and bounding boxes that separate localization failures from reasoning failures, enabling fine-grained analysis of failure modes such as inattentional blindness. Recent state-of-the-art MLLMs and visual reasoning agents leave large headroom on Pinpoint-Bench, demonstrating its quality and difficulty. Code and models are open-sourced.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency on general-purpose vision-language benchmarks, reaching or even exceeding human-level performance. However, these evaluations typically rely on standard in-distribution data, leaving the robustness of MLLMs largely unexamined when faced with scenarios that defy common-sense priors. To address this gap, we introduce VIA-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to probe model performance on visual illusions and anomalies. It includes six core categories: color illusions, motion illusions, gestalt illusions, geometric and spatial illusions, general visual illusions, and visual anomalies. Through careful human-in-the-loop review, we construct over 1K high-quality question-answer pairs that require nuanced visual reasoning. Extensive evaluation of over 20 state-of-the-art MLLMs, including proprietary, open-source, and reasoning-enhanced models, uncovers significant vulnerabilities. Notably, we find that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers negligible robustness, often yielding ``brittle mirages'' where the model's logic collapses under illusory stimuli. Our findings reveal a fundamental divergence between machine and human perception, suggesting that resolving such perceptual bottlenecks is critical for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. The benchmark data and code will be released.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to provide helpful and harmless responses, yet they often exhibit sycophancy--conforming to user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy or ethical soundness. Prior research on sycophancy has primarily focused on single-turn factual correctness, overlooking the dynamics of real-world interactions. In this work, we introduce SYCON Bench, a novel benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in multi-turn, free-form conversational settings. Our benchmark measures how quickly a model conforms to the user (Turn of Flip) and how frequently it shifts its stance under sustained user pressure (Number of Flip). Applying SYCON Bench to 17 LLMs across three real-world scenarios, we find that sycophancy remains a prevalent failure mode. Our analysis shows that alignment tuning amplifies sycophantic behavior, whereas model scaling and reasoning optimization strengthen the model's ability to resist undesirable user views. Reasoning models generally outperform instruction-tuned models but often fail when they over-index on logical exposition instead of directly addressing the user's underlying beliefs. Finally, we evaluate four additional prompting strategies and demonstrate that adopting a third-person perspective reduces sycophancy by up to 63.8% in debate scenario. We release our code and data at https://github.com/JiseungHong/SYCON-Bench.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) excel in multimodal reasoning and have shown impressive performance on various multimodal benchmarks. However, most of these benchmarks evaluate models primarily through multiple-choice or short-answer formats, which do not take the reasoning process into account. Although some benchmarks assess the reasoning process, their methods are often overly simplistic and only examine reasoning when answers are incorrect. This approach overlooks scenarios where flawed reasoning leads to correct answers. In addition, these benchmarks do not consider the impact of intermodal relationships on reasoning. To address this issue, we propose the Reasoning Process Tree Score (RPTS), a tree structure-based metric to assess reasoning processes. Specifically, we organize the reasoning steps into a reasoning tree and leverage its hierarchical information to assign weighted faithfulness scores to each reasoning step. By dynamically adjusting these weights, RPTS not only evaluates the overall correctness of the reasoning, but also pinpoints where the model fails in the reasoning. To validate RPTS in real-world multimodal scenarios, we construct a new benchmark, RPTS-Eval, comprising 374 images and 390 reasoning instances. Each instance includes reliable visual-textual clues that serve as leaf nodes of the reasoning tree. Furthermore, we define three types of intermodal relationships to investigate how intermodal interactions influence the reasoning process. We evaluated representative LVLMs (e.g., GPT4o, Llava-Next), uncovering their limitations in multimodal reasoning and highlighting the differences between open-source and closed-source commercial LVLMs. We believe that this benchmark will contribute to the advancement of research in the field of multimodal reasoning.

Recent advances in large multimodal models suggest that explicit reasoning mechanisms play a critical role in improving model reliability, interpretability, and cross-modal alignment. While such reasoning-centric approaches have been proven effective in language and vision tasks, their extension to 3D remains underdeveloped. CoRe3D introduces a unified 3D understanding and generation reasoning framework that jointly operates over semantic and spatial abstractions, enabling high-level intent inferred from language to directly guide low-level 3D content formation. Central to this design is a spatially grounded reasoning representation that decomposes 3D latent space into localized regions, allowing the model to reason over geometry in a compositional and procedural manner. By tightly coupling semantic chain-of-thought inference with structured spatial reasoning, CoRe3D produces 3D outputs that exhibit strong local consistency and faithful alignment with linguistic descriptions.

Visual mathematical reasoning, as a fundamental visual reasoning ability, has received widespread attention from the Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) community. Existing benchmarks, such as MathVista and MathVerse, focus more on the result-oriented performance but neglect the underlying principles in knowledge acquisition and generalization. Inspired by human-like mathematical reasoning, we introduce WE-MATH, the first benchmark specifically designed to explore the problem-solving principles beyond end-to-end performance. We meticulously collect and categorize 6.5K visual math problems, spanning 67 hierarchical knowledge concepts and five layers of knowledge granularity. We decompose composite problems into sub-problems according to the required knowledge concepts and introduce a novel four-dimensional metric, namely Insufficient Knowledge (IK), Inadequate Generalization (IG), Complete Mastery (CM), and Rote Memorization (RM), to hierarchically assess inherent issues in LMMs' reasoning process. With WE-MATH, we conduct a thorough evaluation of existing LMMs in visual mathematical reasoning and reveal a negative correlation between solving steps and problem-specific performance. We confirm the IK issue of LMMs can be effectively improved via knowledge augmentation strategies. More notably, the primary challenge of GPT-4o has significantly transitioned from IK to IG, establishing it as the first LMM advancing towards the knowledge generalization stage. In contrast, other LMMs exhibit a marked inclination towards Rote Memorization - they correctly solve composite problems involving multiple knowledge concepts yet fail to answer sub-problems. We anticipate that WE-MATH will open new pathways for advancements in visual mathematical reasoning for LMMs. The WE-MATH data and evaluation code are available at https://github.com/We-Math/We-Math.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress in complex problem-solving tasks. Despite this success, LRMs typically suffer from high computational costs during deployment, highlighting a need for efficient inference. A practical direction of efficiency improvement is to switch the LRM between thinking and non-thinking modes dynamically. However, such approaches often introduce additional reasoning errors and lack statistical guarantees for the performance loss, which are critical for high-stakes applications. In this work, we propose Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) reasoning that controls the performance loss under the user-specified tolerance. Specifically, we construct an upper confidence bound on the performance loss and determine a threshold for switching to the non-thinking model. Theoretically, using the threshold to switch between the thinking and non-thinking modes ensures bounded performance loss in a distribution-free manner. Our comprehensive experiments on reasoning benchmarks show that the proposed method can save computational budgets and control the user-specified performance loss.

How does irrelevant information (i.e., distractors) affect test-time scaling in vision-language models (VLMs)? Prior work on text-only language models has shown that textual distractors can intensify inverse scaling, causing models to reason longer but less effective reasoning traces. In this work, we investigate whether similar phenomena arise in multimodal settings. We introduce Idis (Images with distractors), a visual question-answering dataset that systematically varies distractors along semantic and numerical dimensions. Our analyses reveal that visual distractors affect reasoning VLMs in a fundamentally different way from textual distractors: although inverse scaling still emerges, visual distractors reduce accuracy without increasing reasoning length. We further show that attribute counts extracted from reasoning traces provide key insights into how distractors interact with reasoning length and accuracy. As a sanity check, we propose a simple prompting strategy that mitigates distractor-driven predictions in reasoning vision-language models.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet they often suffer from overthinking, expending redundant computational steps on simple problems, or underthinking, failing to explore sufficient reasoning paths despite inherent capabilities. These issues lead to inefficiencies and potential inaccuracies, limiting practical deployment in resource-constrained settings. Existing methods to mitigate overthinking, such as suppressing reflective keywords or adjusting reasoning length, may inadvertently induce underthinking, compromising accuracy. Therefore, we propose ReBalance, a training-free framework that achieves efficient reasoning with balanced thinking. ReBalance leverages confidence as a continuous indicator of reasoning dynamics, identifying overthinking through high confidence variance and underthinking via consistent overconfidence. By aggregating hidden states from a small-scale dataset into reasoning mode prototypes, we compute a steering vector to guide LRMs' reasoning trajectories. A dynamic control function modulates this vector's strength and direction based on real-time confidence, pruning redundancy during overthinking, and promoting exploration during underthinking. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 0.5B to 32B, and across nine benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that ReBalance effectively reduces output redundancy while improving accuracy, offering a general, training-free, and plug-and-play strategy for efficient and robust LRM deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/ReBalance .

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Localized Representation Steering (LRS) is widely used to correct reasoning pathologies in large language models. However, standard benchmark evaluations can easily be fooled by superficial label overrides, creating a false impression of reasoning circuit repairs. In this work, we propose Cross-Rule Transfer (CRT), a diagnostic framework that audits representational interventions by evaluating them on rule families where the model is natively competent. Evaluating late-layer LRS for a widespread logical failure, contradiction blindness, reveals that the intervention merely injects a global label bias: applying the steering vector to rules the model already handles correctly (99.6% baseline) degrades performance to 40.4% by forcing false contradiction predictions. We support this diagnosis with four complementary controls (direct logit bias equivalence, control vector label-flipping, cross-model grafting, and early-layer steering checks), providing a rigorous methodology to distinguish genuine reasoning repairs from superficial label overrides.

While reasoning-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in complex tasks such as mathematics and coding, their effectiveness across universal multimodal scenarios remains uncertain. The trend of releasing parallel "Instruct" and "Thinking" models by leading developers serves merely as a resource-intensive workaround, stemming from the lack of a criterion for determining when reasoning is truly beneficial. In this paper, we propose Dual Tuning, a framework designed to assess whether reasoning yields positive gains for target tasks under given base models and datasets. By jointly fine-tuning on paired Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Direct-Answer (DA) data under controlled prompts, we systematically quantify and compare the gains of both training modes using the proposed metrics, and establish the "Thinking Boundary" to evaluate the suitability of reasoning training across diverse multimodal tasks, including spatial, mathematical, and multi-disciplinary domains. We further explore the impact of reinforcement training and thinking patterns on reasoning suitability, and validate whether the "Thinking Boundary" can guide data refinement. Our findings challenge the "reasoning-for-all" paradigm, providing practical guidance for identifying appropriate data and training strategies, and motivating the development of resource-efficient, adaptive auto-think systems.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Recent progress in Vision Language Models (VLMs) has raised the question of whether they can reliably perform nonverbal reasoning. To this end, we introduce VRIQ (Visual Reasoning IQ), a novel benchmark designed to assess and analyze the visual reasoning ability of VLMs. We evaluate models on two sets of tasks: abstract puzzle-style and natural-image reasoning tasks. We find that on abstract puzzles, performance remains near random with an average accuracy of around 28%, while natural tasks yield better but still weak results with 45% accuracy. We also find that tool-augmented reasoning demonstrates only modest improvements. To uncover the source of this weakness, we introduce diagnostic probes targeting perception and reasoning. Our analysis demonstrates that around 56% of failures arise from perception alone, 43% from both perception and reasoning, and only a mere 1% from reasoning alone. This motivates us to design fine-grained diagnostic probe questions targeting specific perception categories (e.g., shape, count, position, 3D/depth), revealing that certain categories cause more failures than others. Our benchmark and analysis establish that current VLMs, even with visual reasoning tools, remain unreliable abstract reasoners, mostly due to perception limitations, and offer a principled basis for improving visual reasoning in multimodal systems.