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Oct 7

CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement

Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the resulting defenses may struggle against adaptive attacks. We combine adaptive attacker-defender co-training with subsequent refinement: continued interaction improves both roles, while learned attackers provide training challenges for further gains in defender safety and task utility. We therefore model adaptive IPI as a general-sum Markov game: the defender advances the task through successive tool calls, while the attacker can inject multiple times within the same task and adapt subsequent attacks to the defender's responses. Building on this formulation, we propose CoER, a verifier-grounded co-evolution and refinement framework. After initializing the attacker from successful trajectories, Co-PPO retains historical policies from both roles as opponent populations and mixes current and historical opponents for bilateral reinforcement learning, extending training beyond the latest matchup. Attackers from these populations are then reused to challenge teacher agents, and only demonstrations verified for both safety and task completion are used to fine-tune the co-evolved defender. In our main seven-domain evaluation, CoER reduces observed overall attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% and raises task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%, with improved attack resistance on external benchmarks.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 14

Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.